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Preface 
 
This thesis is a study of three philosophical formations in the long and col-
ourful history of melancholy as a cultural notion. For nearly two millennia 
the notion of melancholy helped to shape, organize, explain, focus and ren-
der manageable the encounter between individual and collective in the 
Western world. In terms of its implications for social, ethical, epistemologi-
cal and medical norms, the multiplicity and diversity of this history is with-
out comparison in the Occident. Yet, the work presented here is not so 
much an attempt to unravel its historical complexities. Rather, it is an effort 
to show that the history of melancholy can provide an unequalled and vital 
background to a philosophical study of the relations between the contempo-
rary modes of organizing work and the individual pathos of work-related 
illness like stress and depression, which today has assumed a central role in 
the way we understand the partaking in a socioeconomic reality. In this 
sense, what the thesis provides is philosophical groundwork. It offers a 
looking glass through which the fascinating history of great achievement 
and personal failure that is central to the category of melancholy can be 
represented in all its foreignness, and yet, at the same time, can be said to 
reflect and illuminate the present. The philosophical formations explored 
here, it is my hope, can lead to a better and more complex understanding of 
the association in the contemporary between work-related illness and the 
injunction to participate and contribute as a self in the modern organiza-
tion. What they provide is an attempt to inform and speak into the present 
from the point of view of history; not in order to reach the sublation of now 
and then, but in order to illustrate how philosophy, and the reflexive-
hermeneutic space that it opens, persist in making us the contemporaries of 
a past that remains negotiable and precarious.  
In this sense, the work on this thesis which I began on Copenhagen 
Business School in 2006, has also been a most important test piece for me 
in my attempt to find, maintain and use a personal voice on the threshold 
between classical philosophical studies, and the aspects of management and 
organization studies that were new to me at the time. It is my hope that the 
diversity of these fields, rather than being reduced to each other, are al-
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lowed a space in which to grow and flourish in their diversity. The thesis 
began with an interest into the contemporary association between the spec-
tacle of the experience economy and the social phenomenon of depression. 
It has ended as a philosophical exploration of the historical sources that 
may be said to constitute a background to an association like this. It is my 
hope that this work may offer a philosophical ‘toolbox’ to both my own fur-
ther engagement in LAS, the research programme on management of self-
management, which has provided me with an opportunity to continue my 
study of pathology and work today, and to those who work on the bounda-
ries between philosophy, management and organization studies, and who 
are interested in the relation between tropes of work, illness and performa-
tivity today.  
I want to thank first my supervisor Prof. Sverre Raffnsøe, Asmund Born 
and my good friend and colleague Marius Gudmand-Høyer sine qua non. 
Also Michael Pedersen and Anders Raastrup Kristensen, with whom I have 
enjoyed the privilege of sharing my time at CBS until now, along with 
Birgitte Gorm Hansen and Pia Bramming, deserve special thanks. The ad-
vice, expert assistance and corrections by Campbell Jones and André Spicer 
is something I have valued a lot and which has made my complex text much 
better. Also the opportunity given to me by Peter Case to speak in on the 
subject on the Bristol Centre for Leadership and Organisational Ethics 
(BCLOE) is something for which I am grateful. I want thank all of my col-
leagues at MPP for valuable comments, suggestions and cheers and for 
backing me when things got a little rough. Also all of my friends and my 
family, my father and Eva, mother, sister, Rune, Storm and Viggo deserve 
thanks for putting up with me. 
 
Rasmus Johnsen, Frederiksberg, July 2009  
 
  
Chapter One 
Introducing the ‘Thing’ in the Body 
 
 
Prologue  
1. Stress as a Pathology of Performativity 
2. Michel Foucault’s Historical Problematization Analysis 
3. The ‘Thing’ in the Body and the ‘Quasi-Object’  
4. Historiography: One or Several Melancholies?  
Prologue 
‘An old man who himself was extremely melancholy’, Søren Kierkegaard 
writes in a journal entry from 1846, ‘gets a son in his old age who inherits 
all this melancholy – but also has a mental-spiritual elasticity enabling him 
to hide his melancholy.’ (Kierkegaard 1978: 343) This little piece of self-
observation, apart from representing something which to Kierkegaard was 
more like a condensed autobiography judging from his numerous reflec-
tions on the nature and cause of what he called his ‘thorn in the flesh’, pre-
sents an eminent motif for the present thesis. Through an inquiry into three 
very different periods in the broad and colourful history of melancholy, this 
thesis provides a philosophical and theoretical background for the study of 
a relation between pathology and the ability to perform in a social context 
today. The assertion of such a relation – represented by the burgeoning so-
cietal interest into the association between stress-related illness, depression 
and the way a contemporary workplace is organized (e.g. Iacovides et al. 
2003) – has a socioeconomic impact on society like never before in history. 
In the wake of the debates, which were sparked in the 1990s as a result of 
the approval in December 1989 of Prozac for the American markets (e.g. 
Healy 1997, Kramer 1993), the societal debates about stress and depression 
have become linked to the question of the productivity of the ‘human re-
source’ and the potential humanization of work engaged within this per-
spective. In both fields of critical theory (e.g. Honneth 2005, Honneth 
2004), sociology (e.g. Ehrenberg 1999, Petersen 2007, Willig & Østergaard 
2005), work-environment studies (e.g. Marchand, Demers & Durand 2005, 
Levi 2001), popular management literature (e.g. Williams, Cooper 2002, 
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Loehr, McCormack 1997), psychiatric discourse (e.g. Bech et al. 2005, 
Schultz 2001) and philosophically inspired studies (e.g. Pedersen 2009) on 
stress and depression have been addressed as pathologies related to how 
contemporary work is organized. More often than not, work and mental 
disorder emerge in a cause-effect relation, where pathology is viewed as a 
direct result of the social role that the workplace has acquired as a place for 
the individual realization of the self.  
Yet the assumption itself of a relation between illness and the way indi-
viduals perform in a social context is not new. Although it was not always 
associated with the way work is organized, the association between illness 
and performativity, between individual health and a productive life, has a 
long and complicated history. This thesis explores this history and the as-
sertion in it of individual agency. Sharing with Kierkegaard’s self-
observation the inherent distinction between a psychosomatic state of suf-
fering and the assertion of something like a ‘mental-spiritual elasticity’ of 
the individual will regulating it, the three historical formations with which 
it engages, each represent pathologies that possess connotations of health 
as an individual appropriation and of illness as the signal of a failure of 
agency. As maladies of the will – or pathologies of performativity – the 
melancholy of the extraordinary in character in Antiquity, the acedia of the 
religious man in the Middle Ages, and the neurasthenia of the laborious 
businessman around the turn of the 19th century, all represent privileged 
and important aspects of a long tradition of illnesses associated with the re-
flective ability of the individual to articulate the ‘self’ as an object for regula-
tion and management. It is the task of this thesis to rediscover and explore 
this tradition and to illustrate how it may assist and inform an inquiry into 
the contemporary age in order to provide a better understanding of the way 
illness is associated with the organization of work and performativity today. 
Yet instead of focusing exclusively on this historical association as a 
cause-effect relation, designating a pattern of suffering in the individual 
body as the result of an external pressure, the thesis develops an alternative 
perspective, which seeks instead to ask the pertinent question about how 
such associations are structured and come about. Providing a philosophi-
cal perspective on the history of the pathologies of performativity, it at-
tempts to illustrate how the reflective assertion of an individual agency 
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navigating on the precarious threshold between soma and psyche can in-
form the present in a way that transcends a traditional perception on psy-
chosomatic illness (e.g. Greco 1998, Greco 1993). To Kierkegaard the pro-
found depressive suffering that he believed was passed down to him by his 
father, the inexplicable and inarticulate burden that threatened to crush 
him, was thematized as a hereditary sin; but it was also associated with 
what he paradoxically described as an ‘uncommon resiliency’, an eminent 
health of mind and spirit in spite of it (Kierkegaard 1978: 334). Kierkegaard 
viewed his ‘thorn in the flesh’ as the gift of Governance, something to which 
he, from the first to the last written page of his life, was riveted and com-
mitted. The seeming contradictio in adjecto of this intimate and passionate 
relationship with suffering provides a central theme to the following. Illus-
trating a relationship to an indeterminate relation between soma and psy-
che – a ‘thing’ in the body – around which not only a psychosomatic pat-
tern of suffering is structured, but also the different ways in which the indi-
vidual can present the self as a performing subject within a social setting, 
the reflective relation between self and self – in Kierkegaard’s case repre-
sented as the difference between a state of depression and an activity of de-
spair (Marino 2008: 125) – designates a sway in which the possibility of 
self-regulation and self-differentiation emerges as a problematic space of 
self-articulation. Establishing a fundamental relationship between the di-
mension of pathology and the dimension of performance, it is the unfolding 
and distribution of this space in the historical formations that constitute 
them as pathologies of performativity, which occupies the present thesis.  
An excellent example illustrating the notion of the ‘thing’ in the body is 
found in Plato’s fantastic theory of the ‘wandering uterus’ taken from his 
great cosmological dialogue, the Timaeus (Tim. 91c) i. Describing a pattern 
of symptoms associated with the sexual frustration of women who remain 
childless too long after puberty, Plato’s theory assumes the existence in the 
female body of an unruly organ which, endowed like an animal with spon-
taneous sensation and emotion, desires to produce children. The frustration 
of this ill-tempered animal causes it to migrate through the body of the un-
fortunate, resulting in a host of physiological and psychological distur-
bances, until she becomes pregnant.  
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Albeit an anachronism of medical Antiquity, Plato’s theory much later is 
assumed by Freud, along with his psychoanalytic colleagues, to be the first, 
rudimentary theory of psychosexual frustration and is thus associated with 
the diagnosis of hysteria that was fashionable at the time. (e.g. Freud 2004, 
Freud 1920, see also: Guttman 2006) As a proof of the scientific validity of 
symptoms related to the female generative systems, this theory of a ‘thing’ 
in the body typical of women to Freud illustrated an age-old awareness of 
the malign psychosomatic effects of disordered sexual activity. Structuring 
not only a pattern of psychosomatic suffering in the body of the hysteric, 
which it was up to the individual to articulate in a socially understandable 
manner, but also the pattern of authorities, institutions and technologies 
pointing it out, this ‘thing’ emerges as a precarious threshold between the 
individual and the collective in which the individual finds itself to exist. 
Indicative of the philosophical perspective on the history of pathologies 
developed in this thesis, the Freudian use of Plato’s theory illustrates how 
the regulative space opened in the bodies of hysterics was more than just an 
individual matter. Designating a precarious threshold between soma and 
psyche, between nature and culture, Plato’s assumption of a ‘thing’ in the 
body of frustrated women, in the hands of Freud emerges as a social bond, 
a precarious and problematic space for psychoanalytic self-articulation, 
where the delimitations between individual and collective become blurred 
and indistinct. It is the historical unfolding of social bonds like this one in 
the history of the pathologies of performativity with which this thesis en-
gages. 
But before engaging in this discussion a look at how the thesis is organ-
ized will be in place. Following this introduction, the remainder of chapter 
one introduces the notion of the ‘thing’ in the body and discusses the meth-
odological and philosophical implications of this perspective. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of the contemporary notion of stress as a formal 
indication of the historical dispositions that the following chapters set out 
to explore. Following this, a section discusses how the explorations of the 
pathologies of performativity reflect the methodological notion of problem-
atization developed in the late work of Michel Foucault in the 1980s. The 
next section engages more directly with the notion of the ‘thing’ in the body, 
arguing that it can be seen as what Michel Serres has called a quasi-object 
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(Serres 2007, Serres 1987, Serres 1995). This section also illustrates how 
the perspective on the ‘thing’ in the body in this sense can be represented by 
the distinction made by Bruno Latour between matters of fact and matters 
of concern (Latour 2004). The final section of this chapter discusses the 
historiography of the ‘thing’ in the body, illustrating how the historical per-
spectives on pathologies developed in the thesis can be seen as a part of the 
history of melancholy. 
Chapter two engages with the notion of melancholy, asserted to be the 
pathology of the extraordinary in character in Antiquity, and revolving 
around the assertion of the black bile (gr. melaina cholé) in the short Aris-
totelian text Problems XXX, 1 from the Corpus Aristotelicum as a ‘thing’ in 
the body of extraordinary individuals. Removing the black bile from its 
place among the four humours of Hippocratic medicine, which were 
thought to be in balance when the organism was healthy, the author of 
Problems XXX, 1 (probably Theophrastus, a follower of Aristotle) assumes 
the precarious notion of an eukratos anomalia – a well-balanced anoma-
lism – in the black bile itself. The extraordinary in character, the great men 
of culturally formative achievement in art, politics and philosophy of Antiq-
uity are melancholics, not dià nóson, through disease, but dià phýsin, by 
nature. While this may cause illness if they fail to govern themselves prop-
erly according to their nature, melancholy in them is not in itself pathologi-
cal; rather, when it is handled skilfully, it is an expression of ēthos, of the 
right character. This management of character, paradoxically, is located in 
the body as a physiological balance in the subject of the bile ensuing from 
the Aristotelian assumption of heat as the regulating principle of the body. 
The chapter traces the origins of this disposition to pre-historic times in the 
virtuosity of the tragic heroes and discusses its gradual transformation to 
play a central role in the dietetic theories of the genius in the Italian Renais-
sance. 
Chapter three engages with the capital sin of acedia, first described in 
detail by the monk Evagrius Ponticus around the 4th century A.D., a constel-
lation of unusual and undesirable feelings and behaviour also referred to as 
the noonday demon. First found in the coenobite monks of remote com-
munities in the Egyptian desert, acedia – a kind of sinful carefreeness in-
terfering with the virtuous activities of the monastic – was structured as a 
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pattern of psychosomatic suffering around a demonical possession, which 
made the monk inaccessible to regulation in the theocosmos of vice and vir-
tue and opened his heart to the Devil. Describable as a sinful privation 
causing the confusion of the affective life, which enabled the ‘good works’ of 
the Christian community, acedia demanded constant vigilance, adhering to 
the burden of a social reality, which – unlike the melancholy of the extraor-
dinary in character – was always already indebted to a ‘higher’ order. Fo-
cusing on acedia as an emotional hyperbole caused by deficient self-
regulation, the chapter traces the confusion of affects from its assertion as a 
demon in the body of the virtuous within the context of the theocosmos and 
to its assertion as a monstrous eruption in the body of the vain-glorious 
melancholic within the sociocosmos of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651). 
Chapter four concerns neurasthenia, the malady of the diligent and la-
borious individual of 19th century industrialism, which was structured 
around the nervous force in the bodies of working subjects. Coined by the 
American physician George M. Beard and representing the illness of men 
(and women) of all classes, neurasthenia thematized the difficulties associ-
ated with the management of a personal store of energy in an everyday 
world, where the demands of progress and pitfalls of modernity challenged 
the autonomy and individuality of those unfortunate enough to yield to so-
cial pressure. Owing something to the two Brunonian categories of sthenia 
and asthenia, this pathology of everyday life thematized both the excess of 
stimulation of the individual when it was exposed to modern life, and the 
resulting incapacity of the will to react to stimulus, caused by the depletion 
of nervous energy. Reflected also in the Freudian understanding of melan-
cholia, the exhaustion of the democratic individual resulting from a defi-
cient management of personal resources designated the task of a neuro-
pathic household, which made of the individual a vehicle for the refinement 
of natural resources into culture. 
On the background of the three previous chapters, the fifth and conclud-
ing chapter of this thesis summarizes the findings of the explorations of the 
historical formations and discusses how these findings can contribute to an 
investigation of the relation between pathology, work and performativity in 
the present. Focussing on the contemporary problem of depression, it indi-
cates three dimensions of this problem for further study, suggesting that 
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the work performed in this thesis contributes an important groundwork to 
the drafting of a philosophical topology of the contemporary conceptualiza-
tion of productivity. First it suggests that the affinity between the contem-
porary phenomenon of stress and stress-management in the light of classi-
cal melancholia can be viewed as an eroticism of modern day capitalism. 
Secondly, it illustrates how aspects of the contemporary conceptualization 
of depressive disorder reflect the problematic formation of acedia in the 
Middle Ages and suggests that depression thus can be seen as a fall from 
the social. Thirdly, and finally, it discusses the relation of depression to 
work in the context of subjectivity as a resource modelled around the ener-
getic tropes of 19th century neurasthenia.  
Before proceeding to the investigation of the historical formations, 
though, the following sections will discuss in a little more detail the system-
atical implications of these explorations and take a closer look at the notion 
of the ‘thing’ in the body. First a description of how the contemporary no-
tion of stress constitutes a formal indication of the kind of dispositions that 
the thesis sets out to uncover can provide not only a good introduction to 
the notion of the ‘thing’ in the body, but also help to point out some of the 
systematical dimensions which the thesis seeks to extract from its historical 
explorations. 
1. Stress as a Formal Indication 
The contemporary concept of stress provides an illustrative example of this 
dispersive relation to a ‘thing’ in the body, representing the opening of a 
space for agency between soma and psyche. Resonating with Kierkegaard’s 
own designation in The Sickness unto Death (“Sygdommen til døden”, 
1849) of the self as ‘a relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation 
which is relating to itself’ (Kierkegaard 2004: 43), the example of stress of-
fers what Heidegger in Being and Time (1927) termed a formal indication 
of the disposition that this thesis engages with (Heidegger 1962, see also: 
Streeter 1997). Rather than grasping the concept of stress in the traditional 
manner of a categorical attempt to seize its object, this example traces a 
projective or anticipatory sketch that advances on certain prominent formal 
features of it as an entity, which can assist the understanding of the object 
of this study and provide it with a systematic dimension. As a relation 
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which relates to itself as a mind-body (mis)relation, the popular notion of 
stress articulates both the burgeoning interest in employee empowerment 
and the pathological problems associated with the management of the self 
in convergence with the demands of a productive organizational framework 
(e.g. Rose 1999, Pedersen & Kristensen 2009, Pedersen 2009). 
Popular titles like Creating Success: How to Deal with Stress (Palmer & 
Cooper 2007), Stress for Success (Loehr & McCormack 1997), Stress-Proof 
Your Life: Smart Ways to Relax and Re-Energize (Wilson 2005), and Con-
quer your Stress (Williams & Cooper 2002) bedeck news-paper ads and 
internet flash-banners, newsstand shelves and airport bookstalls for the 
busy traveller, with promises of stress-busting advice that will lead to a 
healthier and more productive lifestyle. In a straightforward manner these 
titles boast advice that mixes management perspectives with psychological, 
physiological and neurobiological research to create insight into how to 
manage the stress that may build up in the body in the best way. One exam-
ple that illustrates very well how stress as a ‘thing’ in the body represents a 
medium for both achievement and suffering is contained in the following 
lines from the foreword to Stress Management for Dummies: 
Stress is an unavoidable consequence of life. There are some stresses you can do 
something about, and others you can’t hope to avoid or control. The trick is 
learning to distinguish between the two, so that you’re not constantly frustrated 
like Don Quixote, tilting at windmills. This book teaches you how to use your 
time and talents effectively so that stress can make you more productive, rather 
than self-destructive. (Elkin 1999: xxv) 
Here stress is asserted to be a natural phenomenon that there is no way to 
avoid, but which on the other hand can be controlled, directed and subli-
mated by the intervention of concentrated self-management techniques. 
Stress, in other words, is not asserted to be pathological in itself; rather it 
acts as a natural potentiality that can lead to physical and mental suffering 
if the individual fails to take into account the pathogenic value of his or her 
specific disposition and environment. On the other hand, learning the trick 
of balancing the subject promises to increase personal productivity. Defin-
ing a healthy and productive balance in the anomaly of stress will lead to 
personal success, because ‘the right amount creates a beautiful tone’. 
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The problem that the assumption of stress as a threshold between soma 
and psyche presents to the individuals managing themselves lucidly illus-
trated by the pseudoscientific concepts of eustress and distress that were 
originally coined by Hans Seley (Cooper & Dewe 2004), but are now popu-
lar in use throughout stress-management programs. Designating stress as 
the articulation of a natural disposition, the ideas of a good stress and a bad 
stress, the erōs and thanatos of modern life-style, assert a subject that one 
does not only manage, but whose emissions one is also disposed to and sub-
jected by. There are, Elkin claims in Stress Management for Dummies, ‘the 
kinds of stresses that add to the enjoyment and satisfaction of our lives. We 
want more of this kind of stress, not less.’ (Elkin 1999: 21) These eustresses 
are not defined in terms of illness; rather than designating anomalies, they 
are asserted to be natural aspects of a paradoxical balance of character in 
the anomaly that one does not simply handle in order to survive. The good 
stresses enable an ēthos – a ‘right character’ – in the anomaly, because ‘ef-
fective stress management really comes down to effective lifestyle manage-
ment’ (Elkin 1999: 2). In this perspective health is not primarily a state of 
being. It is a highly individualized compound of activities, where health 
emerges as the precarious dynamic balance in a ceaseless process of self-
differentiation. The deficiency of self-management, on the other hand, is 
represented as a double pathos: taken in both original senses of the word, 
this pathos is represented as the event of a transience as opposed to an 
ideal (the ēthos), and as an affection causing physical or mental suffering. 
While health is a dynamic value of self-differentiation, the possible dispro-
portions of this differentiation are represented somatically as suffering. 
Stress comes to represent the precarious and problematic ‘thing’ that takes 
place in the body and is detectable as the somatic pattern of failure or suc-
cess of the self which manages itself. As a precarious bond between soma 
and psyche that is not reducible to something psychosomatic, stress func-
tions as an arbiter of self-management (e.g. Pedersen 2009). 
In this sense stress as a ‘thing’ in the body represents the assertion of a 
nature that is in fundamental conflict with itself. Or to be more precise: it 
constitutes a subject structured and cohered only by a fundamental conflict. 
It is through and only through the caesura and ceaseless rearticulation of 
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this subject that the self-differentiation of individual ēthos is constituted. 
The deficient self-management represented as transience as opposed to the 
right character emerges as the decadence in a literal sense (from latin 
de+cadere: fall apart) of a body that the self-differentiation passes through. 
The fundamental conflict that is constitutive of this relation between 
soma and psyche is also represented in Stress Management for Dummies. 
The practical ‘stress-busting advice and exercises’ that are offered here 
function as articulating mediums disseminating stress as mode of existence 
to individuals. Most of these tests, tables, hints and scales are designed to 
tell the reader ‘how [his] body reacts’ (Elkin 1999: 25) and how stress can 
make him sick with individual somatic reactions. The opacity of the subject 
of stress is highlighted by the fact that it is both assumed to be something 
that defies general definition and a hormonal reaction, which works in a 
straightforward causal manner: perceived stressor – hormones – body or-
gans and muscles. According to Elkin, muscles are prime targets for stress, 
but also the circulatory systems, sexuality and the immune system. Stress 
needs to be balanced, because ‘finding your stress balance is one of the best 
ways to find out if you are overreacting to the stress in your life’ (Elkin 
1999: 38). The emission of stress acts as a cause for an individual profile, 
which is the result of a hormonal balance asserted to you as an individual. 
In other words ‘you’ are pointed out by stress as a ‘thing’ in the body:  
Your sympathetic nervous system, one of the two branches of your autonomic 
nervous system, is producing changes in your body. Your hypothalamus, a part 
of your brain, is activating your pituitary, a small gland at the base of your 
brain, which releases a hormone into the bloodstream. This hormone (it’s called 
ACTH or adrenocorticotropic hormone) reaches your adrenal glands, and they 
in turn produce more adrenalin (also known as epinephrine) along with other 
hormones called glucocorticoids (cortisol is one). This melange of biochemical 
changes is responsible for an array of other remarkable changes in your body. 
(Elkin 1999: 26)   
As a fundamental threshold between the somatic constitution of the indi-
vidual represented on a molecular level and the interpellation of the indi-
vidual as an active agent, stress as a ‘thing’ in the body that can be identi-
fied, isolated and manipulated, but also mobilized, recombined and inter-
vened on, here emerges as an emblematic representation of the object of 
this study. Structured around ‘objects’ that are neither fully representable 
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as nature, nor as culture, not fully as soma or as psyche, the pathologies of 
performativity presented in this thesis represent the precarious problematic 
fields of subjects, which designate a conflict between an individual pathos 
and the ēthos of performativity that can only be regulated by a reflective in-
tervention. 
As a first formal indication of the structural dimensions that this study 
sets out to explore historically, this conflict in the contemporary conceptu-
alization of stress can be represented on the fundamental level of a distinc-
tion between problem and response. The emergence of stress as a ‘thing’ in 
the body, illustrated in the quote above in a very literal sense, culminates in 
the assertion a pathological problem, designating a host of more or less 
undifferentiated symptoms, which are articulated in convergence with the 
dimension of a self-regulatory response, designating a space for individual 
agency. Yet these two fundamental dimensions, as the indication above il-
lustrates, are not causally organized as a challenge to which a solution ex-
ists that makes the challenge go away. As the patterns of psychosomatic 
symptoms are autonomic, the pathological problem in a certain manner it-
self represents a response to an undifferentiated and unsymbolized ‘preob-
ject’ in the individual body, an affective reality leading towards the modality 
of significance. Likewise, the self-regulatory response itself on a certain 
level represents a problem as it is an adventure inscribing a symbolic di-
mension to this ‘preobject’ transforming affect into activity. Instead of rep-
resenting a causality, the dimensions of problem and response represent 
the most fundamental categorical aspects of a cosmology organized around 
the ‘thing’ in the body. 
These categorical aspects and how their organization around the ‘thing’ 
indicates a systematical level of exploration for the thesis is something to 
which we will return in the next section. For now the formal indication of 
stress as an irreducible problematic organized around a ‘thing’ in the body, 
and how that reflects the pathologies of performativity explored, deserves a 
little more attention. 
The difficulty of describing the ‘nature’ of the diffuse ‘thing’ in the body 
pointed out by stress as a formal indication reflects a fundamental problem 
with which this thesis engages. Was the black bile really a physical sub-
stance that was more dominant in the bodies of melancholics than in other 
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people, or was it merely a supposition of early Hippocratic theories that 
Modern and more advanced medicine has proven obsolete? Was the coeno-
bite monk, whose body was filled with acedia, really possessed by the 
noonday demon that tied his tongue so that he was unable to say his 
prayers or was his inability to see anything good in God’s creation merely a 
result of his own sinful lack of spiritual vigilance? Was the nervous bank-
ruptcy of the neurasthenic patient really an exhaustion of the body’s natural 
reserves of energy or did it rather constitute a kind of inverted work-ethics, 
an individual resistance to the social pressures of modernity? How about 
the contemporary perspective? Is the imaging of the neural processes of the 
brain in stress a health scientific fact or is it a cultural imaginative? 
The problem of the nature of the ‘thing’ in the body is perhaps nowhere 
as painstakingly illustrated as in the assumption of lycanthropy, derived 
from the notion of the transformation of a human being into a wolf, which 
was popularly used to describe a kind of melancholic individual, who would 
go out at night, imitating a wolf, frequenting tombs in the cemetery until 
daytime, where he would howl and wail madly.  Thomas Hobbes’ definition 
in Leviathan (1651) of melancholy as the kind of dejection which ‘subjects 
man to causeless fears’ and appears among other things as the ‘haunting of 
solitudes, and graves’ (Hobbes 2006: 41) reflects Robert Burton’s call for 
self-knowledge in The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), where he writes that 
while men may be ‘sufficiently informed in all other worldy business’, when 
it comes to themselves, ‘they are wholly ignorant and careless, they know 
not what this Body and Soul are … or how a Man differs from a Dog’ (Bur-
ton 1986: 93). While the ontological problem of knowing the difference be-
tween man and dog, of distinguishing between human and animal in a 
categorical manner, may seem trivial to a contemporary perspective, it was 
more than just a formal matter to the 16th and 17th century. As the trials 
against alleged lycanthropes illustrate, the determination of whether the 
prosecuted had actually been transformed into a wolf or whether he was 
merely under the influence of the Devil’s ability to insinuate himself into 
the mental processes of the melancholic mind, was a crucial prerequisite for 
any legal sentence (e.g. Baring-Gould 1995, Johnsen 2009). To most of the 
metaphysical, theological, juridical, historical, medical and imaginative lit-
erature of the period, the lycanthrope represented a threshold between man 
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and beast, an unresolved and unwanted indistinction that had to be worked 
out in order for the difference between human and animal, between reason 
and unreason to remain (e.g. Agamben 2004). In a theory typical of its 
time, Thomas Willis, a lecturer at Oxford in the early 1660s, argued that 
man possessed a corporeal soul specific to him that had two aspects: one 
was its vital part, which in the tradition of the humoral theory would in-
habit the blood and enkindle it, and the second a sensitive part which on 
account of external influence would sometimes contract disproportionately 
with the body and thus cause delusions of metamorphosis (Jackson 1986: 
348). Possessed by Satan, another theory along the same line added, the de-
luded would imagine himself transformed into a wolf, because the humors 
of his body had been confused; he would, however, not be transformed in 
reality, as the Devil had no power to fundamentally alter the human nature 
that God created in his image (Otten 1986). To science, theology and law, 
the lycanthrope represented a very real problem to which there seemed to 
be no easy solution. 
Reflecting the articulation of stress on a molecular level, the problem of 
the melancholic werewolf may be addressed in different manners from a 
contemporary perspective. One way would be to explain society with na-
ture. One such attempt can be found in the explanation of the lycanthrope 
as an individual suffering from congenital porphyria, a rare disease in 
which there is an inability to convert porphobilinogen to porphyrin in the 
bone marrow. The symptoms of severe photosensitivity, a reddish-brown 
coloured urine, development of pigmentation and hypertrichosis (an over-
growth of hair not localized to the androgen-dependent areas of the skin) 
and hyperplastic bone-marrow would explain why someone would prefer to 
wander about at night in secluded and isolated areas, maybe on all fours 
and probably mentally disturbed and fear-ridden because of the condition 
(Illis 1986). 
Another way would be to explain nature with society: the monstrous 
body of the werewolf contributes to a process of identity formation by nega-
tive definition (du Coudray 2002). As a social construct of the other of the 
humanist subject, the lycanthrope reflects societal anxieties about morality 
and represents an extreme rendition of human carelessness. Such a per-
spective on stress would represent it as the primary trope of resistance to 
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the contemporary hegemony of work in late capitalism as a place for indi-
vidual self-realization, involving the organization and productivity of the 
working subjectivity (the ‘human resource’) (Costea et al. 2008, Fleming 
2008, Fleming 2003, Johnsen 2009)  
To the philosophical perspective on the ‘thing’ in the body taken up here, 
both of these assumptions – the first explaining the evolution of a social 
category with nature, and the other explaining the human settlement on 
matters of fact by social factors – fall short, because they, in spite of consti-
tuting a dichotomy, fail to address the same crucial issue. Reducing the im-
age of the werewolf to a problem to which one appropriate resolution exists, 
both perspectives fail to address the important aspect, that to the 16th and 
17th century scholars, who engaged with the distinction between human and 
beast, with the distinction between nature and society in man, the lycan-
thrope represented a distinction that had yet not been made, a battlefield 
of interests involving supernatural, theological and scientific knowledge 
alike. Rather than representing a simple problem, the lycanthrope consti-
tuted an irreducible dilemma, a problematization that involved continuous 
alertness and circumspection, but also the exercise of specific modes of 
questioning. Its nature, rather than representing something that was both 
man and beast, was that of something that eerily was neither, dwelling 
within both, but irreducible to any of them (Agamben 1998: 105). 
As a philosophical problem this is also the challenge that the ‘thing’ in 
the body represents to this thesis. What the black bile of Antique medicine 
and the nervous energy of the 19th century have in common is the represen-
tation of the ‘thing’ as not exactly nature or society, but as something that 
dwells paradoxically within both. Explaining the contemporary problem of 
stress as either an exclusively neurological and physiological pattern, defin-
ing the limits of the working body (a pathophysiological disease) or as a so-
cial construction representing the limit of the individual beyond which the 
demands of society become illegitimate (a social pathology) is a deadlock, 
because both explanations miss the trajectory of the ‘thing’ in question: the 
paradoxical articulation of a dilemma that itself seems to provide a breed-
ing ground for specific modes of experiencing series or networks of other-
wise heterogeneous elements.  
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The articulation of such a dilemma poses two important challenges. 
First, the question about how the heterogeneity of elements involved in the 
following explorations may be articulated systematically without merely 
coming to represent contradictions. This question will be discussed in the 
following section reflecting on the late Michel Foucault’s work on problem-
atizations. Secondly, the dilemma of the ‘thing’ in the body represents the 
fundamental question about the nature of the object of this study. Follow-
ing the reflections on Foucault’s historical problematizations analysis, a 
section arguing that the ‘thing’ in the body can be understood in terms of 
Michel Serres’ theory of quasi-objects, will thus reflect on the paradigmatic 
status of the ‘thing’ as a social bond – what Bruno Latour calls a matter of 
concern. 
2. Michel Foucault’s Historical Problematization Analysis 
An illustrious example of how the late analytical contributions of Michel 
Foucault can assist an understanding of the dilemma of the ‘thing’ in the 
body and help to indicate a structural level of inquiry to the perspective de-
veloped in the following can be found in Foucault’s reflections on the status 
of homosexuality in Antiquity. Based on the frequent mentioning of it in 
ancient Greek literature and art, it has often been assumed that homosexu-
ality constituted an accepted practice in Antiquity. Yet as Foucault argues 
(Foucault 1996: 363-65; see also Detel 2005: 118-162), the frequent refer-
ence to homosexual encounters and pederasty in particular may be taken 
here also to indicate the contrary: that the phenomenon was not a triviality 
and that we encounter it as often as we do exactly because it was problem-
atic – not least as the implicated youth risked falling into the category 
“prostitute” if the practice continued too long after puberty, as this would 
prevent him from entering any kind of political life. While the Greek men-
tality would tolerate pederastic encounters, it could not accept the combina-
tion of sexual submissiveness and political dominance in one person. 
What Foucault’s example illustrates is that the utterances and practices 
related to a problem like this one may be taken to be modalities of ‘re-
sponse’ to ‘problems’ in the way also this study indicated such levels above 
in relation to stress as a ‘problem’ in the present. In the exemplary case of 
homosexuality, the utterances deal not with whether homosexuality was al-
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lowed, but rather when it was, as it was not proper to the male subject, but 
only to the youth-object that was later to become a male subject. What Fou-
cault’s example illustrates is how the problem ‘homosexuality’ on this back-
ground is constituted in a relational manner associating it with heterogene-
ous elements, to which it might otherwise have no relation at all. In the case 
of homoerotic practice in Antiquity, unexpected connections between topics 
like man/youth/time, eroticism/politics etc., emerge and form complex 
problematizations in patterns or series of associations. 
It is this level of problematization (rather than the problems them-
selves), that constitutes the fundamental field of interest to the late Fou-
cault’s analytical gaze. The formations of melancholy, acedia and neuras-
thenia, which this thesis explores, can be said also to pertain also to such a 
level of inquiry, as they explore the dimension of practice associated with 
and structured in heterogeneous patterns around the ‘thing’ in the body. As 
illustrated above in relation to stress, the association of labour with dimen-
sions of self-regulation, pathology and performativity can be said to consti-
tute a problematization in Foucault’s sense of the word. What the following 
reflections on Foucault’s methodological contribution can do is thus to pro-
vide an indication of how – and with which questions – such explorations 
can systematically proceed. 
Although the notion of a historical problematization analysis itself was 
not fully developed by Foucault, it is possible to reconstruct it from his work 
in the 1980s (Foucault 1991, 1996b, 1996c, 2001). Research has already 
shown that Foucault’s notion of problématisation occupies an important 
and productive place in his thinking in a broad sense (e.g.  Raffnsøe, Gud-
mand-Høyer & Thaning 2008, Castel 1994, Deacon 2000, Koopman 2008, 
Osborne 2003). The work of Marius Gudmand-Høyer demonstrates an at-
tempt to illustrate how Foucault’s reflexions on it can provide a methodo-
logical procedure for historical and philosophical analyses (Gudmand-
Høyer 2009). The following reflections do not pretend to engage in a dis-
cussion of the possible implications of Foucault’s contribution to methodol-
ogy as such; instead the goal here is to indicate how the ‘problematization 
analysis’ – sketchy as it may be – can help to clarify the level of inquiry in 
this thesis and specify the problematic ‘object’ of this study.  
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As Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer and Thaning have argued, Foucault’s 
analysis of historical problematizations asserts a level of inquiry on which 
the problematizations represent the objects of the analysis (Raffnsøe, Gud-
mand-Høyer & Thaning 2008: 232-36). This analysis itself essentially op-
erates by means of historical exploration, given that the problematizations 
themselves consist of historical processes. More precisely, a problematiza-
tion in this sense refers to the totality of historical practices, said or non-
said, discursive or non-discursive, raising issues and concerns, posing ques-
tions and difficulties, inducing procedures, interventions and instruments, 
or introducing hitherto unacknowledged elements into the field of thought 
and practice. As such, Burchell argues, the formation of the problematiza-
tion process has to do with ‘the historically conditioned emergence of new 
fields of experience’ (Burchell 1993: 277), which are not investigated or elu-
cidated directly or in themselves, but indirectly through the formation of 
the experiential field, or “breading ground”, where they emerge. The prob-
lematic formations of melancholy, acedia and neurasthenia, all organized 
around a ‘thing’ in the body, can be seen as such breeding grounds, where 
otherwise heterogeneous elements form associations.  
In such a perspective, the formulation of a series of questions directed 
from the present into the past, cannot be reduced to a level of historical in-
terest; rather in a problematization, as Robert Castel argues, ‘the diagnostic 
turned upon the present guides the reading of the past and prompts it to 
decode history along this line of understanding.’ (Castel 1994: 241) The 
formal indication of stress as a problematic ‘thing’ in the body in this thesis 
thus does not serve the purpose of indicating a contemporary issue, of 
which it then tells the historical emergence. Rather the indication of stress 
as a ‘thing’ in the body today involves a level of inquiry pertaining to ques-
tions, which previous epochs have not asked, exactly because they are con-
temporary questions. The level on which stress, in the way the phenomenon 
has been articulated in the section above, relates to ancient melancholia, to 
acedia and neurasthenia, does not reduce the phenomena to each other, 
because a problematization, if one accepts that it has appeared as a field of 
experience in the past, where otherwise heterogeneous elements have be-
come related, does not repeat itself (Castel 1994: 239). Instead the interest 
into the present situation of this thesis involves the articulation of prob-
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lematizations, which have transformed; but on the background of a conti-
nuity that allows them to be accounted for in the present. The problemati-
zation of the ‘thing’ in the body does not take as its unifying principle of 
continuity the coexistence of its elements in the past. Rather it indicates the 
relationship of them to a contemporary question. The existence of the prob-
lematic formations, which this thesis sets out to explore, hinges on the 
manifestation of the ‘thing’ in the body as a contemporary problematiza-
tion. This also means that the choice of sources for uncovering these forma-
tions does not reflect the history of a historian. As section 4 of this chapter 
illustrates, the historical literature used in this thesis consists only partly in 
primary sources. Most of the sources are well-known and well-represented 
also in secondary literature; but from the contemporary perspective on the 
problematization of the ‘thing’ in the body, the interpretation of them pro-
vides a different account that displays its own level of intelligibility. 
This leads to a second way in which the following explorations reflect the 
historical problematizations analysis. According to Foucault the historical 
analysis of problematizations that constitute such a history involves an in-
vestigation of the processes on the backdrop of which aspects of human ex-
istence and vital conditions emerge as themes which inevitably must be 
fathomed and thus become objects for reflexion and different kinds of prac-
tice, for experience and change and for manipulation and hopes (Foucault 
1984: 17). But such a history can take different forms. While this analytical 
plane could be used to constitute the historical process of formation of the 
‘thing’ in the body, which represents a genealogical level of inquiry, the ex-
plorations that follow this chapter pertain instead to the mapping of their 
patterns of formation around the ‘thing’ in the body. Such a differentiation 
reflects Foucault’s own distinction between genealogy and archaeology, 
where the first is concerned with uncovering the historical emergence of its 
problematizations, while the latter is associated with the existence of these 
formations. The choice of an archaeological level of inquiry in the analytic 
investigation of the ‘thing’ in the body and its association with the problem-
atic formations of melancholy, acedia and neurasthenia reflects the interest 
of the thesis into how this ‘thing’ in spite of its transformations through his-
tory has functioned – and functions – as a social bond designating a 
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threshold between the individual and the collective, between the regulation 
of the self and tropes of performativity and pathology. 
The assertion of a level of inquiry pertaining to the uncovering of pat-
terns structured around the ‘thing’ in the body also opens to a third dimen-
sion in the context of which the work of this thesis can be said to reflect 
Foucault’s late work. The history of ideas or mentalities identifies the dis-
cursive systematic that accounts for how something like melancholia, 
acedia or neurasthenia can be represented as categories of consciousness in 
a given period of time. An example of such a perspective on the history of 
melancholy can perhaps be found in Jennifer Radden’s introduction to her 
anthology of classical texts (Radden 2000b), which seeks to identify a dis-
cursive level of reality. Unlike Radden’s work, the perspective of the follow-
ing does not focus primarily on what can be said about something, as much 
as it focuses on the modes in which that which is being said (and done) 
erupts as a problematic ‘thing’ for reflection and manipulation. Placing 
their interest on this semi-normative level, the following explorations re-
flect Foucault’s assertion that: 
Problematization doesn’t mean the representation of a pre-existing object, nor 
the creation through discourse of an object that doesn’t exist. It’s the set of dis-
cursive and non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the play 
of true and false, and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether under the 
form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.) (Foucault 
1996c: 456-57).  
Taking as its level of interest the constitution of an ‘object’ for thought – the 
‘thing’ in the body – like the one mentioned here by Foucault, the historical 
inquiry of the following chapters seek the bundle of articulations, both of 
linguistic and ‘material’ character, the conglomerate of which makes some-
thing accessible to reflection and practice in such a way that its unity or its 
complexity, its verity or falsity, its consequences or its impressionability, its 
effects or lack of same, its value or harmfulness, its necessities or accidental 
occurrences can become aspects of debate, circumspection, consideration 
or intervention (Foucault 1996c: 456). Like Foucault’s problematization 
this ‘something’, represented in the problematic formations of the following 
as the ‘thing’ in the body, to specific kinds of practice or reflection becomes 
an ‘object’, which may not exist as such or does not exist in exactly the way 
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it is suggested, but nevertheless ‘marks’ the reality to which it pertains. The 
black bile, like the nerves of the 19th century, may become object for biologi-
cal admission or behaviourism, while the monstrous eruption of lycan-
thropy in the bodies of others may instead become a juridical, theological or 
moral theme, a theme for cultural critique and sociological explanation. 
Stress and its close proximity to depression today has become an object for 
managerial intervention, psychoanalytic reconfiguration, political analysis 
and socioeconomic calculation, just to name some. 
These considerations, in their reflection of Foucault’s historical prob-
lematization analysis, may be used to assert a more systematic level of in-
quiry, based on the distinction between problem and response found above 
in stress as a formal indication of what this thesis explores. As a matter be-
yond the distinction between something entirely natural and something en-
tirely cultural, the ‘thing’ in the body here was found to constitute a distinc-
tion not yet made. This assertion reflects Foucault’s claim that the patterns 
of experience associated with the problematization cannot be reduced to 
human behaviour, such as a study of social history would have it – even if 
these patterns of experience present new possibilities for behaviour; or to 
human ideas representable to a history of ideas as a relation between hu-
man consciousness and the already given – even though the patterns of ex-
perience are probably factors in the constitution of these ideas (Foucault 
2001: 115, 1991: 388-89). The patterns of experience belong instead to the 
process of problematization which results in some relations, modes of be-
haviour, phenomena and processes becoming privileged, while others are 
ignored or reconfigured, forgotten or abandoned. Again this does not mean 
that the problematization does not pertain to reality and exists only in it-
self; the phenomenon – the problematic ‘thing’ – exists in the world as it is 
being exposed to reflection and practice at a given time in history (Foucault 
1996c: 457). As Foucault explains:  
[T]o analyze the process of “problematization” … means: how and why certain 
things (behaviour, phenomena, processes) became a problem. Why, for exam-
ple, certain forms of behaviour were characterized and classified as “madness” 
while other similar forms were completely neglected at a given historical mo-
ment … How and why were very different things in the world gathered together, 
characterized, analyzed, and treated as, for example, “mental illness”? What are 
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the elements which are relevant for a given “problematization”? And even 
though if I won’t say that what is characterized as “schizophrenia” corresponds 
to something real in the world, this has nothing to do with idealism. For I think 
there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of 
problematization. The problematization is an “answer” to a concrete situation 
which is real (Foucault 2001: 171-72). 
As indicated above, the emergence of stress as a ‘thing’ in the body, in a 
very fundamental sense could be said to assert the dimension of a patho-
logical problem, which designated a host of more or less undifferentiated 
symptoms. This host of symptoms, as it was also illustrated, were found to 
be articulated in convergence with the dimension of a self-regulatory re-
sponse, designating a space for individual agency. As fundamental aspects 
of the problematization as an ‘answer’ to a concrete situation, these dimen-
sions of problem and response can act as a guideline to the systematic level 
of inquiry in the following. The simultaneity of these dimensions reflects 
another observation on the process of problematization made by Foucault: 
To one single set of difficulties, several responses can be made. And most of the 
time different responses actually are proposed. But what must be understood is 
what makes them simultaneously possible: it is the point in which their simul-
taneity is rooted (Foucault 1991: 389; italics added). 
What Foucault points to here, is the indissoluble and actual relation be-
tween the process of problematization and the ‘objects’ of this problemati-
zation. Like Foucault’s problematizations, the objects of inquiry in the fol-
lowing chapters on melancholia, acedia and neurasthenia represent not 
only problems, but also responses and suggestions for solutions to concrete 
existing conditions that at the given historical times are problematic (Fou-
cault 2001: 115). These dimensions in the following will be referred to as 
dimensions of response, which mark the realities to which they pertain. As 
the explorations in this thesis will illustrate the dimensions of response can 
often be said to be recursive to the extent that they come to constitute the 
privileged response of a given epoch to a given problem (Foucault 2001: 
117). It is the indication of this level of social recursivity that constitutes the 
main contribution of the thesis in its attempt to historically and philosophi-
cally inform an investigation of the present.    
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What Foucault’s notion of problematizations can contribute to the fol-
lowing is thus not only an indication of the level of inquiry on which an in-
vestigation of a precarious matter like the ‘thing’ in the body may be per-
formed. It also provides an indication of what kind of systematic questions 
such an investigation should ask in order to discover the difficult problems 
and the order of response of a given period and differentiate between them. 
If the history of problematizations is simultaneously the history of how cer-
tain conditions ended up as a specific problematic closely tied to a dimen-
sion of response, then the exploration of a ‘thing’ in the body must inquire 
into why, how and where this ‘thing’ ended up being a specific problem to a 
specific period (Foucault 1996b: 414).  
This represents the difficulty of finding a level on which to compare both 
that which is historically similar and that which is historically different. In 
the case of homosexuality as a problematization that was mentioned above, 
Foucault went about this difficulty by assuming a line of identical categories 
on the background of which he could compare the differences between the 
historical “formations” of homosexuality. While these dimension allowed 
him to represent different historical “periods” – Antiquity, the Roman Em-
pire, early Christianity and Modernity – they also constituted different ethi-
cal categories, fleshing out modes of ethical substance, submission, work 
and teleology that made it possible to both analyze the problematizations in 
their own time according to its ethical “framework” and to compare their 
differences over time.   
When the following chapters ask why, how and where the ’thing’ in the 
body ended up as a problem within the context of the different problematic 
formations of melancholy, acedia and neurasthenia, it will structure its 
questions in a similar manner, which will be taken up at the end of each of 
them. Reflecting the importance of uncovering in which way the ‘thing’ in 
the body has become associated with particular problems and particular 
modes of response, such a level of inquiry can be represented within the fol-
lowing six dimension, which will constitute a structural systematic for the 
explorations in the next chapters. Divided as three problematic dimensions 
and three dimensions of response, these questions are represented below in 
TABLE 1. 
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Reflecting the aspects found above in association with the stress as a 
formal indication, the dimension of the pathological problem and the di-
mension of the self-regulatory response represent the fundamental level of 
inquiry into: What kind of pathology is embedded in the problematical 
formations pertaining to melancholia, acedia, and neurasthenia, respec-
tively? And: Which kind of self-regulatory response is associated with the 
problematical formations pertaining to melancholia, acedia, and neuras-
thenia, respectively? Representing a level of inquiry seeking to illustrate 
how the organization of a psychosomatic pattern of suffering around the 
problematic ‘thing’ in the body comes to be associated with aspects of per-
formativity, the four remaining dimensions of problem and response indi-
cate privileged areas of interest, which all add important facets to the prob-
lematizations. While the relevance of these areas to the investigations of the 
TABLE 1 
Problematical 
Formations 
MELANCHOLIA ACEDIA NEURASTHENIA 
Pathological  
Problem 
What kind of pathology is embedded in the problematical forma-
tions pertaining to melancholia, acedia, and neurasthenia, respec-
tively?  
Characterological 
Problem 
Which kind of character is associated with the problematical forma-
tions pertaining to melancholia, acedia, and neurasthenia, respec-
tively? 
Delimitative 
Problem 
How is the individual separated from the collective in which it takes 
part within the problematical formations pertaining to melancholia, 
acedia, and neurasthenia, respectively? 
Self-Regulatory 
Response 
What kind of self-regulatory response is associated with the prob-
lematical formations pertaining to melancholia, acedia, and neuras-
thenia, respectively? 
Performative  
Response 
Which form does the performative response associated with the 
problematical formations pertaining to melancholia, acedia, and 
neurasthenia take, respectively? 
Self-Articulatory 
Response 
How is the ‘self’ articulated in response to the problematical forma-
tions pertaining to melancholia, acedia, and neurasthenia, respec-
tively? 
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pathologies of performativity can only be fully justified through the explora-
tions of the following chapters, the contemporary phenomenon of stress 
again may prove helpful as an indication. 
The dimension of the characterological problem thus asserts for whom 
the ‘thing’ in the body becomes a problem. This question seeks to indicate 
the kind of character to whom the given association between pathology and 
performativity is relevant. While the dietetic measures of the Italian Ren-
aissance for example was only relevant to the extraordinary and culturally 
formative genius, stress as a ‘thing’ in the body today is relevant primarily 
to the self-managing employee as indicated by the stress-management lit-
erature quoted above. This indicates a problematic contemporary associa-
tion of tropes of labour with those of pathology.  
The third question in the problematic dimension engages with how – or 
better: where – the performing character, to whom the pathological pat-
terns of suffering are relevant are pointed out by the ‘thing’ in the body. The 
assertion, for example, of demonical possession in the problematic forma-
tion of acedia sees the afflicted individual erupt on the outside of the theo-
cosmos, while the pathological deepening of an otherwise productive re-
source in the individual body represented by stress rather characterizes an 
inside to the contemporary collective order. 
On the side of dimensions of response, the two remaining questions 
function as a broadening in the same way. Associating pathology with the 
tropes of individual agency, the question about the performative response 
thus indicates how the performativity of the individual in response to the 
‘thing’ in the body was organized. Within the context of 19th century neuras-
thenia, the dimension of the performative response was organized around 
the management of labour power as a scarce individual resource likeable to 
a ‘second nature’. While contemporary work has taken over many of the 
tropes related to such a management of a personal capital, these resources, 
as the notion of stress formally indicates, is associated today more often 
with the management of subjectivity at work. 
The final question that this thesis uses to inquire into the dimensions of 
response to the problematic of the ‘thing’ in the body indicates the mode in 
which the ‘self’ of the involved character is articulated. Although it does not 
make sense to speak of a ‘self’ in an non-historical manner, the pathologies 
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of performativity, as the following will show, have always been associated 
with the ability (and pathological inability) to represent a ‘self’ in conver-
gence with the collective order they belonged to. To the extraordinary mel-
ancholic discussed in Problems XXX, 1, the ability to represent oneself in 
the context of the exalted self-transformation, which Nietzsche praised 
highly as a ‘great health’, was crucial, because this represented the para-
doxical Aristotelian ‘middle’ in their anomaly. In the context of stress today, 
perhaps, the answer to this question can be found in the democratized ver-
sion of the ability to represent a “self” of self-differentiation. As the conclu-
sion to this thesis will reflect on in a little more detail, it is the contempo-
rary injunction to articulate a “self” in ceaseless development that can be 
said to associate the problem of depression with the organization of work 
today. 
In the following chapters these six questions pertaining to the dimen-
sions of problem and response will constitute the structural level of inquiry 
into the problematizing formations organized around the ‘thing’ in the 
body. 
3. Michel Serres and the Theory of the Quasi-Object  
Following the constitution of the dimensions of problem and response, 
which designate the systematic level of inquiry to the historical formations 
that are organized around the problematic ‘thing’ in the body, the challenge 
remains of explaining the character of this ‘object’ itself in a little more de-
tail. Consequently, this section will discuss the notion of the ‘thing’ in the 
body in association with Michel Serres’ theory of quasi-objects (Serres 
2007, Serres 1987, Serres 1995, Latour 1992). Such a discussion will indi-
cate how the ‘thing’ can be understood as a social bond. 
Reflecting the formal indication of the ‘thing’ in the sections above, in 
Serres’ words, the quasi-object ‘is not an object, but it is one nevertheless, 
since it is not a subject, since it is in the world; it is also a quasi-subject, 
since it marks or designates a subject who, without it, would not be a sub-
ject.’ (Serres 2007: 225) The evasive character of Serres’ definition of the 
quasi-object may be appeased, perhaps, by looking at it from the perspec-
tive of what is being developed in this thesis. As a ‘thing’ in the body, the 
black bile of the outstanding Aristotelian character is not an object in the 
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strict sense that a tumour or even a haemorrhage would be. Governed by 
the interaction of opposite energies like the froth, its euphoric counterpoint 
that is found in the sea, in wine and in the sperm of man (Kristeva 1989: 7), 
it is defined by the intervention in it and mobilization of it. Yet since it is 
some-thing, a res extensa taking up space in the world like the body, it must 
be an object; but only if it exists as a quasi-subject marking the melancholic 
who holds on to it. Like the example of the imaging of stress on a molecular 
level from Stress Management for Dummies discussed earlier, the quasi-
object points out the subject that holds on to it, not the other way around. 
Put in terms of what has been developed above, the ‘thing’ is primary to the 
principle of individuation, weaving the individual rather than being weaved 
by it. The ‘thing’, in Serres’ words: ‘is the quasi-object and quasi-subject by 
which I am subject, that is to say, sub-mitted, fallen, put beneath, trampled, 
tackled, thrown about, subjugated, exposed’ (Serres 2007: 227). It is 
through the dilemma of the ‘thing’ that ‘I’ comes to know itself – and is able 
to regulate and differentiate this self as a self. 
Serres presents the theory of the quasi-object in terms of the concept of 
play, but from a very different perspective than the more famous Spiel-
metaphor of his German colleague, Hans-Georg Gadamer. If the hermeneu-
tic subject in Gadamer’s concept of play is defined wholly by the ‘mode of 
being of play as such’, which does not ‘allow the player to behave towards 
play as if towards an object’ (Gadamer 1975: 102), then in Serres’ work it is 
the object in play that designates both the subject and the collective that it 
emerges from.   
Serres uses the example of a children’s game, the game of hunt-the-
slipper, where all players except one are named ‘cobblers’ and sit on the 
floor in a circle a few inches apart. The ‘customer’ remains inside the circle 
to hunt the slipper that passes from hand to hand very rapidly in the circle. 
The one in whose hand it is caught then becomes the new ‘customer’, and 
pays a forfeit. The slipper (in French Serres refers to the furet) in this game, 
according to Serres, resembles the quasi-object, because it points out the 
individual, picks her out when it is found in one of the player’s hands. The 
one who is not discovered remains part of the anonymous chain, circulat-
ing, never recognized or discovered:  
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Who are we? Those who pass the furet; those who don’t have it. This quasi-
object, when being passed, makes the collective, if it stops, it makes the individ-
ual. If he is discovered, he is “it” [mort]. Who is the subject, who is an “I,” or 
who am I? The moving furet weaves the “we,” the collective; if it stops, it marks 
the “I” (Serres 2007: 225). 
The ‘thing’ in the body, rather than being reducible to a natural substance 
or a social construction can be thought of in terms of this furet, the quasi-
object that passes through a social group and mediates identities, both col-
lective and personal, transforming itself while it circulates. The black bile, 
the demon of acedia, the nerves, stress in the body of the contemporary 
employee; these ‘objects’ all have in common that they pass through collec-
tives weaving the social group and marking the “I” by exposing the individ-
ual to a Fall, to the subjugation under the dense heap of others.  
This is, Serres argues, what sets the quasi-object apart from other ob-
jects: like a ball it has no value, no function or meaning unless in the hands 
of a subject that holds it. The demon in the desert is stupid if there is no one 
in the desert with it. The quasi-object is only relevant as it shuttles back and 
forth between individual and collective, like the slipper in the children’s 
game, weaving the knowledge about who are subjects and who are not. 
Consequently, the one who plays ball is subjected not to the play itself, as 
Gadamer would have it, but to the circulating object that presents itself as 
the subject of circulation. The quasi-object witnesses the players only as re-
lays and stations in the production of a nature (‘out there’), a society (‘up 
there’) and an individuality (‘in here’) alike:  
Playing is nothing else but making oneself the attribute of the ball as a sub-
stance. The laws are written for it, defined relative to it, and we bend to these 
laws. Skill with the ball supposes a Ptolemaic revolution of which few theoreti-
cians are capable, since they are accustomed to being subjects in a Copernican 
world where objects are slaves (Serres 2007: 226). 
As the subject of the pathos described above as the somatic pattern of fail-
ure of the self to take care of itself, the ‘thing’ in the body is the martyr (as 
Serres remarks, the Greek word for “witness” is martyr) that witnesses the 
articulation of rules, the bringing together and separation of networks of in-
stitutions and authorities and the ethical shaping of power, knowledge and 
morality as it passes through the individual. Reflecting Foucault’s theory of 
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problematizations, the ‘thing’ is interesting as a problem because of its pre-
carious character that designates collective identities, network relations and 
subjectivity.  
As Serres demonstrates, the character of such a dilemma is that it 
emerges at a given moment in history and may disappear again unresolved 
as ‘history and attention bifurcate’ (Serres 2007: 226). The lycanthrope as a 
dilemma, for example, to the 16th and 17th century, represented the precari-
ous indistinction between man and animal and the general difficulty both in 
philosophy, science and law of performing the human-animal divide. Yet 
pervasive as this dilemma was in its time, as the theories of evolution 
evoked the bestial inheritance of humanity and opened the potentiality for 
lycanthropy to all individuals within the framework of degeneracy (e.g. du 
Coudray 2002, Lawrence 1996), that which used to be true was no longer 
important; that which had supposed to be decided was no longer relevant. 
Reflecting Foucault’s theory of problematizations, the indication of the 
‘thing’ in the body is it emerges as problematic at a given time in history 
designates a realm in which something is introduced as an ‘object’ for dis-
cursive as well as non-discursive activity and thought out of which the truth 
emerges. 
It is on this background that the ‘thing’ in the body can be thought of as a 
social bond, the nature of which may be represented by the distinction that 
Bruno Latour makes between matters of fact and matters of concern (La-
tour 2004). It was Martin Heidegger who initially provided the means for 
this distinction in his discussion of the ontology of the thing, das Ding 
(Heidegger 1970). As Latour points out, Heidegger illustrates how in the 
etymology of the word thing in all European languages, there exists a strong 
relation between the object and the word for a judiciary assembly. The Ice-
landic word for the parliament is Althing. Like the Danish folketing (lit.: 
“assembly of the people”) it uses the word thing to designate the place for 
political dispute. Also in old English this meaning is reflected as the word 
originally designates an assembly. A thing, Latour argues with Heidegger, 
can thus be taken to mean both ‘an object out there and, in another sense, 
an issue very much in there, at any rate, a gathering.’ (Latour 2004: 233) 
The word thing entails a double meaning: designating both a matter of fact 
and a matter of concern, it refers simultaneously to an object that is ex-
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pelled from the political sphere, something that stands out objectively and 
independently (like stress), and to the Ding as an issue that brings people 
together in its division of them, in its problematic character (also like 
stress) (Latour 2005). As a philosophical problem, the ‘thing’ in the body 
that is examined in this thesis takes exactly this form: it designates an ob-
ject (the Gegenstand in Heideggerian terms) as a matter of fact that may at 
the same time be taken to be – or may be turned into – a matter of concern 
(das Ding). As reflected above, this transformation and its historical bifur-
cations, the direction of its ‘flow’ is what makes it interesting as a social 
bond.  
As Latour (2004: 235) maintains such transformations may go both 
ways. An object may suddenly become a matter of great concern, while a 
‘thing’ that was once the nexus of dispute may lose its precarious status, 
and become once again just another object. In terms of the ‘thing’ in the 
body, the formal indication of stress may again serve as a good example. 
While it can be said that the discovery of stress as a problem in the late 20th 
century was more a rediscovery (Cassidy 1999), the term itself was almost 
unknown outside the engineering profession, where it was used in relation 
to how man-made structures (e.g. bridges) could withstand heavy loads 
without collapsing, before the 1940s (Haward 1960, see also: Cooper and 
Dewe 2005). Only with its emergence as a condition did it gain the popular-
ity that it has today as a matter of great concern. On the other hand, the 
black bile of the humoral theories, which for about two millennia was a cen-
tre of attention for physicians, theologians and scientists alike, has passed 
into oblivion, as it is no longer associated with melancholy at all. If the me-
laina cholé for almost two millennia was a matter of great concern, today 
melancholy is reduced to be a thing of the past. 
Together with the systematic dimensions of problems and response, this 
assertion of the ‘thing’ in the body as a matter of concern working to struc-
ture the collective identities, network relations and subjectivities in orbit 
around it opens the way to the historical explorations. Yet before this, one 
aspect remains. If melancholy is said to be a thing of the past, a discussion 
of which past is in place. The following section will engage with this ques-
tion, illustrating how both the phenomena of acedia and neurasthenia can 
be seen as parts of the history of melancholy. 
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4. Historiography: One or Several Melancholies?  
In what is arguably one of the strangest works of English literature, The 
Anatomy of Melancholy, Robert Burton (1577-1640), a mathematician and 
scholar who professed to be writing in the attempt to keep his own depres-
sion under control, asserts that not even the many languages of the Tower 
of Babel yielded the confusion of the variety of symptoms found in the phe-
nomenon of melancholy. Burton’s book, on which he worked for the most of 
a lifetime (preparing four editions, while his final alterations were included 
posthumously), in the words of his modern day editors is ‘a patchwork quilt 
of almost half a million words of miscellaneous learning, an inexhaustible 
quarry of quotations, a rambling, often irrelevant, irregularly systematized 
commentary on the human comedy, always excessive and overspilling.’ 
(Carter 1954: 1) Remaining more a curiosity shop of learnedness than a 
medical treatise, The Anatomy of Melancholy in its time became a short cut 
for anyone who wanted to quickly master the art of make-shift erudition 
and remained so deep into the 19th century (Radden 2000b). 
In many ways this description of Burton’s work is emblematic to the 
broad and colorful history of melancholy in western culture. The concept 
retains a place in psychiatric discourse today, referring to a melancholic 
subtype of major depression (American Psychiatric Association 2000) and 
some researchers hold that it should be reinstated as a distinctive mood 
disorder (e.g. Fink & Taylor 2007, Frost 1992), but to most people it has 
been reduced to a description of a sombre mood in artworks, music and 
cinema. Yet for over two millennia, melancholy played a central role in the 
cultural shaping and fashioning of the human being, covering and explain-
ing such diverse fields as mental illness, lovesickness, artistic genius, shape 
shifting, mere lack of reason, shear madness, the state of bourgeois society 
and hysteria in women, just to mention a few. The melancholic of the Aris-
totelian Problems was a great man worthy of praise for his contribution to 
culture and society, like the Renaissance melancholic exemplified by the 
artist with the ability to sublimate the forces of Saturn creatively. On the 
other hand melancholy in the 17th century was ascribable to almost every-
one who objected to the Enlightenment ideology: as Böhme shows (Böhme 
1988) the list covers both pietists and separatists, romantic dreamers and 
fanatics, enthusiasts and visionaries, ‘monkish’ ascetics, religionists and the 
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superstitious. Marxists saw in melancholy the effect of a bourgeoisie that 
had failed to resolve the historical social dichotomies in a positive way. The 
first congress of Soviet writers thus decided that the goal of literature was to 
oppose the social circumstances that caused the melancholy of the people. 
Melancholy, to the marxists, constituted bourgeois decadence (Klibansky, 
Panofsky & Saxl 2001: 14).  
On this background, perhaps, it is not so surprising that the two most 
prominent contemporary works on the history of melancholy, Stanley Web-
ber Jackson’s Melancholia and Depression: From Hippocratic Times to 
Modern times (Jackson 1986) and Porter and Berios’ History of Clinical 
Psychiatry (Porter & Berrios 1999), represent two radically different per-
spectives. Jackson’s work presents a complete and impressive historical 
overview of a clinical syndrome – or as Jackson indicates, a group of closely 
related clinical syndromes – stretching from Ancient Greece and Rome over 
their more curious manifestations in lycanthropy and nostalgia to their dif-
fusion into the modern day concept of depression. Finding ‘a remarkable 
consistency’ of symptoms that explains ‘the etiology and pathogenesis of 
melancholia and depression’ (Jackson 1986: ix), Jackson’s work argues for 
a continuity in the history of the affliction.  
The standpoint taken by Porter and Berrios in their History of Clinical 
Psychiatry (1999) is the opposite. Arguing that up to the Napoleonic Wars 
melancholia was no more than a rag-bag of insanity states whose only 
common denominator was the presence of few (as opposed to many) delu-
sions, while sadness and low affect (which were no doubt present in some 
cases) were not considered to be definitory symptoms, their perspective is 
one of a discontinuity. Jennifer Radden, in her introduction to a collection 
of classic texts on melancholy in The Nature of Melancholy (2000), also 
falls in this category, as she finds that the differences between melancholia 
and depression, are ‘more persuasive than the similarities’ (see also: Rad-
den 2000b, Radden 2003: 48). 
With these dissimilarities in mind, how is it possible to write a history of 
melancholy? How can a historical continuity be introduced into a source 
material of this diverse character and magnitude that sometimes seems to 
only be held together by difference? With its association of both acedia and 
neurasthenia with melancholy as a cultural and clinical phenomenon, the 
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history that this thesis tells obviously is one of both continuity and of dis-
continuity. As a kind of history of the ‘thing’ in body as a problem demand-
ing an individual response of those implicated, the history of melancholy in 
this thesis focuses primarily on the dimensions of self-regulation and its de-
ficiencies. This history is one of discontinuities associated primarily by their 
ability to illustrate a relation between pathology and performativity. To 
speak of pathologies of performativity in this sense means to provide a 
level of continuity, which argues that melancholy, acedia and neurasthenia 
are not reducible to each other, and yet, when they are joined, provide one 
history which may illustrate a central theme in Western culture.  
The contours of such a history (which for good reasons cannot be more 
than exactly that before the following chapters) may be provided by offering 
a short introduction to the history of melancholy on a more general level 
and by reflecting on how the phenomena of acedia and neurasthenia are as-
sociated with it. This will also provide a welcome opportunity to introduce 
some of the literature, on the background of which the following chapters 
are written. Apart from the works mentioned above, also the psychiatrist 
Hubertus Tellenbach’s clinical study Melancholy (Tellenbach 1980) and 
Julia Kristeva’s Black Sun (Kristeva 1989) constitute important contribu-
tions to this history. Engaging with the history of melancholy from a con-
temporary perspective, the philosopher Michael Theunissen’s short but 
enlightening Vorentwürfe von Moderne – antike Melancholie und die 
Acedia des Mittelalters (Theunissen 1996) belongs also to this category.  
These works show that melancholy always covered a far wider spectrum 
than the narrow one of disease. The wide range of emotional variations that 
it reflects, concern matters at the very heart of what it means to be human, 
and is thus in itself not reducible to pathology: feelings of sadness, depres-
sion, despair, anxiety, but also of being dispirited, discouraged, disap-
pointed, dejected, despondent – or merely bored – have been known to 
human beings through the entire cultural history of the Western world. 
Melancholy, as Radden concludes ‘is both a normal disposition and a sign 
of mental disturbance; it is both a feeling and a way of behaving. It is a 
nebulous mood but also a set of self-accusing beliefs.’ (Radden 2000b: ix) 
This grey area between pathology and more common traits of character is 
very well reflected in the terminological transformation that the notion has 
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gone through. Melancholia is the Latin transliteration of the Greek melag-
cholia, which in ancient Greece was largely reducible to a mental disorder 
involving prolonged sorrow and fear without cause. Sometimes it was just 
used in popular speech to denote ‘crazy or nervous conduct’ and – along 
with its cognates – denoted ‘biliousness’ (Jackson 1986: 4). This term, on 
the other hand, was derived from melaina cholé, later translated into Latin 
as atra bilis and the English black bile (melas, “black”, + cholé, “bile”). As 
one of the four humours in Greek science, which taught the existence of 
four corresponding elements (earth, air, fire, and water), the black bile was 
believed to be the causing factor in melancholia. The Hippocratic medicine 
conceived of health as a balanced relationship between the four humours in 
the human body: blood, phlegm, black and yellow bile; and imbalance (not 
only in the black bile) would cause variations in temperaments as well as 
different states of characteristic disorders in a given person. 
In English writings the various forms of melancholia, taken from Latin, 
began to appear in the 14th century as malencolye, melancoli, malencolie, 
melancholie, melancholy, and others variations on the basic term in medi-
cal thought (Jackson 1986: 5). During the 16th and the 17th century melan-
cholie and melancholy became common terms for naming the disease, both 
in English and in other languages, where they often just came to mean the 
black bile itself. But in addition to denoting the illness, during this period, 
the terms also came to be used for describing various non-pathological 
states of sorrow, dejection or despair, including well-respected somberness 
and fashionable sadness. It was only during the 18th century, with the emer-
gence of clinical psychiatry, that the two terms became separated once 
more, with melancholia gradually coming to be restricted again to the dis-
ease, while melancholy remained a synonym for it, but was also in more 
popular use as a diffuse term denoting different non-pathological states of 
mind. To some commentators this complex structure of the construct, 
which on the one hand stretches it towards pathological states of mind, and 
on the other, involves a whole array of more or less common-place symp-
toms, makes it comparable to the contemporary concept of depression (e.g. 
Jackson 1986). 
The problem of maintaining a formal distinction between forms of men-
tal disorder and more common and non-pathological states related to for 
  
 
 
Chapter One: Introducing the ‘Thing’ in the Body 
40 
example moral dilemmas represents the most fundamental dimension of 
melancholy with which both the phenomenon of acedia and that of neuras-
thenia share a qualitative coherence. While acedia may be taken, as Sieg-
fried Wenzel shows in his work The Sin of Sloth: Acedia in Medieval 
Thought and Literature (1967), to denote primarily despair associated with 
the aversion felt by man against his own spiritual good (Wenzel 1967: 48), 
the phenomenon – apart from a host of symptoms – shares thematically 
with melancholy the precarious position between pathology and non-
pathology. Also neurasthenia takes this position in spite of not primarily 
being associated with the fear and sadness without cause, which has always 
played a central role in the history of melancholy. Although its predominant 
symptom was inhibition associated with the tropes of energy so popular at 
the time, the phenomenon’s status as what Anson Rabinbach in his work 
The Human Motor (1992) calls an ‘ethic of resistance to work’ (Rabinbach 
1992: 167) positions it on the threshold between pathology and non-
pathology.  
Focusing on this in the history of melancholy, the following explorations 
form a historical continuity on the level of self-regulation associated with 
this precarious threshold. It thus centres on the historical dimension of an 
individual ability to perform and on the hyperboles of affect, which may 
describe the deficiencies of this performativity. Stretching from Plato’s 
original antinomy between mania and amathia, between madness and a 
kind of uncultivated ignorance of those who fail to govern themselves, and 
to the contemporary debates about depression and self-management, this 
aspect constitutes an important theme in the history of melancholy repre-
sented in this thesis. This broad definition of melancholy and its tropes fol-
lows Foucault’s assertion in The History of Madness (1961) that the unity of 
the affliction was not defined by observed characteristics or by a presumed 
causality, but rather by a qualitative coherence, with its own laws of trans-
ference, development and transformation.  
The assertion of a level of inquiry into the history of melancholy, which 
includes both acedia and neurasthenia by focusing fundamentally on per-
formativity and its deficiencies, leads naturally to a second theme. If the 
history of melancholy focuses on the ability to regulate the self as a central 
aspect of the phenomena it includes, then it touches also on the important 
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issue of the representation of affects on the precarious threshold between 
pathology and non-pathology. As Radden argues, fear and sadness without 
an obvious cause have been a key aspect in the understanding of melan-
choly since the earliest Hippocratic writings and has stayed so ever since 
(Radden 2000a: 10). On this background another central theme in the fol-
lowing is the association in the historical formations between emotional 
suffering and great achievement. 
As the following will show, the association between suffering and 
achievement has constituted a central motif in this history from the earliest 
references to melancholic states. In tragic drama, Orestes’ attempt to 
avenge the death of his father Agamemnon is a good example of this. Great 
heroes like Ajax and Jason, as the following will show, were seen to walk 
the thin line between states of extreme dejection and despair and states of 
glory. Bellerophon, the rider of the Pegasus became famously known as the 
first melancholic hero, when he was mentioned by the author of Problems 
XXX, 1, who quotes Homer as saying that Bellerophon ended his life wan-
dering “alone on the plain of Aleïum, eating his heart out, and avoiding the 
track of men” (953b23-25)ii. And already the Epic of Gilgamesh, originally 
entitled ‘He who Saw the Deep’ (Sha naqba īmuru) (Gardner, Maier & Hen-
shaw 1985), portrays this relation between states of extreme emotional suf-
fering bordering on madness and the achievement of heroic glory.  
This theme ties especially acedia to the history of melancholy. Not be-
cause the afflicted monastic was a hero; his pattern of emotional suffering 
was rather taken as a sign of spiritual boredom. But because the reality of 
the theocosmos that he pertained to represented a ‘higher order’ beyond 
him, demanding an absolute vigilance in the control of his affective life. In a 
world where the Passion of the Christ made suffering a virtuous deed and 
an absolute prerequisite for the performative convergence of the monastic 
with the institution of vice and virtue, sorrow without cause was more than 
simply a matter of mood. Constituting an absolute vertigo of the religious 
order, the earthly sorrow of those suffering from acedia constituted not 
only a personal tragedy, but also an aversion against the ‘good works’ of 
Christianity when the spiritual good appeared all of a sudden to man as evil. 
Described by Peter Toohey as ‘the Epidemiology of Individuality’ in his 
work Melancholy, Love and Time (2004: 132), the affliction of acedia 
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among the anchorites with its characteristic symptoms of laziness, inertia, 
slowing of time and unwillingness to pursue spiritual exercises, undoubt-
edly represents an emblematic example of a relation between melancholic 
tropes of suffering and performativity associated with the ability to regulate 
the self. 
Finally, this association of a psychosomatic pattern of suffering with per-
formativity in the history of melancholy, which to the following represents a 
privileged level of inquiry, is found also on a level that can only be tenta-
tively presented here. This level of inquiry concerns the gradual transfor-
mation of what performativity means in the history of melancholy. From 
the famous Aristotelian question in Problems about why all great men are 
melancholics, to the glorification of melancholy and the emergence of the 
modern understanding of the genius, which as the following will show can 
be traced back to Florentine neo-Platonism, the association of melancholy 
with creative abilities has been a theme. Emblematic of this theme is espe-
cially Dürer’s Melencholia I, discussed in much detail by Klibansky, Panof-
sky, and Saxl in their influential Saturn and Melancholy (1964). Melencho-
lia I portrays a figure, cheek resting on the hand, with a brooding and som-
bre facial expression. The combination of this melancholic countenance 
with the geometer’s tools lying scattered and unused at the feet of the 
seated figure, suggests the polarity in melancholy between states of dejec-
tion and creative abilities. The long tradition of a link between creative gen-
ius and melancholy was revived in the Romanticist literary movement of 
the late 18th and early 19th century. The melancholic artist was characterized 
by feeling deeper and by being closer to the true and sublime than ordinary 
people. The suffering associated with melancholy was idealized and seen as 
inherently valuable, even if it was dark and tormenting. The fashionability 
of suffering in the service of a more profound responsiveness to a height-
ened sense of reality was also reflected in the larger emphasis in psychiatry 
on the cyclical nature of affective disorders (Radden 2000a). Although to-
day melancholy has to a large extent become obsolete as an explanation, 
psychiatric classifications like bipolar type II have taken over the role of 
representing this more sensitive state of being in the world. A quite recent 
example is Alice W. Flaherty’s The Midnight Disease (2004), where she 
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questions whether her happiness related to hypergraphia is merely a symp-
tom of her bipolar illness: 
The scientist asks how I call my writing vocation and not addiction. I no longer 
see why I should have to make that distinction. I am addicted to breathing in the 
same way. I write because when I don’t, it is suffocating. I write because some-
thing much larger than myself comes into me that suffuses the page, the world, 
with meaning (Flaherty 2004: 266). 
At the other end of this association between creativity and melancholic 
states of mind, the related theme of an association between melancholy, 
tropes of labour and states of idleness is found. The most famous indication 
of this association – apart of course from proverbs like: idleness is the root 
of all evil – may be Robert Burton’s observation in The Anatomy of Melan-
choly that there is no greater cause of melancholy than idleness and no bet-
ter cure than business (Burton 1986: 4). The representation of certain types 
of activity as melancholic, but also the conviction among the medical writ-
ers of the 19th century, such as Freud and Janet, that melancholia especially 
in women was closely related to strenuous action, linked melancholic states 
of mind inevitably to productivism, the belief that human society and na-
ture were related primarily by productive activity (Rabinbach 1992). From 
being represented primarily as a mental category in relation to idleness, 
melancholy during the industrialization became more and more related to 
the 19th century obsession with physical fatigue. As Rabinbach has shown, 
states of mental fatigue were classified as ‘diseases of the will’ and the fash-
ionable diagnosis ‘neurasthenia’ became a popular theme both in the litera-
ture of the age and an object of scientific and medical study. Mental and 
physical exhaustion ‘was not merely the consequence of physical overexer-
tion, but the cause of a variety of physical and mental pathologies born of 
the languid and torpid state of men, women and especially school age chil-
dren’ (Rabinbach 1992: 20). 
Representing a central aspect of the history told in the following chap-
ters, the assertion of a relation between melancholic states of mind, cultural 
decadence, physical exhaustion and the ability to perform as a social re-
source culminates in the 19th century obsession with the tropes of energy. 
As Wolf Lepenies has illustrated in his Melancholy and Society (1992), the 
melancholic by this time had come to represent the verso of the entrepre-
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neurial homo europaeus, whose aggressive philosophy of action was con-
quering the world. 
And yet, in a curious fashion, it is Nietzsche, the philosopher of the will 
par excellence, who in an aphorism from The Gay Science (1882) relates 
the history of melancholy once again with performativity in a fashion that 
reflects the level of inquiry found in the following chapters. In “The Great 
Health”, Nietzsche describes a ‘stronger, more seasoned, tougher, more au-
dacious and gayer’ (Nietzsche 2001: 246) health than any other. It is a 
health that is not meant for everyone; or rather, it is a health needed only 
by those of premature birth, the ‘nameless, hard to understand ones’ (ibid.), 
who have set for themselves new goals in an as yet unproven future. These 
self-transformative ‘argonauts of the ideal’, who have ‘suffered shipwreck 
and damage often enough’ (ibid.), do not need this new health because they 
are sick. On the contrary, Nietzsche argues: they are bursting with health 
already; they are ‘dangerously healthy, ever again healthy’ (ibid.: 247). They 
need the great health, this health ‘that one does not merely have but also 
acquires continually, and must acquire because one gives it up again and 
again’, because they are not satisfied with the goals, dreams and ideals of 
’present-day man’ (ibid.). The new goal they have set for themselves, and 
for which the great health is a mean, is the ideal of another spirit, the spirit 
of ‘a human, superhuman well-being and benevolence’ (ibid.).  
Interestingly, this health of a future ascent in a more literal sense be-
longs to the past. The ‘argonauts of the ideal’ to whom Nietzsche writes and 
who are in need of the great health are the ones with a soul: 
… that craves to have experienced the whole range of values and desiderata to 
date, and to have sailed around all the coasts of this ideal “Mediterranean”; 
whoever wants to know from the adventures of his own most authentic experi-
ence how a discoverer and conqueror of the ideal feels, and also an artist, a 
saint, a legislator, a sage, a scholar, a pious man, a soothsayer and one who 
stands divinely apart in the old style … (ibid.) 
The list of characters named here by Nietzsche as examples of conquerors 
of the ideal who may teach the disposition of the great health is not arbi-
trary. The ‘one who stands divinely apart in the old style’ most likely is a 
reference to the Platonic indication of a divine madness of inspiration out-
lined in Phaidros (Phd. 244a-249e). The true manic lover, suffering from a 
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form of self-transgressive ecstasy, an exciting of the self, is characterized as 
a species of philosopher. The term enthousiasis, which is used to describe 
him, literally means a state of divine possession (Obdrzalek 2008). The ‘one 
who stands divinely apart in the old style’, in Plato’s divine inspiration, ex-
periences the great health of self-transformation through a suffering bor-
dering on madness. 
In fact most of the characters on Nietzsche’s list are taken from the 
opening question of Problems XXX, 1 that it can be argued has an emblem-
atic character to the history of melancholy: “Why is it that all men who have 
become outstanding in philosophy, statesmanship, poetry or the arts are 
melancholic, or are infected by the diseases arising from black bile?” 
(953a10-13) Asking not whether the extraordinary in character suffer from 
melancholy, but rather why, the author hints at the pivoting point around 
which the following explorations of the pathologies of performativity re-
volve: the assumption of a natural relation in Western history between in-
dividual patterns of suffering, the regulation of the self and the ability to 
achieve the extraordinary – whether this ability is found within the cultur-
ally formative context of the genius or within the contemporary context of 
the self-managing employee. 
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Prologue 
There is little doubt that the most important classical text to the history of 
the ‘thing’ in the body presented in this thesis remains Problems XXX, 1 
from the Corpus Aristotelicum. It is here that the melaina cholé – the black 
bile – is singled out among the other humours of the Hippocratic humoral 
theory as a natural substance in the bodies of the extraordinary in character 
around which their paradoxical disposition is structured. Yet as this part of 
the thesis will illustrate, the designation in Problems XXX, 1 of the black 
bile as a ‘thing’ in the body through which the ēthos perriton, the out-
standing in character, must manage themselves, is part of a broader decos-
mologization out of which the care of the self as an individual responsibility 
emerges. With roots that are lost in time, the hyperbolic emotional re-
sponse of the tragic hero represents the precarious emergence of an indi-
vidual who is in ceaseless conflict with his own fate and with the divine 
powers of the cosmos in relation to which he must observe a harmonious 
position. As the next chapter will illustrate, the history of the tragic hero 
designates the outstanding ēthos of the heroic individuality in whom the ex-
cessive emotional response, which will later become the hallmark of the 
melancholic personality, is manifested both in a psychosomatic pattern of 
suffering and in the great achievements that makes him what he is. Struc-
tured around the sublimation of suffering, the great deed of the dejected 
and melancholic hero is represented as the virtuosity of a character whose 
destiny is in the hands of the gods that determine his fate. As a precursor of 
the later Aristotelian naturalization that designates the black bile as the 
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substance dominating the outstanding melancholic ēthos, the psychoso-
matic patterns of suffering among tragic heroes like Bellerophon, Orestes or 
Jason represents the emotional hyperbole of a heroic individuality that is 
both the source of achievement and of maddening torment. 
It is to this disposition that the designation in the work of Plato of mel-
ancholy and its psychosomatic patterns of suffering as a specific kind of ig-
norance – amathia – represents the process of the decosmologization that 
culminates in the Aristotelian Problems XXX, 1. As section 2 of this chapter 
illustrates, Plato assumes an antonymic figure of madness that joins the no-
tion of the hyperbolic emotional response found in the character of the 
tragic hero with the theory of exallagé – of divine inspiration. The assump-
tion of erōs as an aporetic condition originating from a psychosomatic rela-
tion between pain and pleasure defines the exceptional ēthos of someone 
who suffers more profoundly than others in terms of a proportion of self-
regulation. On the one hand the divinely inspired mania of the great he-
roes, the poets and the philosophers expose them to a greater danger of 
disproportion than ordinary human beings. On the other hand the notion 
of amathia designates the melancholy of the ignorant, whose dispropor-
tionate, insufficient or deficient self-regulation leads only to the suffering of 
morbid madness. Representing the loss of proportion to ametria, the mel-
ancholic madness of someone who fails to lead himself, in Plato’s work 
represents an antonymic figure to that of the genius, whose ‘higher’ mad-
ness brings him in harmony with the Platonic cosmos as it is described in 
the Timaeus. The partial decosmologization in the work of Plato is repre-
sented by the emergence of melancholy as a kind of disproportionate igno-
rance of the one that, like the leader who becomes a tyrant because of ex-
cess, fails to lead himself in the proper fashion. 
The assumption in the Aristotelian Problems XXX, 1 of a natural and 
non-pathological kind of melancholy structured around the management of 
the black bile as a ‘thing’ in the body can be seen on this background. As the 
third section of this chapter illustrates, the culmination of the decosmologi-
zation of the exceptional human being results from the emergence of the 
black bile as a ‘thing’ in the body of the ēthos perriton – the extraordinary 
in character – that must be managed in order for him not to succumb to the 
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diseases typical of his temperament. The melania cholé emerges as a ‘prob-
lem’ of self-regulation for the specific nature of the few and culturally for-
mative. Yet as the assumption of a ‘nature’ in the Aristotelian sense, this 
disposition is desubstantialized as soon as it is defined. The melancholic 
disposition of the outstanding human being in Problems XXX, 1 emerges as 
the paradox of a nature in conflict with itself, because it presupposes the 
unnatural and exceptional in the ēthos that it describes. The emergence of 
the ‘thing’ in the body in Problems XXX, 1 designates the assumption of a 
teleology without a telos, the ceaseless self-differentiation towards a higher 
or greater health, the provisionality of which is manifested as a psychoso-
matic pattern of suffering in the bodies of the exceptional melancholics. 
Representing this suffering, paradoxically, not as a result, but rather as the 
prerequisite of a natural disposition, which becomes pathological when it is 
deepened, the exceptional character of Problems XXX, 1 is subjected to the 
manifestation of a double pathos: first as a transience as opposed to the 
ideal of the ēthos represented by the assumption of a ‘higher middle’, and 
secondly as the affection causing a somatic and psychical pattern of suffer-
ing, which structures the management of the self. 
While the intercourse of the culturally formative in Problems XXX, 1 
with the black bile structuring their temperament in this sense is primarily 
of prophylactic character, the Aristotelian theory in the dietetic programs 
of the melancholic genius in the Renaissance is recast in a much more ac-
tive fashion. As the final section of this chapter illustrates, the combination 
in the work of the scholar Marsilio Ficino of physiological Aristotelian ar-
guments with neo-Platonic theory, constitutes a double Renaissance that 
subjects the melancholic to a two-fold source of suffering. Exposed to both 
the effects of the black bile and to the influences of its astrological analogue, 
the planet Saturn, the protean being of the Renaissance genius must ac-
tively seek to intervene on, identify, mobilize and manipulate the effects of 
the ‘thing’ in the body. Out of this double source emerges the grand theory 
of a dietetic of active self-transformation, which the melancholic must ex-
pose himself to tota mente in order to redeem his divine potential. The de-
cosmologization represented by the history of the black bile emerges in the 
Renaissance as an internalization of cosmos, a theory of ‘the heavens 
within us’, reflecting the correspondence between protean man and the 
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world that surrounds him. Accentuating a psychosomatic pattern of suffer-
ing, the assumption of the black bile as a ‘thing’ in the body of the extraor-
dinary few, emerges as an occasion for the active and continuous sublima-
tion of suffering, which exposes the dietetic problem of self-leadership as an 
anticipatory sketch of the problematic in contemporary times. 
1. The Emotional Hyperbole of Heroic Individuality 
The metaphysical resonance of the great tragedies, from King Oedipus to 
Hamlet, all depend on one central motif, the origin of which is lost in time: 
that greatness of character demands great sacrifice, that the extraordinary 
individual is subject to torment nearly beyond human capacity, that the line 
drawn between greatness and madness is thin, vague and sometimes even 
invisible. Western cultural history is full of melancholic heroes. As far back 
as any historical documentation will testify, the relation between suffering 
and achievement has represented an elementary theme of human existence.  
Constituting an important background to the history of the melaina 
cholé – the black bile – as a ‘thing’ in the body, beginning in the 4th century 
B.C. in Greece, the motif of the emotionally tormented hero can be found as 
far back as the Epic of Gilgamesh, originating about 3500 B.C. and count-
ing as the first major work in the history of literature. While some elements 
of the history about the ruler from Sumeria, who became one of  the great-
est heroes of all times, will probably appear quite foreign to a modern day 
reader, some other elements almost certainly will not. Presenting the heroic 
deeds of Gilgamesh, who journeys to the end of the world to retrieve his 
friend and one-time rival Enkidu, who has died and been claimed by the 
nether world, the epic poem also portrays a very human and faulty hero, 
who struggles with the tormenting feelings of loss and mourning that are 
driving him mad. Reflecting somatic and psychopathological symptoms 
found in any modern day textbook on depression – mood reactivity, general 
dejection, a sensation of heaviness in limbs and sleeplessness – the pattern 
of suffering found in Gilgamesh’s character is, as pointed out by Rose 
Spiegel (Spiegel 1997), inseparable from the nature of his conquest. His 
friend Enkidu dies after a dream that foreshadows his death and Gil-
gamesh, struck by his death, sets out to retrieve him and to achieve immor-
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tality. His restless wanderings are represented as the immediate result of 
losing his beloved companion, with whom he shared all good things: 
Enkidu, friend, loved-one, who chased the wild ass, panther of the steppe. 
We overcame everything: climbed the mountain, 
captured the Bull of Heaven and killed him, 
brought Humbaba to grief, who lives in the cedar forest; 
entering the mountain gates we slew lions; 
my friend whom I love dearly underwent with me all hardships (IX. i, 47-51).iii 
Gilgamesh mourns this loss, but the process of mourning takes on an exces-
sive extent to which the central aspect becomes Gilgamesh’s fear of his own 
death: 
The fate of mankind overtook him. 
Six days and seven nights I wept over him 
until a worm fell out of his nose. 
Then I was afraid. 
In fear of death I roam the wilderness. The case of my friend Enkidu lies heavy in me. 
On a long journey I wander the steppe. 
How can I keep still? How can I be silent? 
The friend I loved has turned to clay. Enkidu, the friend I love, has turned to clay. 
Me, shall I not lie down like him, 
never again to move? (IX. ii, 3-14) 
The epic journey that Gilgamesh undertakes to retrieve his friend from the 
nether world is simultaneously represented as a journey into himself and 
his own anxiety, constituting an uncanny description of both the non-
acceptance of death and the terror of harboring a wish to die. Paradoxically, 
death is both the source of Gilgamesh’s depressive dread and the goal of his 
journey. Combined with the epic’s description of his appearance, this sug-
gests that what Gilgamesh is struggling with has far more extensive impli-
cations than just the loss of a friend. Travelling to the end of the world he 
seeks out the ferryman Urshanabi, whose description of Gilgamesh reflects 
the nature of his dejected state:  
Your heart is filled with sadness, your features are worn; 
there is sorrow in your belly. 
Your face is like that of a man who has been on a long journey. 
With cold and heat your face is weathered. 
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You roam the steppe in search of a wind-puff (X. iii, 26-29). 
Adding to this, Gilgamesh himself explains that he is suffering from insom-
nia and that his body is aching: 
No real sleep has calmed my face. 
I have worn myself out in sleeplessness; my flesh is filled with grief (X. v, 28-29). 
While Spiegel may be right in assuming that passages like these suggest 
that Gilgamesh is suffering from what today would be referred to as a clini-
cal depression (Spiegel 1997), to the study presented here, this in itself is 
not the crucial point. Rather, what is interesting is how the state that Gil-
gamesh is in shares with the modern day construct of depression what may 
be referred to as a hyperbolic emotional response, manifested as a psycho-
somatic pattern of suffering. Reflecting the famous Freudian designation of 
melancholia as an excessive mourning over a lost object that the ego has 
turned on itself, Gilgamesh’s obsession, which keeps him sleepless and 
darkens his features, makes not only his ego destructively void of meaning, 
but also robs the world around him of all substance as if there was no dif-
ference between the two. Yet where the hyperbole in Freudian theory is the 
source exclusively of pathology, in the case of the melancholic hero, the 
torment of the excessive emotional response also represents the source of 
his great destiny. 
The hyperbole of heroic individuality found in the myth of Gilgamesh is 
well-known and found in many versions. A beloved one dies and is lost to 
the nether world, where a hero like Gilgamesh, compelled by sorrow, comes 
close to – and is yet so far from – retrieving him or her. The power to do 
this, whether it be through rage verging on madness or through artistic gen-
ius, springs from the ability of the abandoned to persistently and incon-
solably deny death its right and sublimate emotional suffering into action. 
It is this motive in the tradition of the myth of Gilgamesh that serves as an 
important background in the following: the individual and heroic ability to 
sublimate suffering in order to achieve the extraordinary.  
Another myth of Sumerian origin tells the story of Ishtar, goddess of life 
and fertility, and her attempt to reach the nether world in order to save her 
lover, the shepherd-god Tammuz, and bring him back to life. This myth is 
reflected in the myth of Demeter, goddess of grain and fertility, who, like 
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Ishtar, travels beyond life to retrieve her daughter Persephone, who has 
been abducted by Hades, the king of the nether world, who wants to make 
her his queen (Spiegel 1997). Famous also is Orpheus, the artist-god, who 
descends to retrieve his beloved Eurydice from the shadows of the under-
world, and fails when he breaks his promise not to turn around and look at 
her. As Maurice Blanchot comments, paradoxically this failure is Orpheus’ 
way of being true to his destiny, because he has actually been turned to-
wards Eurydice all along: ‘he saw her when she was invisible and he 
touched her intact, in her absence as a shade, in that veiled presence which 
did not conceal her absence, which was the presence of her infinite absence’ 
(Blanchot 1999). Finally, Dante’s Divine Comedy, which begins with the 
poet gone astray in the middle of his life after losing his beloved Beatrice, 
also presents the excessive emotional response as a source of inspiration. It 
is Dante’s famous melancholy and his possible contemplation of suicide 
(more references are made to this in Canto I and Canto XIII) that makes 
him enter that place where ‘all hope is abandoned’ and journey through the 
underworld with his travel-companion, the poet Virgil.  
The wide recognition of Bellerophon, the Homeric hero who attempted 
to storm the heavens on the Pegasus, as the first melancholic, can be seen in 
this context. Mentioned by Aristotle as the primary example of those ex-
traordinary in character that were susceptible to the diseases of the black 
bile, Bellerophon’s dejection, anxiety, loneliness and rejection of any hu-
man contact resulted from the loathing of the gods who turned on him. The 
sixth song of Homer’s Iliad tells the story of the hero’s great deeds and 
tragic ending, when: 
… Bellerophon came to be hated by all the gods,he wandered all desolate and 
dismayed upon the Alean plain, gnawing at his own heart, and shunning the 
path of man (XI.200-203).iv  
Bellerophon’s suffering is an indirect result of his great virtue, as he rejects 
the advances of a queen and consequently has the gods turn on him. It is 
only after his incredible achievements, his hunting down and killing of the 
chimera, and his final triumph, that he is struck by the emotional suffering 
that leads him to shun other people completely. The Homeric hymns offer 
no psychological explanation to Bellerophon’s sudden state of mind; only 
that the gods seem to agree in their wrath. As Jean Starobinski points out 
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(Starobinsky 1960: 3), the greatest hero of all times, who withstood all hu-
man challenges, is unable to fight against the hatred of the gods. In the 
Homeric universe the ability to associate with other people, to live among 
one’s peers in the normal way, is dependent on the divine guarantee of the 
cosmos in which man must find his place. Without the benign acceptance of 
the gods, he is left to loneliness and all-consuming self-torment (Staro-
binsky 1960: 3). As a foreign and invasive subject of sublimation that con-
stitutes a background to later Aristotelian assumption of the black bile as a 
‘thing’ in the body, the melancholic sentiment found in the hyperbolic emo-
tional response of the great hero may be associated with a kind of agitation 
that upsets the cosmos in which man must find his place. Heracles melan-
cholicus, of whom Virgil in the Aeneid says that he burns with the atrum 
fel, the black bile, or simply with melancholy (VIII.219-220), is a good ex-
ample of this, as Heracles’ madness is not described as an illness or even 
characteristic of the protagonist, but rather as an attack, maybe even some-
thing god-sent that periodically upsets the order of cosmos and constitutes 
his heroic character (Theodorou 1993b: 36). 
Yet the association of melancholic madness with heroic character, which 
brings a relation between suffering and achievement to the foreground, can 
also be found in a context where it possesses a characterological meaning. 
The example of the hyperbolic emotional response as a trait of character, 
rather than a fit, provides an illustrative background to the melancholic 
ēthos that is the central theme of Problems XXX, 1. With the representation 
of a ‘psychological’ depth lacking in the Homeric hymns, the examples of 
Orestes and Jason, as Peter Toohey has shown in a work that among other 
themes explores the relation between character and melancholy in Antiqui-
ty (Toohey 2004), constitute typological examples of melancholic personal-
ities, whose achievements were closely related to a hyperbolic emotional re-
sponse manifested in psychosomatic pattern of suffering. Providing early il-
lustrations of the melancholic as a type, these examples represent the dis-
positions of their characters within a precarious context of nosos, of dis-
ease, that was later to become essential to the understanding of melancholy 
in Western cultural history.  
Toohey primarily illustrates this in his discussion of a vase painting of 
Orestes from the 4th century, where the dejected hero is depicted in the agi-
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tation caused by his melancholic disposition. Orestes’ famous madness is 
often understood as a result of his matricide. At the advice of Apollo he had 
killed his mother, Clytaemnestra, and her lover, Aegisthus, to avenge the 
murder of his father, Agamemnon. Yet in spite of Apollo’s blessings, 
Orestes finds himself haunted and tormented by the Erynies, the deities of 
vengeance, for his bloodguilt. On the painting discussed by Toohey, Orestes 
has fled north to Apollo’s shrine, where the god will attempt to purify him 
of his deed. He is sitting with a dissatisfied, tired and even unhappy expres-
sion on his face, while Apollo, wearing a similar facial expression, holds 
over his head a piglet, whose blood is intended to wash away the pollution 
of the matricide. To their left the Furies similarly seem to be in a deep me-
lancholic state. Yet, as Toohey argues, “The Purification of Orestes” does 
not depict the melancholic sentiment as a lack of mental activity. Rather, 
there are ‘clear signs of mental activity – of agitation’ (Toohey 2004: 17), il-
lustrated by the way Orestes holds his sword and by the tautness of his tor-
so. What we find in Orestes’ state of mind is an example of a madness that 
rages with inner turmoil and activity. Varro, the first century B.C. Roman 
writer and scholar, termed the condition insania on this background and 
later also Cicero in Tusculuns suggests that Orestes was the victim of me-
lancholic illness (Toohey 2004: 17.) 
That Orestes’ violent melancholia, unlike that of Heracles, possesses 
characterological meaning, is supported by the fact that his madness is not 
reported by a messenger, but is rather represented on stage. In a hallucinat-
ing scene he can feel the attack coming. Elektra, his sister, informs us that 
six days have gone by since his mother’s burial, during which Orestes has 
not eaten or washed, and has stayed hidden in bed, occasionally crying or 
jumping around as seized by madness. It is on these terms that the nosos, 
the disease, which is introduced very early by Elektra, is central (Theodorou 
1993: 25) to an understanding of Orestes’ character. 
The psychosomatic pattern of suffering in the melancholic hero, as illu-
strated by Toohey, is even more lucidly represented in the example of Ja-
son, the Hellenic hero of the poem on the voyage of the Argo by Apollonius 
of Rhodes (ca. 295 B.C.). Although Jason, the protagonist of Apollonius’ 
Argonautica, is not usually characterized as a melancholic by the ancient 
writers (Toohey 2004: 43) – at least not in any medical sense – his reaction 
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to the challenges and adversities of his epic journey is often more than 
merely tearful and emotional. The medical historian Stanley Jackson pro-
duces a translation of ‘signs of melancholy’ in the medical author Soranus 
of Ephesus, whose description – although outdating the Argo considerably 
– can be helpful in understanding what is a stake in the early descriptions 
of the melancholic type. These symptoms include:  
… mental anguish and distress, dejection, silence, animosity toward members of 
the household, sometimes a desire to live and at other times a longing for death, 
suspicion of the part of the patient that a plot is being hatched against him, 
weeping without reason, meaningless muttering, and, again, occasional jovial-
ity; precordial distention, especially after eating, coldness of the limbs, mild 
sweat, a sharp pain in the esophagus or cardia … (Jackson 1986: 35). 
As Toohey points out (Toohey 2004: 43f.), many of Jason’s character traits 
comply with Soranus’ list of symptoms. He is depicted as ‘brooding over the 
enormity of the impending tasks’ (1.460-61)v, as ‘utterly resourceless be-
cause of his woeful circumstances’ (2.410), as ‘distraught in wretched and 
helpless ruin’ and a few lines later as ‘wrapped in excessive fear’ (2.627-28). 
He complains over sleeplessness (2.632-33) and is despairing (4.1347). 
When the nymphs appear to assist him, Jason is not only amazed, but also 
‘grief-stricken’ at their appearance and he turns away from the support they 
offer in ‘absolute helplessness’ (4.1313-18). After the disappearance of He-
racles he falls utterly still: 
But Jason, amazed and utterly helpless, 
Said never a word, one way or the other, but sat there 
Bowed under his heavy load of ruin, in silence, 
Eating out his heart (1.1286-1289). 
Interesting about this last quote, of course, is the formulation, ‘eating out 
his heart’ (“thymonedôn”), which revokes the Homeric description of Belle-
rophon also quoted by the author of Problems XXX, 1. The symptoms of Ja-
son, represented along the lines of the hyperbolic emotional response that 
is typical of the tragic sufferer, provide an insight into the character of the 
melancholic ēthos. As Toohey points out, such ‘anxieties and dejections, 
while foreign to any Homeric hero but a mourning one, are in Jason’s case 
excessive, even for a Hellenistic hero’ (Toohey 2004). What we find in the 
character of Jason, as he is described by Apollonius, is the element of the 
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emotionally excessive response to suffering represented as absolutely cen-
tral to the idea of a melancholic sentiment. As a background, not only to the 
later assumption of a melancholic ēthos found in Problems XXX, 1, but also, 
as the next section will illustrate, to the Platonic dichotomy between a di-
vine madness and a melancholic ignorance dependent on character, the 
motif of the tragic melancholic hero represents an intimate and precarious 
relation between suffering and achievement, out of which the management 
of the self emerges as a kind of virtuosity.  
The virtuosity designating the heroic character, at least in the cases dis-
cussed above, can be identified on the background of a remarkable consis-
tency in symptoms of both mental and physical suffering (Jackson 1986). 
Dejection, anxiety, sorrow, sleeplessness, rumination, indigestion and dif-
ferent forms of both mental and physical pain accompany the great 
achievement of both Gilgamesh’s raging sorrow and Bellerophon’s slaying 
of the Chimera. Orestes’ vengeance, even by the Ancient writers, was 
viewed within the context of a violent melancholic disease, which like Ja-
son’s dejected and sorrowful states constituted a part of his character. As a 
foreign and invasive body, the melancholy of these tragic heroes constituted 
the anomalism of a hyperbolic emotional response that challenged the cos-
mos they were a part of, but which also pointed them out as extraordinary 
characters. Implying an activity involving the virtuosity of an individual 
struggle with and ability to balance the somatic manifestations of a disease, 
the melancholic structure of these characters provides a background for the 
gradual emergence of an individual responsibility and ability to manage a 
self defined by its ability to sublimate suffering into great achievement. 
2. Erōs and the Antinomy of Madness in Plato’s Dialogues  
In the opening of Plato’s Symposium a comment is made about a certain 
Apollodorus, the narrator of the dialogue, characterizing him as ‘the ma-
niac’ (Smp. 173d). Although the words are said, it seems, mostly in irrita-
tion with Apollodorus, because he has a tendency to characterize everyone 
but Socrates – including himself – as a failure, the words are interesting, 
because they provide an entrance in philosophy to the theme of madness as 
a disposition specific of character discussed above in relation to the tragic 
hero. Not that Apollodorus is ever characterized as a tragic hero – quite the 
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contrary. Apollodorus is a maniac because of his obsession with Socrates. 
The term manikos is used about him to refer to the vehemence and excess 
of both his praise and blame (Bury 2008). But the reason that Apollodorus 
is characterized as mad is not only that he is obsessing about Socrates; 
many others did that too. The reason is that he is absolutely out of line in 
the way he does it. And what is more, it does not seem to be something he 
does only in this situation, as much as it seems to be something in his char-
acter: in the Phaedo the same Apollodorus is present with a few others at 
Socrates’ deathbed. Here everyone is affected in much the same way, alter-
nating between laughing and weeping – but, Phaedo says, ‘especially one of 
us, Apollodorus – you know the man and his ways’ (Phd. 59a). The sugges-
tion of Apollodorus as a well-known example of emotional imbalance is in-
teresting here, because it opens up to both Plato’s conception of an anto-
nymic figure in the understanding of madness, and to a subtle relation be-
tween this, the concept of erōs, and the ability to be someone who seeks real 
knowledge – a philosopher. 
Reflecting the assumption of suffering as a prerequisite of heroic 
achievement found in the previous section, this theme may be represented 
by starting with Phaedo’s reference to the unusual mixture of pain and 
pleasure in the people present in prison with Socrates on his last day in the 
Phaedo. Phaedo’s indication that everyone shared this ‘strange’ or ‘out-of-
place’ (“atopon”) emotion can be seen as a reflection of what Socrates tells 
his friends when he first sits up and speaks: 
What a strange thing that which men call pleasure seems to be, and how aston-
ishing the relation it has with what is thought to be its opposite, namely pain! A 
man cannot have both at the same time. Yet if he pursues and catches the one, 
he is almost always bound to catch the other also, like two creatures with one 
head. I think that if Aesop had noted this he would have composed a fable that a 
god wished to reconcile their opposition but could not do so, so he joined their 
two heads together, and therefore when a man has the one, the other follows 
later. (Phd. 60b) 
The strange emotion that Phaedo refers to, Socrates identifies as part of 
all humanity: to the most intense feelings of pleasure belong also intense 
feelings of pain. Moreover the two sensations seem to stand in a constitu-
tive relation to each other, indicating that the person who seeks a life in 
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pleasure must also submit to a life in pain – or at least to fierce oscillations 
between the two. That what Socrates describes is not only true for some, but 
for everyone, can be seen by his reference to the fictive Aesopian fable, 
which, as Bruce Rosenstock has pointed out (Rosenstock 2004: 245), is the 
very reverse of the Aristophanic fable in the Symposium about the origin of 
erōs from the severing of a single creature. This creature, a kind of an-
drogynous human being with four hands, two faces and two sets of sexual 
organs, was separated into two parts by Zeus, when he found out that it was 
trying to attack the gods because of its self-sufficiency. According to Aristo-
phanes, erōs came into being as a longing in the two parts to be reunited 
(Smp. 189e-191d). In the Phaedo, on the other hand, this condition is re-
versed and represented in terms of a psychosomatic relation, when Socra-
tes explains about the curious conjunction between pain and pleasure and 
later adds that ‘every pleasure and every pain provides, as it were, another 
nail to rivet the soul to the body and to weld them together.’ (Phd. 83d) 
It is on the background of this psychosomatic relation that Socrates’ ref-
erence to the origin of erōs in his explication of the conjunction between 
pain and pleasure becomes interesting to the present study of melancholy. 
While the circular combination of pleasure with pain may represent a con-
dition of being human, the emotional oscillations it causes may be more 
violent in some than in others. In the emotional response of Apollodorus’ 
character, Plato certainly seems to suggest that this is the case. What is of 
interest here is that exactly Apollodorus in the Symposium is simultane-
ously presented as someone, who does not possess erōs at all, one who 
lacks any understanding of it. It is out of the antinomy between a morbid 
madness like this and the divine madness of the tragic hero who possesses 
erōs, that melancholy first emerges as a problem of self-regulation. 
 The temptation to understand Apollodorus’ role as a narrator of the 
Symposium as an indication that he has been caught up by erōs exists be-
cause he is ‘preserving’ the speeches that he recounts. But as Rosenstock 
argues (Rosenstock 2004: 243), rather than merely understanding the 
Symposium as a dialogue about erōs, its narrative structure also suggests 
that it is designed to dramatize and manifest erōs. In contrast to this, Apol-
lodorus’ memorization of the speeches does not dramatize erōs at all. De-
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spite his obsession with Socrates, Apollodorus’ documentations of what 
Socrates has done, precise as they may be, are hardly erotic in themselves. 
As Rosenstock suggests, Apollodorus is more ‘like a record with a scratch’, 
ever-repeating the story of Agathon’s feast over again and again (it is even 
indicated that he did this only a day before). Apollodorus, although he him-
self might think otherwise, is an ignorant when it comes to erōs, merely 
making it his job to document everything Socrates does and says every day. 
Before taking on that task, he says, he ‘simply drifted aimlessly’ (Smp. 
173a). While his encounter with philosophy might have given him a purpose 
in life, the hyperbole of his abnormally excitable disposition (referred to 
even by himself as ‘raving’ (Phd. 173d)) has not allowed him access to the 
heart of the matter according to the Symposium: erōs itself. Although Apol-
lodorus feels stronger than people normally do, something in his character 
denies him the understanding and grasping of erōs.  
The role of erōs in philosophy and the relation in it to the combination of 
pain and pleasure as it is treated in the Phaedo is the subject of Socrates’ 
speech in the Symposium on the education in love that he received from 
Diotima. Socrates explains that Diotima taught him that erōs is a daimôn 
that shuttles back and forth between gods and men, rounding out ‘the 
whole’ and binding ‘all to all’ (Smp. 202e). While erōs exists as an attraction 
between that which is set apart, it also – reminding of the circular combina-
tion of pain and pleasure in the Phaedo – works to relate separates and 
make them whole. Erōs is the son of Poros (“resource”) and Penia (“pov-
erty”), and therefore, Socrates explains, his life is a lot like theirs: 
In the first place, he is always poor, and he’s far from being delicate and beauti-
ful (as ordinary people think he is); instead, he is … shoeless and homeless, al-
ways lying on the dirt without a bed, … having his mother’s nature always living 
with Need. But on his father’s side he is a schemer after the beautiful and the 
good; he is brave, impetuous, and intense, an awesome hunter, always weaving 
snares, resourceful in his pursuit of intelligence, a lover of wisdom through all 
his life […] (Smp. 203c) 
Being the product of a paradoxical combination of resourcefulness and 
lack, erōs is at the same time in need, and itself in possession of the means 
to solve that need. In this way erōs is literally a-poria, ‘bewilderment’ or 
‘embarrassment’. But representing a ‘problem’ in this sense is not necessar-
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ily negative. As Socrates describes in the Meno (Men. 84a), reducing some-
one to aporia can have a purgatory effect, because it illustrates to the one 
who merely thought he knew what he was talking about that he does in fact 
not know it and compels him – instils in him the desire, erōs – to investi-
gate it further. As an aporetic problem, erōs itself is of the positive: it de-
mands of the assailed to be handled intelligently. 
Exactly the theme of intelligence is interesting here, because it touches 
on the question of melancholy as a problem of self-regulation, which has 
been mentioned above. Apollodorus lacks erōs, not for want of trying, but 
because he does not understand the way it works and is merely obsessing 
about what Socrates thinks and does. When it comes to erōs, Apollodorus is 
an ignorant in the characteristic sense covered by Plato’s use of the melan-
cholic sentiment in the condition of amathia. As illustrated by the psychia-
trist Hubertus Tellenbach, the ignorance of Platonic amathia results from 
an inharmonious unison of the human body and soul that does not live up 
to the paradigm of the well-proportioned cosmos as it is described in the 
Timean vision of man and world (Tellenbach 1980: 7). Amathia designates 
a condition where the domination of the material body over the soul has de-
teriorated from the wish to learn to the unteachability of someone with a 
character flaw. Reflecting the definition in the Republic (R. IX, 573c) of the 
leader who fails to lead himself as a deranged, as melankolikos, the specific 
condition of amathia compares with the excessive gesture of someone who 
tries to rule, not only over human beings, but over gods as well, and whose 
hyperbole results in tyranny as both the individual and the state degener-
ates. As a later chapter will illustrate this assumption of an analogue be-
tween the health of the individual and societal body plays an important role 
in the history of melancholy as a ‘thing’ in the body, as Thomas Hobbes de-
fines the melancholic derangement of the individual who fails to lead his 
passions in terms of the degeneration of man into beast in the Leviathan.  
The assumption of a fine line separating grandeur and failure and gov-
erned by self-regulation is also found in the Phaidros, when Socrates char-
acterizes ignorance by providing the example of a man who thinks that he 
has mastered harmony, only because he is able to produce the highest and 
the lowest notes on his strings. Although that is not what a good teacher 
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would do, Socrates asserts, this man can be approached as an ignorant, but 
of a special dispositional kind: ‘You stupid man [melancholais], you are out 
of your mind!’ (Phdr. 268e) The use here of the term melancholais amounts 
to more than mere stupidity: the melancholic stupidity of the man who 
thinks he is a virtuoso because he can play the high and the low tones 
shares with Apollodorus the kind of ignorance that results from the defi-
ciency of self-leadership. To Plato melancholy is a kind of ignorance result-
ing from the excessive emotional response to a psychosomatic flaw of char-
acter. It is in this sense that amathei is related to the inability to achieve the 
divination of erōs and its purgatory, productive effects. 
To the present study the disposition of melancholic ignorance is interest-
ing because it is supplemented by the Platonic assumption of the opposite 
kind of ēthos, that of the divinely inspired. Representing a preliminary ex-
position of the precarious Aristotelian naturalization of the black bile as a 
‘thing’ in the body, the designation in Phaidros of a god-given transforma-
tion, the exallagé, which as a condition must be strictly differentiated from 
the morbid state of mania as described above (Phdr. 244b), constitutes an 
antonymic figure of madness. Not for the average man, this inspired dispo-
sition governed by erōs is, as Socrates states, a matter for the exceptional in 
character. Prophets and sibyls, great sufferers like Orestes, poets and art-
ists, all those who like Socrates himself are absorbed by erōs, are subject to 
a greater health: that of the divine mania that finds genial proportion with 
cosmos. 
To Plato the assumption of an antonymic figure of madness, represent-
ing both the melancholy of someone unable to achieve erōs because of a 
character flaw resulting in deficient self-leadership, and the divine madness 
of the genius, as Tellenbach illustrates, is closely linked to the Platonic re-
ception of the Hippocratic antinomy between pain and pleasure presented 
above (Tellenbach 1980: 9). Something like this is already hinted at in the 
Symposium, when Eryximachus in his speech argues for the existence a 
kind of love responsible for physical health, found between the heterogene-
ous elements of the body. It is the task of the doctor and his patient to re-
store the symmetry between those elements that have come to predominate 
over one another through repletion and depletion (Smp. 186b-d). 
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But as Tellenbach shows (Tellenbach 1980: 6), it is in the Timaeus that 
Plato’s reception of the Hippocratic doctrine is most obvious. Here both the 
divine symmetry and the melancholic dissymmetry that have been dis-
cussed above, are thematized within the context of the ‘diseases of the soul 
that result from a bodily condition’ (Ti. 86b). The disproportion of the hy-
perbolic attitude resulting in ‘a multitude of bad temper and melancholy’ 
(Ti. 87a) is psychosomatic in character and incorporates Hippocratic ele-
ments into the Platonic ordering of the soul and the body. As Tellenbach 
argues, it is in this Hippocratic context that the Platonic understanding of 
the melancholic as an ignorant must be seen. Like mania, its counterpart 
among the two basic characterizations of the nosos psychés (“diseases of 
the soul”, Ti. 86b), amethia, the melancholic ignorance, results from an im-
balance between body and mind: when inside the living thing the soul is 
more powerful than the body, then if the soul becomes too excited, the body 
becomes ill. Similarly, when the body is stronger than the soul, this can lead 
to ’the greatest disease of all: ignorance’ (Ti. 88b). None of these conditions 
are present when the body and the soul are found to be in harmony. Mod-
eled after the harmony of the cosmos (Ti. 88c-d), the Hippocratic notion of 
disequilibrium is integrated into the Platonic world order in the Timaeus 
(Tellenbach 1980: 7). 
The result of this introduction of a Hippocratic perspective on propor-
tion into Plato’s thought, in reference to the emotional hyperbole of the 
tragic hero discussed in the previous chapter, represents a partial decos-
mologization, because it presents the hyperbolic movement from the right 
measure into the excessive and pathological in terms of ēthos. The combi-
nation of the motif of a relation between pleasure and pain with the notion 
of an excessive reaction that leads to either mania or amathia – melan-
cholic ignorance – constitutes a partial internalization of responsibility 
structured around the disposition of psychosomatic suffering. It is the defi-
cient self-regulation of this responsibility, related to character, that sepa-
rates the ignorance of the melancholic individual from the divine inspira-
tion of erōs. As a fall from cosmos, the pathological state of the emotional 
hyperbole constitutes a loss of symmetry contrasted by the divine mania of 
the exceptional one who sublimates psychosomatic suffering into cosmic 
symmetry, through the genius of their character. Structured around a pat-
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tern of suffering represented by the Hippocratic antinomy between pain 
and pleasure, both the ēthos of the Platonic genius and the ēthos of the mel-
ancholic ignorant, the exceptional proportion of genius and the hyperbolic 
disproportion of ignorance, are subject to a virtuous activity, the origin of 
which is no longer completely external to their terms. If the first are able to 
achieve the cosmic symmetry of divine madness through the dispositions in 
their character, the latter suffer the consequences of their dispositions 
which lead them into excess. Through the introduction of Hippocratic the-
ory into the Platonic worldview, the emotional hyperbole becomes closely 
related to the balancing of a psychosomatic relation. While this relation, in 
the work of Plato, is still found within the confines of a cosmic world order, 
the Aristotelian assertion of the melaina cholé as a ‘thing’ in the body of the 
extraordinary, which can lead to both geniality and to disease, if it is not 
managed in the right manner, naturalizes the precarious ēthos of the mel-
ancholic type as someone abnormal by nature. This is the theme of the fol-
lowing chapter. 
3. Abnormal by Nature: Melancholy in Problems XXX, 1 
Although there can be no doubt that the writings on melancholy in late An-
tiquity and all through the Middle Ages focuses nearly exclusively on the 
pathological effects of the black bile (Jackson 1986, Klibansky et al. 2001) it 
is similarly reasonable to say that no single text on melancholy has had the 
influence of Problems XXX, 1, which examines also the positive effects of 
the melaina cholé. As already mentioned above, even though the text be-
longs to the Corpus Aristotelicum, it is probably not written by Aristotle 
himself, but by his follower and kindred in spirit Theophrastus, who is 
known to have written a whole treatise on melancholy, where he, among 
other things, pursues the question of a relation between geniality and mel-
ancholy (Tellenbach 1980: 9, Theunissen 1996: 3). The text’s focus on a 
kind of non-pathological melancholic ēthos supports this claim, as Theo-
phrastus was also the author of Characters, a treatise containing thirty brief 
descriptions of moral types, like flattery, complaisance, surliness, arrogance 
and irony. But as Philip van der Eijk (van der Eijk 2005) has shown in an 
interesting study, the theory of melancholy in Problems XXX, 1 corre-
sponds quite well to the concept of melancholy as it is represented in other 
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parts of Aristotle’s work, indicating that there is no reason to doubt that Ar-
istotle supported this theory.  
The historical popularity of Problems XXX, 1 can to some extent be at-
tributed to the fact that it constitutes the first comprehensive study of the 
melancholic temperament in a specific type of character, even though the 
author never gives a definition of melancholy – or even mentions the term 
melancholia. Having been understood first and foremost as a ‘monography 
of the black bile’ (Klibansky, Panofsky & Saxl 2001: 76), and even as a sort 
of phenomenology of the creative genius (see for example: Radden 2000b), 
Problems XXX, 1 opens up a whole new tradition in the understanding of 
the influence of the black bile by asserting it to be a ‘thing’ in the body of the 
culturally formative, around which their self-regulation is structured. 
As the following illustrates, in Problems XXX, 1 the black bile is the pri-
mary subject. This is all the more interesting, because the Hippocratic 
medicine treated it as a part of a larger cosmological framework – and even 
believed it to be merely a secondary phenomenon, a degeneration of the 
yellow bile or the blood (Klibansky, Panofsky & Saxl 2001: 53, see also: 
Flashar 1966: 24). In the Aristotelian text the black bile is detached from 
the doctrine of the four humours and their relation to the elements, result-
ing in a decosmologization, not only of the Hippocratic notion of balance 
(“krasis”), but also of the Platonic notion of proportionality, which was the 
subject of the previous chapter. It is out of this decosmologization that the 
black bile emerges as a ‘thing’ in the body, which calls for management and 
nurture by the extraordinary in character in order for them to meet the de-
mands of their nature. Compared to the Platonic notion of the divinely in-
spired madness, which would lead the exceptional few to a higher order of 
symmetry, the Aristotelian portrait of the melancholic extracts the moment 
of achievement from that of divination and places it in man, in the nature of 
the few, who – paraphrasing Nietzsche – have a need for a ‘greater health’ 
(G2 382). If the Platonic theory of the divine and metaphysical inspiration 
of erōs separated the genial sharply from the pathological, the Aristotelian 
notion of a non-pathological melancholic ēthos collapses this distinction 
and conceives instead of a type of character, whose genial nature makes 
him more than averagely susceptible to the diseases associated with the 
black bile. This is also the reason that the real principal of Problems XXX, 1 
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is not melancholy itself or the ones who have succumbed to its diseases, but 
the ones who find in themselves the natural ability to manage their suffer-
ing in order to achieve the potential greatness of their character. Constitut-
ing a preliminary sketch of the contemporary problematization of a self-
regulation structured around a ‘thing’ in the body, the paradoxical ēthos of 
the extraordinary few is the primary interest of this chapter. 
This assumption of a genial ēthos, more susceptible to melancholy than 
the average, is indicated by the framework of the text in shape of its open-
ing question: 
Why is it that all men who have become outstanding in philosophy, statesman-
ship, poetry or the arts are melancholic, and some to such an extent that they 
are infected by the diseases arising from the black bile, as the story of Heracles 
among the heroes tells? (953a10-13) 
Interesting about this question is of course that it does not ask whether, but 
rather why all men of creative genius are susceptible to – but not necessar-
ily infected by – the illnesses of the black bile. The assumption of a kind of 
outstanding character – the ēthos perriton mentioned above – that is in-
clined to achieve great things, but on whom the influence of the black bile is 
very strong, is underlined by the reference to the tragic heroes. As discussed 
above, the hyperbolic individuality of the tragic sufferer constitutes a char-
acter in which the gift of heroic achievement is united with the affliction of 
madness.  
But the opening question of Problems XXX, 1 distinguishes the ēthos 
perriton not only from the heroic individual, to whom the rapture of mel-
ancholic rage was a matter of cosmic fate, but also from the divine posses-
sion of the Platonic erotic. In the exceptional human being of Problems 
XXX, 1 the greatness of character is structured around the natural sub-
stance of the black bile. The ēthos perriton of Problems XXX, 1, as Michael 
Theunissen points out (Theunissen 1996: 11), are outstanding diá physin, 
‘by nature’. As a ‘thing’ in the body of the extraordinary in character, the po-
tentially harmful and pathological character of the black bile is asserted as a 
prerequisite for great achievement. As Theunissen argues (Theunissen 
1996: 9), the surprising thing about this is the indication of something 
negative as a prerequisite for the positive.  
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To understand this precarious indication, it is necessary to take a closer 
look at the way the author of the text in Problems understands melancholy 
as an element of character, of ēthos. While the presupposition in the ques-
tion quoted above is that all men of outstanding character are melancholics 
– and are at least more susceptible to the illnesses of the black bile than 
others – the contrary is not necessarily the case. All melancholics are not 
geniuses. This is indicated among other things by the ambivalent use of the 
word perritos, ‘outstanding’. The word can certainly be taken to mean ‘out-
standing’ in the positive sense of someone of excellent or extraordinary 
character. But it is also used in a more neutral sense, denoting simply 
something strange or out of the ordinary. As Theunissen points out 
(Theunissen 1996: 9), the meaning of the word varies through Problems 
XXX, 1, sometimes denoting the positively extraordinary and gifted and 
sometimes referring simply to the abnormal. But in the somewhat odd sup-
position that turns the opening question around and ends the text, in which 
it is stated that all melancholic persons are outstanding (“perritoi”), not ow-
ing to disease but by nature (955a38-39), the only way the expression 
makes any sense is by indicating ‘abnormality’. If the assumption cannot be 
of a character that is a genius, because he is a melancholic (as this would 
contradict the assumption in the opening question of the genius as someone 
especially susceptible to the diseases of the black bile), then the assumption 
of the extraordinary melancholic at the end of the text, must paradoxically 
be of someone who is naturally out of the ordinary. The melancholic in 
Problems XXX, 1 is not a natural genius; he is something as rare as an ab-
normal by nature. 
This interpretation is supported by the indication that the black bile re-
sides in everyone to some degree, but that this does not mean that everyone 
is a melancholic (954a26). Everyone, even those who are not abnormal, can 
succumb to the illnesses of the black bile; but to most people these condi-
tions, arising from the consumption for example of daily foods, have no ef-
fects on their ēthos, on their character. Only those in whom ‘this tempera-
ment exists by nature’ are affected in such a way that they develop different 
characteristics according to their different temperaments. The ones in 
whom the bile is found ‘considerable and cold’ have a tendency to become 
‘sluggish and stupid’, while the ones who have it ‘excessive and hot’ become 
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‘mad, clever and amorous and easily moved to passion and desire’ (954a33-
34). It is clear from the description of these average bilious characters that 
they are not especially inspired or extraordinarily creative, but also that 
their hyperbolic emotional response to the effects of the bile may make 
them appear different from everyone else owing to their condition. These 
melancholics may be abnormal by nature, but they are not necessarily gen-
iuses. 
It is among these anomalies, though, that the author of Problems XXX, 1 
finds those who are. Some melancholics, where the bile is warm-natured, 
but in whom the hyperbolic response is moderated and the ‘excessive heat 
has sunk to a moderate amount’ are found to be ‘more intelligent and less 
eccentric’, and they are ‘superior to the rest of the world in many ways, 
some in education some in arts and others again in statesmanship’ (954b1-
3). In these exceptional human beings, abnormality is not an effect of dis-
ease. Rather it is a consequence of a natural disposition that is both the sub-
ject of their great achievements and of their above average susceptibility to 
the diseases of the black bile: 
For just as men differ in appearance not because they have faces, but because 
they have a certain type of face, some handsome, some ugly and some again 
having no outstanding characteristics (these are of normal character), so those 
who have a small share of this temperament are normal, but those who have 
much are unlike the majority. If the characteristic is very intense, such men are 
very melancholic, and if the mixture is of a certain kind they are extraordinary 
(perritoi). But if they neglect it, they incline towards melancholic diseases …  
(954b21-29, translation modified) 
As a moderation of the emotional hyperbole found in those who are abnor-
mal by nature, the geniality of the extraordinary in character emerges on 
the background of an act of self-regulation. Structured around the black 
bile, this act of self-regulation is governed by a psychosomatic pattern of 
suffering designating it as a prophylactic activity.  
This becomes clear from the description of how the extraordinary mel-
ancholic in Problems XXX, 1 becomes ill. The relation between the melan-
cholic and the black bile in his body is explained within the context of the 
temperature of the bile, which can be both very hot and very cold. These 
qualities, as the author informs us, are the greatest agents in life when it 
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comes to the making of character (955a33). On the one hand, when the bile 
becomes colder than it should, it produces ‘all kinds of despair’ (954b35). 
On the other, if it is too warm it produces for example over-confidence 
(954b30) or madness (954a25). The relation of respectively dysthymia and 
euthymia – of being dispirited or excessively overjoyed – to the prophylac-
tic activity of the melancholic, the author seeks to illustrate through the ex-
ample of wine. As the consumption of wine can produce different kinds of 
emotional responses of both cheerfulness and despondency, the black bile, 
which like wine is full of air (955a35), can produce hyperbolic emotional 
states of either manic elation or depressive desolation in the melancholic 
body. The mixture of the two is dangerous to the melancholic because the 
heat of the wine, according to the author, has a tendency to cool the natural 
heat of the bile in the body and may bring him to ‘commit suicide after a 
bout of drinking’ (954b35). Thus, while the average people will drink ‘to the 
point of drunkenness’ (955a4) to become more confident, the melancholic 
is inclined to go and hang himself if he attempts the same (955a10). This 
hyperbolic and negative inclination is an effect of the melancholic ēthos, 
which unlike the wine that brings it about only temporarily, lasts all life 
(953b17). 
It is the task of the ēthos perriton to manage the ‘thing’ in the body to-
wards a median optimal composition of cold-and-warm-galledness on the 
background of this. In the melancholic character, referred to by Hubertus 
Tellenbach as the meson-type in order to indicate his inclination towards a 
middle (Tellenbach 1980: 10), the abnormality, under the right auspice of 
self-regulation, can be extraordinary in character and come to represent the 
precarious ‘right mixture’ from which geniality springs. It is this ‘eucrasia 
in the anomaly’ that makes the non-pathologic melancholics extraordinary 
(Klibansky, Panofsky & Saxl 2001: 51f.). Responding to the task of regulat-
ing the paradoxical nature of the black bile, the ēthos perriton can achieve 
the higher balance of the abnormal. It is in this sense that the disparate 
‘thing’ in the body emerges as the paradoxical subject of the prophylactic 
activity of the extraordinary in character. 
What is interesting about this etiological description of suffering and 
achievement in the melancholic character is the difference it constitutes to 
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the Platonic conception of melancholic ignorance discussed in the previous 
chapter. If the amathia of the Platonic melancholic was a result of a charac-
ter flaw, which set his disposition against that of the divinely inspired in 
possession of erōs, there is no qualitative difference between these states in 
the melancholy of the extraordinary character of Problems XXX, 1. Struc-
tured around the paradoxical nature of the ‘thing’ in the body instead, the 
circular and bipolar form that the diseases of the black bile take, are exclu-
sively the result of deficient self-regulation causing the hyperbolism. Fur-
thermore, as Theunissen points out (Theunissen 1996: 15), the way the dis-
eases set in the melancholic character is not through the eruption of an 
anomaly; rather, as the illustration provided by the author with the example 
of wine shows, the diseases of the black bile constitute a deepening of an 
already, naturally present anomaly. The melancholic character in Prob-
lems XXX, 1 becomes sick – and more so than others less so inclined – be-
cause he neglects to manage himself according to his ēthos. It is in this 
sense that he can be said to be subjected to the effects of a double pathos: 
on the one hand his pathological condition is represented as a transience as 
opposed to the paradoxical ideal of his ēthos, caused by a hyperbolic emo-
tional response, and on the other this transience is manifested as a physical 
and mental pattern of suffering at the limits of which he gradually gains 
knowledge of himself. In contrast to the irredeemable ignorance of the Pla-
tonic melancholic, the ēthos perriton of Problems XXX, 1 ceaselessly trans-
forms himself through the suffering to which his ‘thing’ in the body subjects 
him. As the paradox of a teleology without a fixed telos, it is in the nature of 
the extraordinary melancholic to ceaselessly seek out his own limitations 
and treat them as the provisional telos of his ‘higher balance’. It is around 
this management of a natural disposition, defined in terms of the circular 
polarity between the exalted and the dejected, that the culturally formative 
activities of the extraordinary in character – the philosophers, legislators, 
poets and artists of Problems XXX, 1 – are structured. Steering clear of the 
excesses that will make him mad, the outstanding character must manage 
the inequality which sets his ēthos apart from the average. Naturalizing the 
Platonic antinomy of madness, which separated the pathological from the 
inspirational, the disposition of the ēthos perriton in Problems XXX, 1 
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represents a ceaseless activity of self-differentiation structured around the 
black bile as a ‘thing’ in the body. 
This is supported by Theunissen’s argument that the ideal ethical middle 
of Aristoteles’ Ethics does not count for the ēthos perriton. Although the au-
thor of Problems XXX, 1 recommends a tempering of the excessively hot 
black bile as a remedy to avoid disease, the ideal, natural middle, Theunis-
sen claims, is completely unattainable to the melancholic in character. In-
stead the melancholic is left to seek out the middle continuously, pròs tò 
méson (“towards the average middle”), something that will never constitute 
a perfect balance, but only a weakening of the symptoms he is inclined to 
(Theunissen 1996: 16f.) Reflecting the Nietzschean notion of a ‘great health’ 
the melancholic disposition of the exceptional melancholic character in 
Problems XXX, 1 emerges as a transformation of the ethical “Be good!” into 
the typical Hellenic “Be different!” (Klibansky, Panofsky & Saxl 2001: 91), 
which has a definitively modern ring to it. 
The emergence of the black bile as a ‘thing’ in the body of the extraordi-
nary melancholic of Problems XXX, 1, on the background of this has three 
important implications for the present study. First, it constitutes the culmi-
nation of a decosmologization where the idea of a higher cosmic order, in-
dicated by the suffering of the tragic hero, and by the Platonic idea of a di-
vine symmetry of madness, is substituted for the natural substance of the 
black bile in the body of the melancholic. The difference between the pro-
portionality formed by the erōs of divine madness and the disproportion 
with cosmos found in the inability of the melancholic ignorant to lead the 
self, is reduced to the natural form of a substance, which is the source of 
both pathology and geniality and is subjected to self-regulation. 
Secondly, the internalization resulting from this decosmologization 
transforms the question about greatness of character into the problematic 
of a paradoxical ēthos that is in constant and irreducible conflict with itself. 
Desubstantialized by the internal disparity in it, the assumption of a natural 
kind of non-pathological melancholy forces the extraordinary in character 
to a prophylactic activity of care for the self structured around a psycho-
somatic pattern of suffering. 
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Thirdly, and finally, the assumption of the potentially pathological as a 
prerequisite for the great and culturally formative achievement, results in a 
ceaseless and incessant activity of self-differentiation through this pattern 
of suffering. As the paradoxical designation of a makeshift telos, the knowl-
edge of the self gained on the limits of the ‘elevated existence’ peculiar to 
this ēthos, invites a dietetic activity designed to actively sublimate suffering 
into achievement through the ‘thing’ in the body. While suggested in Prob-
lems XXX, 1 by the example of the Syracusan poet, who is better when he is 
ecstatic (954a38) and also by the consequent use of intoxication as an anal-
ogy to the productivity of the naturally melancholic, this perspective is not 
fully unfolded in Antiquity. But as the following section will illustrate, the 
positive rehabilitation of the Platonic notion of divine madness in the Ren-
aissance is unfolded in the dietetic philosophy of Marcelo Ficino, who re-
establishes the Aristotelian notion of the black bile as a ‘thing’ in the body 
as the background for what became a theory of geniality. Here melancholy 
is asserted also in its double character aut Deus aut Deamon, as either ‘an 
angel of heaven or a fiend of hell’ (Walkington 1607, in: Klibansky, Panof-
sky & Saxl 2001: 361, note 23) in a theory of sublimation that allows for 
those who are born under the astrological influence of Saturn to much more 
actively seek pleasure in the suffering of their peculiar disposition. 
4. Saturnine Men: The Dietetics of Melancholy in Ficino  
In what was later arguably to become the ‘manifesto’ of the Renaissance, 
the Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486),vi the great Italian humanist Pico 
della Mirandola focuses attention on the capacity of man and on the human 
perspective. Like his good friend, Marsilio Ficino, whose dietetic philosophy 
will be the primary subject of this chapter, he considered the scholastic 
questions of logic and semantics to be futile and was instead preoccupied 
with the relation of the human to the divine. Being the summit and purpose 
of God’s creation, man had before him a great, if not easy task: the creation 
of himself out of the gifts that he had been possessed with by the powers of 
the universe. The Oration begins along this line: re-telling the story of crea-
tion, it sketches the foundation to a radical anthropology of self-
transgression and sublimation that encompassed the Renaissance man and 
came to reiterate and unite the Platonic and the Aristotelian notions of the 
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extraordinary in character with a general theory of genius. Change and 
metamorphosis, Pico asserts, is not a lack of stability in created life; rather 
it is on the autarchic capacity for change that the dignity of man rests 
(Jeanneret 1996: 129). This is made clear by his answer to the question 
about the excellence of human nature. Why, he asks ‘should we not admire 
more the angels themselves and the beatific choirs of heaven?’ (§3, 5) His 
answer comes in the form of an odd version of the biblical genesis: at the 
end of creation, when ‘God the Architect’ (§4, 10) had nearly completed his 
work, created both angels and animals and put them in heaven and on 
Earth, he longed for someone who would exist ‘to ponder the meaning of so 
great a work, to love its beauty, and to wonder at its vastness’ (§4, 12). This 
being was to become man; but as everything created was complete, and the 
highest, the middle and the lowest orders were already assigned, no arche-
types remained to model from. Man, the final creation and ‘creature of in-
determinate image’ (§5, 18) would have to do without anything of his own, 
sharing instead a little bit of what belonged to every other being. With this 
gift, man’s lack of predefinition instead became an endowment: he could 
take the role, the appearance and the function he wanted to and fashion 
himself as he responsibly desired. In return for the lack of fixed identity 
that set him apart from all other beings, he gained the freedom to be the ar-
chitect of his own nature: 
Constrained by no limits, you may determine it for yourself, according to your 
own free will, in whose hand we have placed you [...] We have made you neither 
of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that you may, as the free 
and extraordinary shaper of yourself, fashion yourself in the form you will pre-
fer. It will be in your power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are 
brutish; you shall have the power, according to your soul’s judgment, to be re-
born into the higher orders, which are divine. (§5, 20-23) 
Man, Pico maintains, is the being that has been granted the task to master 
his own destiny at the risk of both ultimate failure and ultimate glory. Sub-
ject only to himself, he will have the power to cultivate his being in every 
which direction he would desire: his vegetable seed will make him plant-
like, his sensual seed like a beast; with his rationality he can turn into a ce-
lestial being, and his intellectual gifts can make of him ‘an angel and a son 
of God.’ (§6, 30) As a creature of metamorphosis, he is a chameleon (§7, 32) 
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and even symbolized by Proteus, the ancient Greek sea-good, who pos-
sessed the ability to tell the future, but would change his shape to avoid it 
(§7, 34). 
It is in the light of this conception of man as a protean being that we 
should see the philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. Reiterating the Platonic no-
tion of a divine madness and combining it with the physiological arguments 
of the Aristotelian Problems XXX, 1 by maintaining that madness does not 
have the proper effect on the mind unless it is assisted by the material 
means of the black bile, Ficino’s theory of human genius develops out of the 
Aristotelian theory of the ‘thing’ in the body discussed in the previous chap-
ter a specific notion of dietetics that was only provisionally present before. 
As in Pico’s work, man is not merely subjected to the influences of specific 
physical properties; rather, he is free to seek out and cultivate different 
powers in order to design himself in his own image. These thoughts, shared 
by the Italian Renaissance with the Reformation in the North, emerges out 
of the urge for emancipation, both of the individual and its nationality, 
which sought to liberate notions of ‘personality’ from their ties to hierar-
chies and tradition (Burke 1998). In both the Italian South and the Ger-
manic North the humanistic dealing with philosophical problems empha-
sized the newfound self-awareness of a specific type of autarchic human be-
ing and sought to emancipate the individuality of personality (Klibansky, 
Panofsky & Saxl 2001: 352). As the following will illustrate, melancholy, the 
influence of the black bile on the body in those who was found under the 
auspices of Saturn’s astrological authority, played a very special role in this. 
If the human being in the antiquity of Aristotle had been relatively bound in 
terms of nature, but free from the influence of the stars, the emancipated 
human being of the Renaissance, on the other hand, found himself strug-
gling with, manipulating or succumbing to these powers as a part of a grand 
dietetic gesture structured around ‘the heavens within us’ as Ficino writes 
in a letter (Faracovi 2005). The autarchic homo literatus, who was 
stretched out between heroic notions of self-affirmation, on the foundation 
of a suffering sublimated into productive pleasure, and the despairing self-
doubt of someone who is exposed to powers beyond his control, sketched 
out what became the ethical form of the modern genius. This form was the 
result of a double Renaissance: on the one hand of the neo-Platonic under-
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standing of the Saturnine powers, according to which the highest of the 
planets was also responsible for the highest powers of the soul; and on the 
other of the Aristotelian doctrine of melancholy from Problems XXX, 1 ac-
cording to which all great men were melancholics (Klibansky, Panofsky & 
Saxl 2001: 358). The Renaissance melancholic suffered not only under the 
pressure of his psychosomatic constitution like his Aristotelian cousin; he 
also had the astrological influences of Saturn that were both benign and ter-
rifying to answer to. 
As Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl have shown in their work on Saturn and 
melancholy (Klibansky, Panofsky & Saxl 2001), the astrological under-
standing of Saturn as a planet with precarious and equivocal qualities re-
flecting the peculiar polarity of melancholy discussed in the first three sec-
tions of this chapter, was not an invention of the Renaissance, but have 
roots that reach back into Antiquity. Providing an external analogy to the 
black bile as a ’thing’ in the body, the ambiguity of the planet’s properties 
was clear already in the Arabic astrology: Saturn is said here to be dry, but 
sometimes it is described as moist; its reference is to the deepest poverty, 
but also to the greatest wealth; it is said to symbolize both deceit, honesty, 
belonging and long journeys at sea – and the people born under it include 
both slaves, criminals, the powerful and the ones who are silent because of 
deep thought and the secret wisdom they possess (Klibansky, Panofsky & 
Saxl 2001: 209f.). The same kind of equivocation is found in the under-
standing in early Roman sources of Saturn, this dark and mysterious ruler 
of the heavens, as someone who exercises his fundamental power over the 
universe from an inverted perspective: he sees everything on its head from 
his place on the axis of the heavens, thus manifesting an evil gaze on the 
world. In his hands he bore the fate of all fatherhood and of old age (Kli-
bansky, Panofsky & Saxl 2001: 220f.). 
Beyond referencing to his status as father of the universe and the highest 
of the planets, this indication also points to Saturn’s origin out of the deity 
Cronus, who was probably the most ambivalent of all the Greek gods. As 
noted by Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl (2001: 212f.) this paternal figure can 
rightfully be called the god of contrasts, not only because of his influence, 
but also because of his own fate: he is the father of the three very different 
rulers of the world, Zeus, Poseidon and Hades and seems to have in him all 
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of their qualities. He ruled the world in the Golden Age where everything 
was abundant and he invented agriculture; but he also functions as the de-
throned god who sadly roams the farthest shores and waters of the earth. 
He is chained and imprisoned, living in or even under Hades’ kingdom Tar-
tarus, but also counts sometimes as the Lord of the Dead. He is the father of 
men and gods alike and, most famously, also the evil one who feeds on his 
own children, eater of raw flesh, the god who drinks up all other gods in 
him. 
Although this polarity in the figure of Cronus can be taken to have in-
spired the properties that defined the ambivalent astrological influences of 
Saturn as a planet under whose auspices those who both suffered the dis-
eases of the black bile and enjoyed its intellectual gifts were placed in Fi-
cino’s theories of the genius, it was the influence of its function in the neo-
Platonic tradition that made the difference. These theories shall not be ex-
tensively discussed here. It suffices instead to say, as pointed out by Kli-
bansky, Panofsky and Saxl (2001: 237), that the notion of a generally posi-
tive planetary influence propagated here, did more for Saturn than for the 
other planets. In the neo-Platonic tradition that so greatly inspired Ficino 
and his school of thought, Cronus is reinterpreted as the mightiest figure in 
the philosophical pantheon: he becomes nous (“pure spirit”) in contrast to 
Zeus, who signifies the soul. It was this glorification of Cronus, no longer as 
an agent of worldly powers, but as a representative of the highest and most 
pure force of thought, which enabled Ficino to find in Saturn’s influence an 
affinity with Plato’s notion of a divine madness and to combine it with the 
influences of the black bile as a ‘thing’ in the body. It was not only the 
shared qualities of the planet and the melancholic – the coldness and dry-
ness, the propensity to loneliness, dejection and excessive fear, but also to 
visionary states of mind – that related the two. It was also the analogy of 
their effects on the melancholic bodies: like the black bile, Saturn possessed 
both the quality of lethargy (because of its slow revolution it could equip 
those born under it with ‘leaden feet’), but also the power of intelligence 
and contemplation (Klibansky, Panofsky & Saxl 2001: 245). 
This is perhaps nowhere as lucidly illustrated as in the admiration in the 
Renaissance of the tragic and melancholic hero. Ficino’s emblematic use of 
the suffering Prometheus, also a name in the Orphic mysteries for Cronus 
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(Klibansky, Panofsky & Saxl 2001: 239), as a mythical paradigm for the 
melancholic genius, merged the theme of the tragic sufferer, with the Pla-
tonic notion of erōs and with the Aristotelian traditions of melancholy as a 
‘thing’ in the body. According to Ficino, Prometheus was instructed by di-
vine wisdom to gain possession of the divine fire, that he interprets as rea-
son, but this exhilarating task also proved to be Prometheus’ bane: on the 
highest mountain of his insight he was also most miserable of all, gnawed at 
forever by the vultures of the mind, symbolizing the torment of inquiry 
(Brann 2002: 95). It is on this background that Ficino’s dietetic philosophy 
of the melancholy genius as a subject leading himself under the double in-
fluence of the saturnine powers and the black bile as a ‘thing’ in the body 
unfolds. Having the property of the Earth itself, the black bile: 
... continually incites the soul both to collect itself together into one and to dwell 
on itself and to contemplate itself. And being analogues to the world’s center, it 
forces the investigation to the center of the individual subjects, and it carries 
one to the contemplation of whatever is the highest, since, indeed, it is most 
congruent with Saturn, the highest of the planets. Contemplation itself, in its 
turn, by a continual recollection and compression, as it were, brings on a nature 
similar to the black bile (Ficino 2000: 90). 
Retaining the properties of the deepest things, the black bile will lead the 
philosopher, who is under the direction of Saturn, on an intellectual jour-
ney, sublimating the mere earthly life to a heavenly and eternal level. Thus 
the Platonic divine inspiration, which Ficino finds in the emblem of Prome-
theus’ heroic erōs, is not only passively received; it also actively instigated 
and sought out by those whose constitution allows them to give in to their 
melancholic nature tota mente, and place themselves under the guidance of 
Saturn, the Planet of Tears.  
Ficino’s De vita tres libri (“Three Books on Life”, 1489), from where this 
quote is taken, unlike his Theologica Platonica that he himself considered 
his most important work, is not so much a book of philosophy as it is a book 
on the health of this character. More specifically, it deals with the healthy 
life of the intellectual, who is inclined, like Ficino was himself, to melan-
choly and emotional suffering. As Radden has argued (Radden 2000b: 87), 
it is not only the singling out of the health of the intellectuals for special at-
tention, but also that De vita was the first Renaissance work to reiterate the 
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Aristotelian link between suffering and achievement in Problems XXX, 1, 
and to develop the notion of the astrological influence on the black bile of 
Saturn, which makes it unique. The combination of these elements with the 
development of a dietetic theory structured around the psychosomatic pat-
tern of the black bile endows De vita with a perspective, which constitutes a 
direct prolongation of the problematization of self-regulation emerging 
from the ancient theories about melancholy. Including both concrete advice 
about how to live – avoidance of excess of any kind, a reasonable use of the 
day, good living quarters, the right nutrition, good digestion, massages and 
musical therapy (Klibansky, Panofsky & Saxl 2001: 384f.) – and more theo-
retic reflections about how the melancholy can be optimally cultivated, Fi-
cino’s dietetic philosophy of melancholy represents a conclusion to the per-
spective on the ‘thing’ in the body developed in the previous chapters.  
In De vita (Radden 2000b, Ficino 2000: 88-93) Ficino brilliantly illus-
trates this. Here he develops his dual perspective on the health ‘of those 
who devote themselves fulltime to literary studies’ (p. 88) by referring to 
Hippocrates as a physician of the body, while Socrates is one of the soul. 
Both kinds are important, as the sublime achievement of ‘the high doors of 
the Muses’ (p. 89) will not be possible without combining them. Already 
this rudiment is interesting compared to the prophylactic theories found in 
the Aristotelian Problems XXX, 1. Whereas the author of Problems XXX, 1, 
as illustrated above, focused primarily on the predisposition in the extraor-
dinary in character towards the diseases of the black bile, Ficino focuses on 
the dietetic importance of maintaining good health in order to be able to 
achieve greatness. 
This is also illustrated by the emphasis on the importance of achieving a 
moderation of the hyperbole in a passage reflecting the attempt of Aristote-
lian melancholic to reach a ‘higher middle’ in the anomaly, which was also 
discussed in the previous chapter. Learned people in particular, claims Fi-
cino, are told ‘scrupulously to avoid phlegm and black bile, even as the sail-
ors do Scylla and Charybidis’ (ibid.). Like the hero Odysseus, they must 
avoid the two monsters threatening their sanity and find a moderate way 
between them. For the Scylla of phlegmatic sloth ‘dulls and suffocates the 
intelligence’, whereas the Charybidis of melancholy, where it is ‘too abun-
dant or vehement, vexes the mind with continual care and frequent ab-
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surdities and unsettles the judgment’ (ibid.). Without either phlegm or 
black bile to stop them, the learned people would not only be ‘unusually 
healthy’, they would also be ‘the happiest and wisest of mortals’ (ibid.).  
Yet, because of the combustible nature of the black bile, this crux, which 
threatens the learned with the extremes of the two monsters, also offers 
possibilities. With a moderate temperature it not only steers the learned 
clear of disease; it also provides a middle passage between the monstrous 
fangs of insanity towards genius. As Ficino claims in De vita, with reference 
to Plato’s Phaedrus: ‘without madness one knocks at the doors of poetry in 
vain’ (p. 91). No one can be intellectually outstanding if they are not ‘deeply 
excited by some sort of madness’. Melancholy, Ficino states, unlike any 
other humour, has a ‘great tendency towards either extreme, in the unity of 
its fixed and stable nature’ (p. 92). In this it is ‘like iron; when it starts to get 
cold, it gets cold in the extreme; and on the contrary, once it tends towards 
hot, it gets hot in the extreme’. But like the reaction in lime, when it is 
sprinkled with water, the melancholic humour is easily kindled and when it 
is kindled, it burns intensely. This combustibility also provides the learned 
with a means to control and sublimate it: 
Extremely hot, it produces the extremest boldness, even to ferocity; extremely 
cold, however, fear and extreme cowardice. Variously imbued with the interme-
diate grades between cold and heat, however, it produces various dispositions, 
just as wine, especially strong wine, characteristically induces various disposi-
tions in those who have imbibed to the point of drunkenness, or even just a little 
too freely (Ficino 2000: 92). 
At this heart of Ficino’s genial theory it becomes clear that man’s drive to-
wards and sublimation of his own inert ‘divinity’ is not only a matter of 
steering clear of disease; instead the assumption of an underlying affinity 
between contemplative rapture and the divine madness that lifts the soul 
beyond its corporeal limits prompts man to use material causes and die-
tetic means to manage the black bile in his body in a way that was only ten-
tatively present in the Aristotelian Problems. Being born under the auspices 
of Saturn, meant to the melancholic genius not only to suffer under its in-
fluences. The saturnine influence on the somatic subject of the black bile 
also constituted an agent for the realization of his hidden ‘divine’ potential, 
available only through a meticulous dietetic management of the melan-
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cholic body. The rule of Saturn over the melancholic complexion also 
played a cooperative role in the provocation of the human genius (Brann 
2002: 95). 
 Ficino’s dietetic philosophy of melancholy provides an interesting con-
clusion to the perspective on the emergence of the ‘thing’ in the body devel-
oped in this part of the thesis. Representing the theory of an active subli-
mation structured around the pattern of psychosomatic suffering, consti-
tuted by the black bile as a ‘thing’ in the body, his theory accentuates the 
importance of self-regulation to those extraordinary human beings whose 
hyperbolic emotional response makes them both more susceptible to the 
diseases of the black bile and more inclined to geniality. As a theory also of 
active self-transformation based on this dietetic knowledge, Ficino’s theory 
provides an important background to the contemporary problematization 
of the ‘thing’ in the body. While the implications of his theory gained its 
own life in the assumptions of the artistic genius as someone fashionably 
melancholic and more receptive to influence than others (e.g. Schleiner 
1991), the assumption of the black bile as a direct subject of influence in the 
bodies of the extraordinary human beings waned. The following part of the 
thesis will take up the assumption of acedia, a sinful affliction emerging 
first among anchorite desert monks in the 4th century A.D., manifested as a 
psychosomatic pattern of suffering caused by the inability to control and 
manage affect and represented as the noon-day demon. 
5. Pathologies of Performativity: Melancholy 
As the first of the three areas of interest, which this thesis has set out to ex-
plore, the problematical formation of melancholy that has been the subject 
of the sections above has a privileged status. This status it owes not exclu-
sively to the fact that it is the first and as such constitutes the frame of ref-
erence on the background of which the following chapters inevitably will be 
seen. The real privilege of the formation structured around the black bile in 
the bodies of the outstanding is that in it the drama of the great tragedies 
becomes theory. The ‘theoretical man’ of whom Nietzsche wrote that he 
possesses an ‘infinite satisfaction with what is’ (BT 15) here comes not only 
to occupy the Greek scene, but also to represent its theoros, its spectator. 
The decosmologization described in the sections above not only represents 
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a deconstruction, but also the gradual opening of a space for individual self-
regulation, the implications of which are still relevant and problematic to-
day. Representing what has been developed in this chapter within the con-
text of the six dimensions of problems and responses introduced in the be 
ginning of the thesis are summarized in TABLE 2 and explicated in the fol-
lowing. 
 Firstly, the pathological problem that presents itself in the conceptual 
formation of melancholy emerges as the gradual transformation of the hy-
perbolic emotional response of the tragic hero into a circular antinomy of 
madness divided between excessive states of exaltation and dejection and 
associated with self-regulation, thus being MANIC-MELANCHOLIC (see TAB. 
TABLE 2 
Problematical 
Formations 
MELANCHOLIA ACEDIA NEURASTHENIA 
Pathological 
Problem 
MANIC-MELANCHOLIA 
CIRCULAR ANTINOMY 
DESPAIR 
BINARY ANTINOMY 
EXHAUSTION 
ERUPTION OF IMMANENT 
ANTINOMY 
Charac-
terological 
Problem 
THE EXTRAORDINARY 
 
 
THE REJECTED THE SENSITIVE 
Delimitative 
Problem 
PERIPHERY 
 
 
OUTSIDE 
 
INSIDE 
Self-
Regulatory 
Response 
DIETETICS 
 
 
VIRTUOUS LIVING 
 
NEUROPATHIC  
HOUSEHOLD 
 
Performative  
Response 
ACHIEVEMENT WORK AS VIRTUE 
 
WORK AS SECOND  
NATURE 
Self-
Articulatory 
Response 
SELF-TRANSGRESSION 
 
SUBLIMATION 
CONTROLLING AFFECT 
 
ABSTINENT SUBLIMATION 
RESOURCE  
ADMINISTRATION 
PSYCHOANALYTIC 
SELF-DIFFERENTIATION 
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2) First found in the Platonic designation in the Phaidros of a divine state 
of the madness – the exallagé – that had to be strictly differentiated from 
the morbid states of mania, this antinomy was associated with the inspira-
tion of the few and extraordinary, whose disposition made them more sus-
ceptible than others to the psychosomatic nosos psyches, the diseases of the 
soul. When the ēthos perritón of the Aristotelian Problems XXX, 1 was de-
scribed as someone struggling with the diseases of the black bile, the prob-
lem was also represented within the context of this circular antinomy. 
Opening a space for self-regulation structured around the temperature of 
the black bile as a ‘thing’ in the body, the Aristotelian naturalization of mel-
ancholy came to point out a specific character, who would be able to take 
control of his opportune disposition in order to achieve what it was in his 
paradoxical nature to achieve. With Ficino’s later appropriation in the Ren-
aissance of the Platonic and Aristotelian theories, this antinomy of violent 
mood swings became more than a disposition, it came to represent the ideal 
of the genius, who would have to expose himself actively to it in order to 
turn dejected impotence into glorious achievement and freedom. 
This idealization in Ficino’s work of the circular antinomy as something 
specifically associated with self-regulation among the geniuses that were 
governed by the combustibility of the black bile is reflected in the second of 
the dimensions, the dimension of the characterological problem. As indi-
cated in this chapter, the problematical formation of melancholy also de-
scribes the gradual emergence of a specific character, in which the melan-
cholic disposition in its offset is non-pathological and non-morbid. As an 
EXTRAORDINARY the negative in this character is presented as a prerequisite 
for the positive. Already indicated by the association of achievement with 
great suffering in the characters of tragic heroes like Orestes and Jason, the 
elevated normality of the non-pathological melancholic emerged as a pre-
carious and complex modality, which represented a virtual mode of exis-
tence that separated success from failure. This ēthos is reflected in the Pla-
tonic distinction between those who like Socrates and his peers possessed 
erōs and those who did not, like Apollodorus whose quest for knowledge 
was bound to fail because of his characteristic and irredeemable ignorance. 
Constituting a background for the Aristotelian ēthos perriton, who was 
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paradoxically abnormal by nature, the anomaly of the inspired was struc-
tured around the ability to achieve a higher balance through self-
regulation, where most people would fail. Problems XXX, 1 associated this 
achievement with the extraordinary character whose hyperbolic nature 
made him more susceptible than others to the pathologies of the black bile, 
but as illustrated above, it was only with the assumption of man as a pro-
tean being in the Renaissance that this disposition became the ideal of the 
culturally formative genius. 
The delimitative problem of the extraordinary melancholic, indicating 
the designation of the borderline between the individual and the collective, 
can be seen to reflect this. As anómalos the self-regulating character that 
emerged out of the gradual decosmologization, which the chapter has pre-
sented, always appeared on THE PERIPHERY, not only of the collective in 
which he took part, but also of his own self, as the pathos he was subjected 
to pointed him out at the limits of his capabilities. The figure of the heroic, 
but tragic individuality, which struggled to find and possess its place in 
cosmos, is emblematic of this defining inequality. When the Homeric 
hymns left Bellerophon, on whom the Gods had turned on account of his 
rebellious attitude against the cosmic order, wandering in broken solitude 
on the barren Alean plain, it was no coincidence. Rather it reflected the fate 
of the culturally formative, appearing always as a transgression of the al-
ready constituted collective order. Culminating in the precarious Aristote-
lian designation of the ēthos perriton, whose legislative, philosophical or 
artistic contributions placed them always at the limit of the collective, the 
peripheral appearance of the culturally formative in the conceptual forma-
tion of classical melancholy was constituted as a state of exception which 
redefined the collective from which it was excepted. Illustrated as a kind of 
makeshift telos for a teleology that possessed none, the elevated existence 
of the outstanding melancholic, whose disposition was structured in a psy-
chosomatic pattern of suffering around the ‘thing’ in the body, appeared in 
terms of a transgressive inequality with both the collective, the self and na-
ture. It was on the periphery of all three that the delimitation of the melan-
cholic took place. The inequality of the extraordinary melancholic was 
found both in terms of his exception from the collective and in terms of the 
disparity of his natural disposition, which separated him from himself and 
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designated in the gradual opening of this rift a space for self-regulation. It 
was the appropriation of this space in Ficino’s Renaissance theories of sub-
limation, with which the chapter concluded, that the fundamental founda-
tion for a theory of the genius was laid.  
As a conceptual formation representing the emergence of the extraordi-
nary character on the periphery of a gradual decosmologization, the prob-
lematic dimensions presented above was closely associated with the dimen-
sions of response. Thus, the self-regulatory response was dominated by the 
gradual transformation of the pathos, which subjected the heroic individual 
to his cosmic fate, into the full-blown DIETETICS OF SUBLIMATION in Ficino’s 
Renaissance theories. As illustrated in the chapter above there was no prin-
cipal difference between the hyperbolic emotional patterns to which the 
tragic hero was subjected and his achievements, which made him what he 
was. The opening of a space of self-regulation for the exceptional in charac-
ter gradually changed this. Already the Platonic assertion in the Sympo-
sium of erōs as an aporectic problem, which contained the resources for its 
own solution for those few who had it in their character to be possessed by 
it, indicated how that which had used to be a matter of divine intervention 
gradually became transposed into a dimension of individual manipulation. 
But although the internalization of the heroic virtuosity, represented by 
Socrates’ theory of divine madness, did open a space for self-regulation, it 
was not before the Aristotelian naturalization in Problems XXX, 1 of the 
black bile as a subject of manipulation that the association of melancholy 
with great achievement came to flourish. As illustrated, the nature of the 
Aristotelian self-regulation was of prophylactic character, indicating the 
necessity of the naturally gifted melancholics to manage the combustibility 
of the black bile towards the ‘higher middle’ for which they were disposed. 
Representing the boundless and unending necessity for self-regulation in a 
teleology without telos, the eucrasia anomalia of the outstanding and cul-
turally formative melancholic gave form to a ‘greater health’ of geniality. It 
was this ‘greater health’, which became the fundament for the active dietetic 
theories of the Renaissance melancholics. If the dietetic gestures in the Ar-
istotelian theories were mainly concerned with maintaining the health of a 
type who was characterized by his susceptibility to the diseases of the black 
bile, the active self-regulative response of the Renaissance melancholic 
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came to mobilize and manipulate the inverted cosmos of the ‘heavens in 
man’, emblematically symbolized by the planet Saturn, in order to achieve 
the greatness of geniality.  
Although this axis of self-regulation illustrates the transformation of the 
heroic virtuosity into the dietetics of the genius, what holds these ends to-
gether is the dimension of the self-articulatory response. From the classic 
gesture of sublimation through the psychosomatic pattern of suffering, 
which has been illustrated in The Epic of Gilgamesh, to the active self-
transformation of the Renaissance genius in Ficino’s dietetic theories, the 
self-articulation of the melancholic character took the form of SELF-
TRANSGRESSION. As a mode of sublimation, the self-transgression of the ex-
traordinary in character indicated the primary trope for performativity. 
As a performative response to the problematic dimensions presented 
above, however, the self-transgression presented in this chapter was closely 
associated with and took the form of ACHIEVEMENT. The roots of this per-
formative response representing achievement through self-transformation 
was found in the pathos of the tragic hero, whose sublimation of a psycho-
somatic pattern of suffering emblematically allowed him to travel between 
the worlds of man and gods. In a certain sense, this logic of transgression 
represented the source on which the virtuosity of the heroic individual was 
based. As the chapter has illustrated it was the consistency of this logic, 
which gradually came to transform the hero’s virtuosity into the self-
techniques of the outstanding in character, whose performative response to 
his precarious disposition became represented as the extraordinary 
achievement of cultural formation. Structured as a conceptual formation 
associated with psychosomatic suffering around the black bile as a ‘thing’ in 
the body, the dietetics of the Renaissance finally came to represent this per-
formative response in terms of the genial. 
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The desert grows: woe to him who harbours deserts! 
F. Nietzsche: Dionysos-Dithyrambs 
Prologue 
The Aristotelian assumption of a paradoxical melancholic disposition, as 
the previous part of this thesis has illustrated, naturalized the hyperbolic 
emotional response of the heroic individual and organized it around the 
‘thing’ in the body so that it could be managed dietetically by the extraordi-
nary in character. While the black bile emerged from this history as the un-
equalled and problematic subject of dispute, the notion of the ‘thing’ in the 
body among the coenobitic monks who suffered from acedia is both more 
diffuse and more opaque, because it is no longer located within the natural-
istic framework of the humoral theories. As this chapter will illustrate, both 
the assumption of the noonday demon (a reference to the ‘destruction that 
wasteth at noonday’ of Psalms 90, 6) that according to the work of the 
monk Evagrius Ponticus possessed the accidiosi, and later in this tradition 
of the melancholic as a lycanthrope in the popular theories of Robert Bur-
ton, designates the ‘thing’ in the body as a psychosomatic pattern of suffer-
ing structuring the inability to control and manage affect. Constituting the 
conflict between the individual and the moral scheme of the capital vices 
which at its very bottom was based on a pathological conception of human 
behaviour, the tradition analyzed in this part of the thesis thematizes the 
‘thing’ in the body as the manifestation of a confusion of affective energies 
in the attempt of the individual to regulate the self within the context of a 
theological and moral conceptualization of the world. 
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Representing the sinful privation of the monastic, whose mental or 
physical suffering prevented him from taking any pleasure in his spiritual 
calling, the vice of acedia, unlike that of the melancholy described in the 
previous part, lacked any notion of ecstatic combustibility. On the contrary, 
as the first of the following chapters will illustrate, acedia can be described 
in terms of psychosomatic symptoms resulting from a sinful dejection in 
the exercise of virtuous activities. As a ‘thing’ in the body, the demon of 
acedia represented the lack of care in the monk whose deficient manage-
ment of the self opened him to worldy sorrows instead of inspiring in him 
the virtue of godly sorrow that he should be sharing with the suffering 
Christ on the cross. As a sinful freedom from the virtuous sorrow, the de-
monic combination of sloth and sorrow inspired in the monk by the sin of 
acedia represented not so much an absence of suffering as a privative mis-
appropriation of suffering resulting from the deficient management of af-
fects. While this may seem to some extent to make acedia comparable to 
the Platonic notion of amathia – the melancholic ignorance of someone 
unable to achieve erôs because of disproportion – the sinfulness of the 
noonday demon consisted in a mark of depravity rather than in ignorant 
stupidity. The inability to lead the self according to the moral standards of 
the church found in acedia, as Thomas Aquinas has it, is opposed to the vir-
tue of spiritual joy and consists in the aversion against God himself. Con-
ceivable according to Thomas as a superficial perception of God, the sin of 
acedia came to be represented by the monastic feelings of ill health that led 
to the quenching of the soul’s spiritual voice and made the inner life of the 
monk inaccessible to the moral standards of the Church. 
Described as an unbearable tempest of the soul, the demonic spirit of 
acedia demanded the constant watchfulness and vigilance of the suscepti-
ble monk, who had to hold his sinful disposition in check. The disorienta-
tion of the affects originating from the intermediate position between soma 
and psyche held by acedia constituted an idle condition towards which the 
monk had to take voluntary action in order to rectify his conduct. As the 
second chapter in this part of the thesis will illustrate, this rectification was 
structured around the recommendation of work as a therapeutic measure 
meant to cure the dejected states of idleness. It was out of these therapeutic 
measures that acedia came gradually to be identified in a more popularized 
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version as the sin of sloth or idleness, which constituted a danger to all 
christians, but also came to emphasize primarily an external behaviour that 
no longer involved the ‘thing’ in the body to the same extent as before. 
Yet with the implication of work as a virtue, structured by the juxtaposi-
tion of sloth and busyness in the idealization of the state as a body, the ‘so-
matic’ manifestations of the inability to control and lead affect re-emerged 
on another level. Emphasized by Robert Burton in The Anatomy of Melan-
choly as the unhealthy disorder in a society, melancholy came to represent 
the somatic pattern of illness in a societal body that was out of balance, 
caused by the inability of its members to observe their right place. 
As the third and final chapter of this part of the thesis illustrates, in 
Hobbes’ Leviathan this analogy between the management of affects on an 
individual and a societal level is presented as an analogy between the mel-
ancholic individual, whose deficient management of passions literally trans-
forms him into a beast and the famous dictum ‘homo homini lupus’ describ-
ing the state of nature, where man is ‘a wolf to man’. As an anarchic and 
threatening ‘thing’ in the body of both the individual and the state corpus, 
the lycanthrope represents the melancholy of someone who fails to lead 
himself within the normative boundaries of the commonwealth. Repre-
sented by Hobbes as a result of vain-glory, the transformation of the mel-
ancholic body into a beast designates the pathology of an excessive desire 
for power with no place in civilized society. 
1. Acedia among the Anchorite Monks 
When Dante reaches the filthy shores of Styx in the Divine Comedy he finds 
a slimy swamp inhabited by muddled people, who are fighting each other 
violently; not just with their fists, but with their entire bodies, tearing at 
each other with their teeth. Underneath these people, who have been de-
feated by their anger, he can make out everywhere bubbles on the surface. 
These bubbles are caused by the sighs of the accidiosi, the slothful, who lie 
submerged beneath the water. These sinners, his companion Vergil informs 
him, have to gurgle their hymns wedged in the slime, because they cannot 
speak in full words:  
We had been sullen 
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in the sweet air that's gladdened by the sun; 
we bore the mist of sluggishness in us: 
now we are bitter in the blackened mud (Div. Com. VII.121-126). vii 
Trapped bitterly in the deepest regions of hell, their song barely audible, 
these neighbours of the wrathful, who held their anger in, were darkened by 
the accidïoso fummo, the mist that clouds both mind and soul in spite of 
the kindness of a sun that would warm them.  
That Dante would have them gurgle hymns is no doubt a reference to the 
original occupation of these poor souls: the sinful ‘weariness or distress of 
the heart’ as John Cassian calls it (Jackson 1986: 65), which the christian 
church by the end of the 4th century had come to know by the term acedia, 
was first found in the ascetic Egyptian desert monks and was related to 
their struggles with isolation and temptations of the flesh as anchorites. 
This constellation of unusual and undesirable feelings and behavior, which 
was often referred to as the noonday demon was first described in detail by 
Evagrius Ponticus (A.D. 345-399), himself a monk, who had withdrawn to a 
community that was part of a cluster of hermit colonies gathered at Nitria 
and Scete and the “Desert of the Cells” not far southeast of Alexandria 
(Wenzel 1967: 4). Like in other colonies of the same kind, the monks here 
lived separately and gathered only to common worship. As Siegfried Wenzel 
explains in his excellent work on acedia (Wenzel 1967), these people were 
mostly common Egyptian peasants without any education, who were often 
not prepared for the rigorous and intense tests of the ascetic’s life. Among 
the eight different ‘vices’ that could befall them acedia is named by Eva-
grius as the sixth and is said to be the most oppressive of all the demons 
(Evagrius 2003: 93). Possessing the monk between the fourth and the 
eighth hour (at noon, between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m.), this demon, in Evagrius’ 
powerful words, ‘makes it appear that the sun moves slowly or not at all, 
and that the day seems to be fifty hours long.’ The monk becomes restless, 
looking constantly towards the window, or he jumps out of the cell ‘to watch 
the sun to see how far it is from the ninth hour [3 p.m.], to look this way 
and that’. The demon also overwhelms him with a sense of dislike for the 
whole place, and compels him to think that all love has disappeared from 
the community of the brothers, so that he can find no one who can offer 
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him consolation. He also makes the monk long for other places, where he is 
convinced that he can easily find ‘the wherewithal to meet his needs and 
pursue a trade that is easier and more productive’, adding that pleasing the 
Lord is not a question of place. Along with this dislike of the community the 
demon makes the monk remember and think of the close relations of his 
former life, comparing his long lifetime with the ‘burdens of asceticism’. In 
short, the demon in the body of the monk ‘deploys every device in order to 
have the monk leave his cell and flee the stadium’.  
Acedia is not followed by any other demon, Evagrius explains; but the 
relaxation and the time of ‘ineffable joy’ that comes instead is exactly the il-
lusion, which makes it the most oppressive. Opening the soul to other 
temptations and vices that the monk has struggled to be rid of (Evagrius 
2003: 83), it makes him be quick to undertake a service, for example, but in 
the end only to his own private good: he ‘proposes visiting the sick, but is 
fulfilling his own purpose’ (Evagrius 2003: 84). 
On the background of the exploration of melancholy and the black bile as 
a ‘thing’ in the body of the extraordinary in character, the first important 
question that Evagrius’ description of the spiritual flaw of acedia brings to 
mind is of course if the two phenomena are the same. Is acedia simply mel-
ancholy presented within the moral conceptual framework of the ecclesias-
tical writers and their lay followers and no longer within the physiological 
scheme of the humoral dispositions developed by the Hippocratic writers? 
As Robert Daly has shown, acedia at least shares symptoms with melan-
choly by including difficult emotions and feelings that are known to this day 
in psychopathology: the loss of sources of gratification and emotional at-
tachments, loss of motivation, dejection, hopelessness and sadness, low 
self-esteem, diminished span of concentration, nostalgia, irritability, isola-
tion, apathy and suicidal tendencies, just to name some (Daly 2007: 32). 
Yet a look at the psychosomatic pattern of suffering structured around 
the demon of acedia will attest to one important difference: as Noel Brann 
has also pointed out (Brann 1979: 198), the notion of acedia lacks com-
pletely the physiological quality of ecstatic combustibility, which was cru-
cial to the understanding of melancholy as a subject of sublimation associ-
ated with the hyperbolic emotional response of the exceptional in character. 
As a ‘thing’ in the body, acedia constituted only the pathological manifesta-
  
 
 
Chapter Three: Acedia and Virtuous Living  
92 
tions of an unwanted disposition that prevented the afflicted monk from 
completing his chores. Wenzel provides an example from the 11th century of 
a monk who associated acedia primarily with the drowsiness that befell him 
and his fellow monks in the early morning: ‘The coming of dawn, at which 
time acedia falls upon us more heavily, must find us upright and busy with 
reciting the Office.’ (Wenzel 1967: 30) The monk praises the example of the 
saint Rodolphus, who would overcome this acedia by tying ropes to the 
ceiling of his cell, hang himself from them by the arms and sing the psalms 
extended in this position.  
Apart from the sleepiness, acedia would also manifest itself as a general 
feeling of illness, along with more specific symptoms, which are similar to 
some of those we described in melancholy, but with the particular effect of 
upsetting the monks exercise of his spiritual duties. The weakness in the 
knees, pains in the limbs and fever experienced by the monastic was in no 
way associated with his achievements other than in the negative. As Andrew 
Crislip argues, the psychosomatic pattern of suffering produced by the de-
mon of acedia in the monastic body has the specific result that [the monk] 
is unable to pray the synaxis. An illustration of this is provided by an anec-
dote attributed to Amma Theodora (probably a 4th century monastic of 
Lower Egypt), who asserts that dejection and the demon’s work: ‘weighs 
down the body through illnesses, … debility, … and slackening of the knees 
and all the body’s members. It dissipates the strength of the soul and body, 
so that [one might say]: ‘I am ill and not strong enough to perform the sy-
naxis.’’ (Crislip 2005: 147) 
The manifestation of a psychosomatic pattern of suffering associated 
with the monk’s inability to meet the moral demands of his spiritual life, is 
reflected also in the problem of aphonia that is often attributed directly to 
the demonical possession of the monastic body. Another example speaks of 
a general heaviness of the limbs and the monk continues by explaining how 
‘once, this demon of acedia … took hold of my tongue and prevented me 
from performing the office because he had placed a heavy weight on my 
head, and a burdensome disease … on all my limbs.’ (Crislip 2005: 147) Re-
flecting the unpleasant fate of the accïdiosi in Dante’s Inferno, who suffered 
eternally the sin of the terrible paradox they lived: choosing the darkness of 
the soul in the broad daylight of God’s grace, the psychosomatic manifesta-
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tion of muteness was often associated with demonical possession. As Star-
obinski indicates (Starobinsky 1960: 26), some writers described acedia as 
a quenching of the soul’s voice, which made the inner life of the monk 
gradually more inaccessible and incommunicable. 
While sharing a family resemblance to the extent that many of their 
symptoms were the same, another important difference between the an-
cient conception of melancholy as a ‘thing’ in the body of the extraordinary 
and the demonical possession associated with acedia is found in this sinful 
disposition. To the ideal of a virtuous, Christian life, whose goal it was ‘to 
bring about a relationship between human beings and God, who are not the 
same’ (Campbell 2001: 11), acedia constituted a sinful privation, even if it 
was an involuntary one, drying out any source of communication, not only 
with others, but also with God himself. As the psychosomatic pattern of a 
dejection in the exercise of virtue structured around the demon in the mo-
nastic body, acedia represented the pathological conception of human be-
haviour found at the roots of the moral scheme of the capital vices. 
Interestingly, this definition of acedia allows also for a differentiated 
perspective on the role of the hyperbole, which played an essential part in 
melancholy in Antiquity. While the notion of the hyperbolic emotional re-
sponse in the understanding of the black bile as a ‘thing’ in the body was 
gradually involved in the decosmologization that culminated in the dietetic 
programs of the Renaissance genius, the excess of affect in the Medieval 
conception of acedia was only representable as the negative source of pa-
thology. Crislip provides an example that illustrates this, describing how 
the monastic’s excessive practices of asceticism were seen as the work of 
the demon of acedia that possessed his body. In the form of an anecdote 
describing the spiritual guidance of a master to a young monastic, who 
burns to become a solitary before he is ready, the acedia in the body of the 
student is associated with his inability to moderate his practice. The master 
advises his disciple to allow good time for rest and comfort in his asceti-
cism, but as soon as he is on his own he begins to question the advice he has 
been given and on the third day falls prey to acedia:  
… instead of eating, drinking, and sleeping when faced with demonic affliction, 
“he sang an abundance of psalms” and fasted until dark because of the demon’s 
subversive influence. Instead of finding rest at night, he was haunted by fright-
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ening – perhaps erotic – images: an Ethiopian “gnashing his teeth” at him in 
bed. (Crislip 2005: 154) 
Representing the result of excessive performance during the exercise of 
spiritual duties, the psychosomatic pattern of suffering found in acedia, as 
this example illustrates, was associated with the inability to regulate the self 
properly according to some external moral standard. Designating the defi-
cient management of affects, the phenomenon of acedia within the frame-
work of the ecclesiastical vices represented the sinful and privative deepen-
ing of a pattern of suffering in the monastic who failed to regulate himself. 
The assumption of acedia as a privative and sinful kind of suffering, 
prompted by the individual inability to manage affect, is supported by two 
important indications. First, the association of the phenomenon with the 
notion of care implicated by the etymology of the word. Deriving from the 
Greek akedia, it is a compound. The first part is the prefix a- which means 
“not” in the same way as the prefix “un-” does in English. The second part is 
the abstract noun kedia, which itself comes from the more concrete noun 
kedos – translatable into ‘care’. Thus acedia primarily points to a negative: 
the lack of care. As David Holden has pointed out (Holden 2009: 7) the 
kind of ‘care’ implicated here is of a special kind; kedos means ‘care for oth-
ers,’ because it is the kind of care that you show when someone dies. It des-
ignated the practice related to the death of a loved one, to washing the 
body, attending the funeral, and seeing the remains of the person respect-
fully buried. Kedia, then, meant the exercise of kedos, caring for others re-
spectfully and expecting nothing in return. The ‘carelessness’ of acedia, in 
its association with a psychosomatic pattern of suffering structured around 
the demon in the body of the monastic, in this sense implicated not so 
much a complete lack of care, as it designated the lack of care for others as-
sociated with a privation of suffering. 
This becomes even more lucid in the association of the phenomenon 
with the medieval distinction between two kinds of tristitia, two kinds of 
sorrow, of which one was virtuous and the other sinful. As Mark Altschule 
has illustrated, (Altschule 1967: 779) the medieval belief that a dejection of 
spirits may be either rational or irrational, finds its origin in a few words in 
the Corinthians (7, 10). Here St. Paul distinguishes between two kinds of 
sorrow, one coming ‘from God’ and the other ‘of the world’. The ‘godly sor-
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row’ that Christ felt when he was dying on the cross is much appreciated 
because it causes repentance. The ‘worldly sorrow’ on the other hand – the 
despair and dejection over worldly matters – causes only death. According 
to an early exegetic, Altschule indicates, what Judas Iscariot, who gave up 
Christ to the Romans, succumbed to, was the latter form of tristitia. To the 
notion of acedia, which for a long time led an interchangeable career with 
tristitia on the list of capital vices (e.g. Wenzel 1967, Daly 2007), this dis-
tinction is interesting primarily because Judas’ suffering is defined, not in 
terms of an unforgivable sin (as God has it in his power to forgive every-
thing), but in terms of the excess of his remorse. It was Judas’ deficient 
management of affect that allowed the Devil to lead him away from the be-
neficent sorrow and cause his paltry death instead. Like the tristitia that 
opened Judas up to the influence of the Devil, acedia designated an inabil-
ity to lead affect that caused the sinful deepening of a pattern of suffering in 
the monastic.  
But still acedia was not reducible to this second kind of tristitia. As a 
third thematic separating it from melancholy in the Hippocratic framework, 
acedia, as the following illustrates, was associated with a paradoxical free-
dom from care seen from the perspective of the kind of repentance that vir-
tuous sorrow could lead to. Culminating in the Thomistic perception of it as 
the result of a ‘superficial perception of God’, acedia as a ‘thing’ in the body 
of the monastic represented the privation caused by a psychosomatic pat-
tern of suffering, which led to the sin of being careless about that which one 
should really care for. Representing the precarious position of acedia 
within a moral framework as a pathological manifestation in the individual 
body on the threshold between sin and vice, this theme illustrates how the 
diseases of demonically possessed erupted as a crisis with implications also 
for the social order.  
It was John Cassian (ca. 360 – 435 A.D.), who was responsible for the 
tabulation of the effects of the capital vices, and for the establishment of a 
list of the virtues replacing them in the human heart. Travelling in Egypt 
and visiting the hermit colonies, Cassian came to know Evagrius and his 
teachings. Cassian transformed the Greek akedia of Palestine and Egypt 
into the Latin ‘de spiritue acediae’, where it remained in Western Europe 
for over a thousand years as acedia or sloth (Daly 2007: 34). He added to 
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Evagrius’ description of the noonday demon the symptoms of weariness 
and anxiousness and specifies further that the danger it poses is especially 
directed against the desert monks. Like Evagrius he was concerned with the 
harmfulness of the affects to the ascetic practices, to which they constituted 
practical barriers:  
Our sixth struggle is with what the Greeks call acedia, which we can refer to as 
wearied or anxious heart. It is akin to sadness and is the peculiar lot of solitaires 
and a particularly dangerous and frequent foe of those dwelling in the desert. It 
disturbs the monk especially around the sixth hour (12 a.m.), rushing in upon 
him like a kind of fever at just this time and inflicting upon the enfeebled soul 
the most burning heat of its attacks at regular and set intervals. Some of the eld-
ers declare that this is the “midday demon” that is mentioned in the nineteenth 
psalm. (Cassian 2000: 219)  
Although Cassian’s description of acedia is not notably different from that 
of Evagrius, it is interesting here, because of Cassian’s endeavors to estab-
lish a fixed moral system of the vices in relation to the virtues. As Wenzel 
points out, in the work of Cassian, the monk’s acedia is responsible for ei-
ther sleep or flight from the cell, while the virtue related to it is fortitude – 
‘strength’ or ‘courage’ (Wenzel 1967: 20). Within this moral framework of 
vice and virtue acedia emerges on the precarious threshold between sin and 
vice. This is illustrated by Robert Daly in his discussion of the difference in 
Christian Medieval Europe between the two.  
If sin proceeded from freedom because the act it constituted was not 
compelled but was effected by the capacities of a person or author who was 
responsible for his action and accountable to God for them, then these acts 
constituted a refusal of God’s love or a resistance to God’s grace. The ques-
tion, of course, is if vice proceeded from freedom in this way. As Daly points 
out, making a distinction between sin and vice implies that a ‘vice is con-
ceived of as a more or less enduring trait of an individual’s character’, which 
is then ‘deemed variously a habitual fault, flaw or defect (“vitium”) relative 
of some norm of conduct, or as a tendency or disposition to seek degrading 
pleasures and/or to engage in degrading practices.’ (Daly 2007: 41) In con-
trast to the sin that is more exclusively related to one action, the vice repre-
sents a disposition or shameful habit, a mark of depravity, which would 
“stand in for” the desired disposition. Reflecting the Aristotelian ethics, the 
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vice originates in a wrong estimate over time of “the good” and with this 
temporal aspect is in opposition to virtuous activity. Acedia, as Daly ex-
plains, could very well be a sin if the actions it implicated proceeded from 
freedom; but vices were not simply viewed as effects of freedom and the two 
terms were often used without distinction, making it hard to give a clear 
univocal answer to whether acedia was one or the other. Rather, in the con-
text presented in the work of Cassian, acedia erupts on the precarious 
threshold between the two. Representing a flight from virtue, it is the 
demonically induced diseases of the sufferer who leads him astray. Yet 
within the moral framework of vice and virtue the victims of the demonic 
illnesses are held responsible for their condition and its rectification (Cris-
lip 2005: 149). As a problematization of the monastic’s ability to lead the 
self within the moral scheme of the capital vices and virtues, acedia was not 
simply the name of a habitual sin. More precisely it designated a set of 
pathological traits within the afflicted that had complex or variable relation 
to an activity (or a lack thereof), which was acknowledged as a sin. 
When Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologica later defines acedia as 
tristitia de spirituali bono (II, 2, quae. 35), as the kind of sorrow or aver-
sion that man feels against the spiritual good, it is the paradox of this pre-
carious situation that is reflected. As Wenzel writes, acedia in the work of 
Aquinas is ‘conceived as, essentially, the aversion against the spiritual good 
when it appears to man as evil’ (Wenzel 1967: 48). The character of the sin 
of the accïdiosi is not like the sins associated with the other vices; whereas 
the glutton, for example, is excessive in his love of food and drink, some-
thing that is created by God, acedia constitutes the much more problematic 
aversion against God himself.  
As Theunissen has pointed out (Theunissen 1996: 27), Thomas’ defini-
tion in the quaestio 35 on acedia of the Summa Theologica has to be read 
in the light of his definition of joy in the quaestio 28 on joy. Acedia is a spe-
cial vice, and its effects even a special sin, because it is opposed to spiritual 
joy – the love of Creation. In this sense it reflects both Kierkegaard’s later 
notion of despair and the broader based feeling of a general disintegration 
of values in the late 19th century, culminating in the Nietzschean notion of 
nihilism. Its character of psychosomatic privation of sorrow is not limited 
to the individual it affects; instead it spreads across and infects everything 
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good in the world. It is evil, not just because it is a sin in action, but because 
it is more fundamentally a sin of the heart infecting all other activities. 
As Theunissen has shown (Theunissen 1996: 31) the paradox of acedia, 
according to Thomas emerges because of a superficial perception of God 
that is characterized by the inability to penetrate to the source of joy. It is as 
such that acedia represents a sinful freedom from care: as the eruption of a 
privative deepening of suffering structured around the noonday demon as a 
‘thing’ in the body, acedia simultaneously represents a crisis in the moral 
framework that surrounds it. The lack of care in acedia is not just a care-
lessness associated with individual virtue; it is a carelessness that is also 
thought to prevent the virtue of the social body, because of the individual’s 
deficient management of affect. This precarious analogue between the 
pathological patterns of suffering in the individual body and the social pa-
thologies of melancholy which emerges out of the medieval notion of acedia 
as a sinful freedom from care will be the interest of the following chapter. 
2. The Virtue of Work and the Melancholy of the Social Body 
In his work on acedia, Siegfried Wenzel quotes from a 12th century sermon 
by Abbot Isaac of L’Étoile on the episode from Matt. 8, 23-27 of Christ’s 
sleeping in the boat of the Apostles, when a great storm rises. While this 
passage is often used to emphasize the comfort of those who have faith, 
Isaac’s interpretation is somewhat different. Using the metaphor of the vio-
lent storm to point out the importance of constant and vigilant watchful-
ness, he interprets the episode as an image of those religious who have 
slackened in their faith in false security, and have thus let Christ ‘fall asleep’ 
in their hearts and souls. The storm, which Isaac thinks of as Christ’s doing, 
shakes those who have become mentally inattentive out of their ‘acedia, 
which leads to the flow of evil thoughts, like an inner and unbearable tem-
pest’. Concluding with a forceful exhortation to always be watchful and 
alert, Isaac declares:  
Woe to you if Christ sleeps in you! The wind wakes, the sea wakes, the storm 
and waves of evil thoughts wake, and thousand tides of temptation come upon 
you, if only He is asleep in you … Therefore let us be vigilant, brethren, let us be 
vigilant above all against the plague of acedia! (Isaac de Stella, Sermo XIV 
quoted in Wenzel 1967: 33).  
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The paradoxical position of acedia on the threshold between a sin, consti-
tuted by an act of freedom, and a vice related to the natural or habitual 
condition of the monastic, as discussed in the previous chapter, erupted as 
a problematization of the monastic’s ability to control his affects. With the 
gradual evolvement of the moral scheme of the capital vices and virtues, the 
focus came to be on the question of the personal responsibility for rectifica-
tion. As reflected in Isaac’s sermon quoted above, although the demon itself 
might attack where one would least expect it, the afflicted monk had a sig-
nificant degree of responsibility, both to be always alert about the origins of 
the spiritual disease, whether it was a result of demonic possession or not, 
and, as a penitent, to take voluntary action against it. Daly has shown (Daly 
2007: 41 ff.) that the acknowledging of the vice as a sinful disposition, with 
the help of the church and God’s grace could rectify the penitent’s conduct 
and character. He would have to seek the ministrations of the church, re-
ceiving both the exhortations and the compassion of others, examine his 
conscience and confess his sin in order for it to be forgiven by a priest of the 
church (e.g. Gudmand-Høyer 2006). 
The attitude found in Abbot Isaac’s sermon also points to another issue. 
While the previous section showed that acedia shared with the conception 
of melancholy within the Hippocratic framework of the humoral theories a 
pattern of psychosomatic suffering, primarily as a kind of sinful tristitia, 
structured around the demon in the body, it also had in it an element defin-
able as laziness or indolence. The abbot’s exhortations to stay alert and the 
definition of acedia as a demon that might come at the time when the spiri-
tual practices proved most difficult, show that the affliction represented 
more than a physiological problem; rather, the intermediate position be-
tween soma and psyche, between body and spirit, held by acedia, corre-
sponded to a crisis in the moral framework of which it was a part. The sin of 
acedia meant more than only a withdrawal from spiritual exercise because 
of pains in the body. The demonically induced pain in the sufferer, though 
very real, was a manifestation not of aversion with work or toil in itself, but 
of a confusion or even disgust with that which should be the object of man’s 
greatest love and hence should guarantee the spiritual value and joy of his 
activities within the moral scheme of vice and virtue. Or in Wenzel’s words: 
‘At the root of acedia lies, not physical exhaustion or a weakening of man’s 
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will or intellectual darkness, but a disorientation of his affect or, as we 
would say today, his emotional life.’ (Wenzel 1967: 64) As Wenzel readily 
adds this affectus should not be taken as a “feeling” in the modern sense of 
the word. To the medieval Christian affect was a question of will and love 
resulting in “good works”. 
It is the understanding of acedia, not as laziness in itself, but as a de-
spairing confusion that omitted the afflicted, who failed to lead his affects, 
from the “good works”, which explains its close historical relation to labour. 
Emerging on the threshold between the monastic, who had come to be pos-
sessed by acedia and the moral crisis implicated by this in the societal 
framework surrounding him, the virtue of work represented the corre-
spondence between the health of the individual and the health of the social 
body. This correspondence is reflected in Robert Burton’s famous assump-
tion about business as the best cure for melancholy and in such later prov-
erbs as ‘idleness is the root of all evil.’ From the earliest known sources of 
acedia, manual work, in the right measures, was recommended therapeuti-
cally as an effective treatment of the ‘thing’ in the body. Crislip quotes Eva-
grius for the following advice: ‘Give thought to working with your hands, if 
possible both day and night … In this way you can also overcome the demon 
of acedia.’ (Crislip 2005: 156) Also Cassian’s chief weapon against acedia is 
manual work, which he suggests, should be applied to the ‘ulcers, which 
spring from the root of idleness’, so that Christ may heal them ‘like some 
well-skilled physician’ (Cassian 2000: 10ff.). The more sophisticated ‘inte-
riorization’ (Jackson 1986: 73) of acedia in the Scholastic tradition is not 
less associated with work, even if it sometimes recommends the opposite. 
Those of the accïdiosi, some writers suggest, who suffer from a ‘natural 
cause’ of the vice (which could be for example melancholy), or have been 
practicing excessive feats of asceticism to save themselves, may be better 
helped by not practicing endurance or manual work, but by taking a walk or 
even dieting (Wenzel 1967: 59). 
Even if the primary target was the spiritual nature of the individual mo-
nastic, the inability in acedia to maintain a regular and temporally bound 
sense of discipline and work in a social setting played a major role in these 
therapeutic measures. It was within the context of the popular view of the 
vice as idleness that the sins associated with acedia became failures that 
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was no longer restricted to those who lived an ascetic life in the desert, but 
was potentially dangerous for all Christians as the sin of sloth. This shift in 
emphasis to a focus on external behaviour, Jackson suggests, was related to 
the practical concerns of clergy and flocks with sinfulness in general and its 
assessment in confession and penance (Jackson 1986: 73). As Jackson has 
illustrated elsewhere, the association of sloth with a reprehensible idleness, 
which was the primary target of critique from both lay and religious leaders 
alike, gradually shifted the attention away from the psychosomatic pattern 
of suffering in the bodies of the afflicted. The dejection and despair associ-
ated with the ‘thing’ in the body of the monastic possessed by the demon of 
acedia, in the own life that sloth acquired in post-medieval religious and 
secular writings, was no longer a primary target of criticism (Jackson 1981). 
The transformation of acedia as a vice that was first and foremost con-
cerned with the precarious pathological manifestations that resulted in a 
neglect of spiritual matters, to the popularized version of sloth, which was 
more concerned with one’s worldly status and profession, indicates that to-
ward the end of the Middle Ages, the sin of acedia came to implicate a 
broader notion of negligence of duties in a social body. The implication of 
the virtue of work must be seen in this light. As an antagonist of sloth, the 
virtue of busyness took the place of the virtues of fortitude or spiritual joy, 
and as such constituted a change in the meaning of acedia away from its fo-
cus on the ‘thing’ in the body to a reflection of a general change in society 
towards a greater significance of worldly performance. While sloth was cer-
tainly also related to the organization and execution of spiritual matters, the 
virtue of work, which also found support in the Bible (for example in Job 
5:7 ‘man is born to work, and the bird, to fly’), became more a prominent 
theme, indicating the point of convergence, the threshold, between the in-
dividual and the social body.  
Wenzel provides two cases, which exemplify this shift towards the as-
sumption of a precarious relation between the individual and the societal 
body in a brilliant manner. The conception of sloth in the treatise “On the 
seven Deadly Sins”, attributed to Nicholas Hereford (ca. 1385) defines the 
sin in the conventional manner of the tradition of acedia by referring to it 
as ‘slouthe in Gods servise’. But immediately after this it turns around and 
speaks instead of ‘ydelness in servise of God’ (Wenzel 1967: 91), represent-
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ing the moral failure of the slothful to observe his place in the societal body. 
The difference here between the reference to the original conception of 
acedia the sin and idleness in matters of worldly work servicing God does 
not prevent the author from naming and discussing idleness in three es-
tates: that of priests, “gentil men” and labourers. Sloth here, as Wenzel 
maintains, simply means the neglect in the obligations of one’s status or 
profession.  
The same three estates are named in the second example, taken from an 
extract of a sermon by Thomas Brinton, bishop of Rochester (1373-1389), 
but here they are all subsumed under the different genera of the work 
served to them: 
Since man is by nature born to work, the army of Christians, which chiefly con-
sists of three degrees, namely the prelates, religious, and workers, must hope of 
the kingdom of God be constantly occupied: either in the works of active life 
(which are works of mercy, such as feeding the poor, clothing the naked, visiting 
the sick and similar things), or in the works of contemplative life (which are 
praying, keeping vigil, preaching, hearing divine matters, etc.), or in the works 
of human servitude (such as digging, plowing, sowing, reaping, and working 
with one’s own hands). In consequence, those miserable idlers who are not use-
fully occupied in any of these three degrees and hence are unfruitful, deprive 
themselves by divine justice of the kingdom of God. (Brinton Sermo 20, quoted 
in Wenzel 1967: 91) 
Disappeared here, and completely replaced by a notion of worldly matters 
related to the virtue of work, is the psychosomatic pattern of suffering rep-
resented by the demon of acedia possessing the hermit monks of the Egyp-
tian desert. From representing first and foremost a therapeutic measure de-
signed to assist the monk’s management of affects, which led him to stray 
from the path of virtue, work in Brinton’s sermon has acquired a central po-
sition in the moral structure of a human society, organized by status and 
generic duties. Idleness, on the other hand, represents nothing like an emo-
tional pattern of suffering, but indicates a crisis in the divine organization 
of God’s kingdom. The sin of acedia, once representing activities associated 
with the inability to regulate affect, because of a psychosomatic pattern of 
suffering structured around the ‘thing’ in the body, here has become a 
largely secular concept, with little or no relation to soma, reflecting instead 
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the incipient aspirations of a society based on the both symbolic and mate-
rial value of labour. 
Interestingly, this transformation of the sin of acedia from being a spiri-
tual affliction among the desert monks to indicating a more worldly negli-
gence of one’s obligations to society, converges with the conceptualization 
of melancholy as a pathology of the social represented in the context of the 
correspondence between the individual and the social discussed above. The 
assumption of society, reflected in the thoughts of Hereford and Brinton 
quoted above, as an organization that would come apart without the abso-
lute compliance of its individual parts, was already expressed in the strong 
Platonic tradition of viewing the state as a body whose functionality de-
pended on the cooperation of its members. The organic metaphor of the 
state became popular already in the 12th century, in the work of the Bishop 
of Chartres, John of Salisbury. In Salisbury’s Policraticus (1159) the state is 
idealized as a body, whose health represents the good of all its members 
(Salisbury 1990). The offices of the state and their roles in society are here 
described analogously to parts of the body, with those who exert govern-
mental authority first, those who perform its functions second and thirdly 
those who are governed, but do not govern others. While the primary tier 
represents the head that is also the prince, who must function accordingly, 
with governors and judges as his eyes and mouth, the senate as his heart 
and the church as his soul, the second likens the hands, internal organs and 
flanks. Including for example soldiers and tax collectors as hands and the 
bureaucracy of the state as the organs, the primary and secondary functions 
are all carried by the peasantry and the guilds of craftsmen, who constitute 
the feet of this governing golem. 
The dysfunctional government, in this analogy, accordingly is a result of 
an illness or a conflict between the differing parts, not only working one 
way from the superior functions to the lower, but both ways so that ‘an in-
jury to the head’, according to Salisbury, ‘is brought home to all its mem-
bers, and that a wound unjustly inflicted on any member tends to the injury 
of the head’ (Pol. IV, 24). Emphasizing the mutual dependence of the single 
members and their duty to fulfil exactly their purpose, the proper relation 
between the parts would constitute societal health, while the appearance of 
conflicting goals among them would make the body sick. When Thomas 
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Hobbes in 1651, at about the same time as Robert Burton’s sixth and final 
edition of The Anatomy of Melancholy was released posthumously, pub-
lished his Leviathan, the disease of a societal body out of balance with itself 
had been given the name melancholy.  
As the following will illustrate, in Hobbes’ work melancholy came to be 
represented in a dual manner that borrowed from both the ancient tradi-
tion of melancholy and the medieval tradition of acedia to represent the re-
sults of a deficient management of the self. Constituting both a representa-
tion of how the body of the commonwealth could deteriorate once again 
into the natural state if its parts did not manage to lead themselves accord-
ing to their proper place, and the somatic manifestation of this deteriora-
tion as a transformation of the civilized man into an animal, melancholy in 
Hobbes’ work emerges as a moral conception of the excess or defect of the 
‘Desire for Power’ in the Leviathan. 
3. Thomas Hobbes and the Melancholic of the Leviathan 
The assumption in Hobbes’ work of melancholy as a pathology, which 
threatens not only the sanity of the individual but also the health of the 
commonwealth, although this relation has not been extensively developed 
in the literature, is influenced by Robert Burton (Rossello 2008, Malcolm 
2002). In his Anatomy of Melancholy, which was very popular at the time 
when Hobbes wrote and published the Leviathan, Burton develops a theory 
of melancholy that emphasizes the individual ability to control human pas-
sion, thus reflecting the moral association of acedia with the inability to 
regulate the self according to the standards of the ecclesiastical moral 
framework. In short, as Wolf Lepenies has illustrated in his work Melan-
choly and Society (1992), melancholy to Burton is equal to disorder. It is 
found both on an individual level, where it is represented as an imbalance 
in the passions, and on a social level, where it is designated as a social pa-
thology in the humoral constitution of the state body (Lepenies 1992: 22). 
Reflecting the organic metaphor of the state in the work of Salisbury men-
tioned in the previous chapter, in one example of this, Burton makes a ref-
erence to the work of a colleague and describes how the state in question 
‘was like a sick body which had lately taken physic, whose humours are not 
yet well settled, and weakened so much by purging, that nothing was left 
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but melancholy’ (Burton 1986: 45). The implication of a correspondence be-
tween the diseases of the individual body and the state, which was repre-
sented in the tradition of acedia and sloth, culminates in the work of Bur-
ton. Like the designation of melancholy in the individual body as a result of 
the failure of self-mastery over the passions, the corresponding melancholic 
emissions in the soma of the state here is represented as a decadency that 
can lead to collapse. The pathology thus had to be purged in order for the 
societal body to survive: 
Kingdoms, provinces, and politic bodies are likewise sensible and subject to this 
disease … whereas you shall see in many discontents, common grievances, com-
plaints, poverty, barbarism, beggary, plagues, wars, rebellions, seditions, muti-
nies, contentions, idleness, riot, epicurism, the land lie untilled, waste, full of 
bogs, fens, deserts, &c., cities decayed and poor towns, villages depopulated, the 
people squalid, ugly, uncivil; that kingdom, that country, must needs be discon-
tent, melancholy, hath a sick body and had to be reformed. (Burton 1986: 43f.) 
The understanding in Hobbes’ Leviathan of the melancholic subject as 
someone incapable of regulating himself within the framework of the com-
monwealth can be understood within the context of this analogues corre-
spondence between the individual and the social body. In chapter VIII of 
the work, named ‘Of the Vertues commonly called intellectual; and their 
contrary defects’, Hobbes defines the melancholic as a mad individual, 
whose dejection has subjected him to fears with no cause. His madness ap-
pears in different manners; in superstitious behaviour, in the groundless 
fear over something particular; or in ‘the haunting of solitudes and graves’ 
(Hobbes 2006: 41). 
It is specifically the allusion to the haunting of graves as something typi-
cal of the melancholic, which is interesting to the following. This allusion is 
taken from Robert Burton’s understanding of lycanthropy – the wolf-
madness which was a subject of great interest to the period – as a specific 
kind of melancholy including ‘howling about graves and fields at night’ 
(Burton 1986: 113). In the context of the Leviathan Hobbes’ description of 
the melancholic suggests a precarious and interesting correspondence be-
tween the lycanthrope and the crisis of the commonwealth associated with 
the return to a natural condition, where, in the words of Hobbes’ famous 
dictum, man is a wolf to man: homo homini lupus. On the one hand the 
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melancholic individual in Hobbes’ universe, as the following will illustrate, 
is someone in whom madness has interrupted the use of reason. On the 
other hand, melancholy also signals the irruption of the beast in man, 
which signifies a crisis in the social body of the Leviathan. In the Hobbe-
sian melancholic, the psychosomatic pattern of suffering associated with 
the madness of someone unable to control their affects, emerges simultane-
ously in the analogue of the beast as a ‘thing’ in the body of man represent-
ing the crisis of a social pathology. 
This argument can be illustrated in the context of study of melancholy in 
Thomas Hobbes performed by the scholar Mauro Simonazzi. As Sim-
monazzi has shown, reflecting the precarious problem of the human-animal 
divide in the 17th century (e.g. Otten 1986, du Coudray 2002, Fudge 2003), 
the difference between pathology and normality in Hobbes’ Leviathan is a 
quantitative, rather than a qualitative one (Simonazzi 2006: 6). Melan-
choly, in other words, is conceptualized as a moral defect.  
The distinction that Hobbes makes between men in the chapter VIII of 
the Leviathan on grounds of the development of their wits can be seen in 
this context. While the natural wit, consisting in the ‘Celerity of Imagining’ 
– the swiftness of thought and its steady direction – has as its contrary the 
dullness of mind, the acquired wit, which proceeds from the proper man-
agement of reason and passions, has madness. As Simonazzi illustrates, the 
difference between wits is closely related to the greater or lesser intensity of 
‘desire of power’ that also sets men apart (Simonazzi 2006: 51). While a 
proper development of the intellectual gifts originates from a well-tempered 
desire of power, a weak desire for the same results in giddiness and dull-
ness. It is in the space between these two extremes that the individual dif-
ferences among men are modulated; but as soon as this modulation goes 
beyond their boundaries, the excessive desire for power becomes patho-
logical: 
And therefore, a man who has no great passion for any of these things; but is as 
men term it indifferent; though he may be so far a good man, as to be free from 
giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy, or much judge-
ment. For the thoughts are to the desires as scouts, and spies, to range abroad, 
and find the way to the things desired: all steadiness of the mind’s motion, and 
all quickness of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no desire, is to 
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be dead: so to have weak passions, is dullness; and to have passions indiffer-
ently for every thing, GIDDINESS, and distraction; and to have stronger and 
more vehement passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that 
which men call MADNESS (Hobbes 2006: 41, original capitalization and em-
phasis). 
Reflecting Antiquity’s understanding of the hyperbolic emotional response 
in the two manifestations of madness, mania and melancholia, Hobbes’ 
variants of fury and melancholy result either in the excessive confidence in 
oneself or in the inability to satisfy ones desires. The title given by Hobbes 
to these excessive expressions of passion ‘whose violence, or continuance, 
maketh madness’, is either ‘great vain-glory; which is commonly called 
pride, and self-conceit; or great dejection of mind.’ (ibid.) As problematiza-
tions of the image of thoughts as scouts or spies seeking out solutions to the 
problem of life, these two pathological effects of the desire for power are re-
sults of the deficient management of the self. While the desire for power in 
the individual who understands how to regulate himself can cause well-
tempered joy, the vain-glory and the great dejection of the mind, which 
Hobbes ascribes to the melancholic in character, will cause the madness of 
excess. The precariousness of managing an existence between the two ex-
tremes without succumbing to excess is underscored by Hobbes’ use of the 
image of Prometheus, as already indicated in chapter two a figure central to 
the tradition of melancholy: 
For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or 
shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth 
to secure himself against the evil he feares, and procure the good he desireth, 
not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; So that every man, espe-
cially those that are over provident, are in an estate like that of Prometheus. For 
as Prometheus (which interpreted, is, The prudent man) was bound to the hill 
Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, de-
voured in the day, as much as he repayred in the night: So that man, which 
looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day 
long, gnawed on by the feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no 
repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep. (Hobbes 2006: 60, original em-
phasis)  
Illustrating the difficult task of managing a human existence that is always 
already projected into the dangers of an unknown future, the image of Pro-
metheus represents the temptations of man that can lead to excess of pas-
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sion from which melancholic madness follows. As Simonazzi argues, vain 
glory and dejection of mind, which are the two effects of a pathological pro-
jection of the desire for power into the future, are described by Hobbes in 
psychological terms as the hyperbolic effects of the ‘sudden glory’ of the 
passions which causes ‘those grimaces called LAUGHTER’ or of the ‘sud-
den dejection’ of the passion ‘that causeth WEEPING’. Reflecting the im-
portance of this theme in the tradition of melancholy presented so far, mel-
ancholy in Hobbes in this sense can be described as a disorder closely re-
lated to the complex dynamics of self-regulation that govern the functioning 
of the passions (Simonazzi 2006: 53). But whereas the hyperbolic emo-
tional response of the melancholic in antiquity was the hallmark of an ec-
static combustible disposition structured around the black bile, the birth of 
society required a sacrifice. As Simonazzi argues, in the state of nature there 
was room for two anthropological types: on the one hand, the moderate 
man, who pursued the middle class values of caution and safety at the ex-
pense of passion and glory; and on the other, the vanaglorious man for 
whom there does not seem to be room in the civilized society (Simonazzi 
2006: 54). 
It is in this sense that the figure of the melancholic in the work of 
Hobbes can be said to bring with it a certain awareness of that which was 
lost in the commonwealth, and which also – when it erupts again in the de-
ficient control of the passions – constitutes a crisis in the social body of the 
Leviathan comparable to the one proposed by Burton. Reflecting the psy-
chosomatic pattern of suffering found in the accidiosi caused by the evil in-
fluence of the noonday demon who possessed him, the culmination in 
Hobbes’s Leviathan of melancholy as a relational disorder of everyday life, 
associated with the frustration of the desire for power, signifies the irrup-
tion of the beast within man in a world where the passion for expenditure 
had been substituted for the passion of calculation. As a pathology associ-
ated with the excessive display of passions rendering human carelessness, 
melancholy is here structured around the animal as a ‘thing’ in the body 
that simultaneously represents the crisis of a theological and moral concep-
tualization of the world. 
It is in the similar context of a psychopathology of everyday life to 
which everyone in principle is susceptible that the following will continue to 
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explore the ‘thing’ in the body. But whereas the noonday demon of acedia, 
hiding among the monks in the Egyptian desert, specified a tradition that 
culminated around the time of Hobbes with the assertion of the emotional 
hyperbole as an animal in man, the subject of the nerves came to represent 
a problematization of the democratic man.  
4. The Pathologies of Performativity: Acedia 
Returning to the structural level of the six dimensions of problem and re-
sponse, which this thesis has set out to investigate, it is clear from the sec-
tions above that the problematization of acedia explored in this chapter 
represents a considerable change of perspective from the problematization 
of melancholy, which was explored in the previous chapter. This change 
comes down to more than the difference between the conceptual framework 
of the two: that acedia was concerned primarily with the difference between 
vice and virtue adhered to by ecclesiastical writers, while the formation of 
melancholy subscribed primarily to the medical theories associated with the 
infirmities caused by imbalances between the four bodily humours. The es-
sential shift which this chapter has been concerned with is not only found 
on a conceptual level, but also in a fundamental shift away from the drama 
of subjectivity associated with the extraordinary, who emerged as the cul-
turally formative spectator at the periphery of his own private tragedy. 
Unlike the monastic or the Hobbesian melancholic, the extraordinary exis-
tence of the outstanding was never indebted to any other ‘higher’ reality 
than its own. Always already a deficient life-form in the perspective devel-
oped in the sections above, the melancholic was subjected exclusively to 
himself and to the precarious ‘thing’ in his body, which made his character 
uneven to itself. The most striking difference between him and the charac-
ter described in the sections just presented is that the latter does not find 
himself at the periphery, but always already in the middle of a social real-
ity. In that sense if the history of melancholy was also the history of the 
theoros, the ‘theoretical type’ who watched himself take a central place on 
the Greek scene, the history of acedia explored above, at least at its offset, 
represents the history of the martyr – the Greek word for “witness” – of a 
personal sacrifice to a higher reality. The monastic character suffering from 
acedia was born into a reality in which man and God was already separated, 
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like evil and good, vice and virtue. To him suffering made not only the real-
ity of the affliction clear, but also the painstaking reality of God and the 
world. Not only an individual issue, the psychosomatic pattern of suffering 
structured around the monstrous eruption of demons and wolves in the 
bodies of the afflicted, adhered to the burden of a social reality, the histori-
cal implications of which also represents the gradual transformation from  
 the theocosmos of the Church Fathers to the sociocosmos of the Hobbesian 
Leviathan.  
TABLE 3 
Problematical 
Formations 
MELANCHOLIA ACEDIA NEURASTHENIA 
Pathological 
Problem 
MANIC-MELANCHOLIA 
CIRCULAR ANTINOMY 
DESPAIR 
BINARY ANTINOMY 
EXHAUSTION 
ERUPTION OF IMMANENT 
ANTINOMY 
Charac-
terological 
Problem 
THE EXTRAORDINARY 
 
 
THE REJECTED THE SENSITIVE 
Delimitative 
Problem 
PERIPHERY 
 
 
OUTSIDE 
 
INSIDE 
Self-
Regulatory 
Response 
DIETETICS 
 
 
VIRTUOUS LIVING 
 
NEUROPATHIC  
HOUSEHOLD 
 
Performative  
Response 
 
ACHIEVEMENT WORK AS VIRTUE 
 
WORK AS SECOND  
NATURE 
Self-
Articulatory 
Response 
SELF-TRANSGRESSION 
 
SUBLIMATION 
CONTROLLING AFFECT 
 
ABSTINENT SUBLIMATION 
RESOURCE  
ADMINISTRATION 
PSYCHOANALYTIC 
SELF-DIFFERENTIATION 
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Reflecting the Heideggerian notion of the burden of existence (“Last-
charakter des Daseins”) (Theunissen 1996), the pathological dead weight of 
acedia represented the problems associated with the compulsion to exis-
tence itself. The characterological problem presented in the sections above 
for this reason was not that of the extraordinary; it was that instead of the 
outcast, THE REJECTED (see TABLE 3), who represented the precarious Other 
of the collective or even, as it became quite clear in the case of the Hobbe-
sian melancholic, the casualty of the social formation. More than the para-
dox of a contradictory nature, the characterological problem presented 
above was that of someone living a contradiction. This contradiction was 
found first in the paradoxical etymological construction of acedia as a con-
cept. Representing not necessarily the problem of someone who did not 
care, but rather the problem of one whose care lacked the quality of the vir-
tuous, the negation of kedos implicated a careless treatment of a practical 
situation. The specific carelessness of acedia was associated with the kind 
of activities that presupposed a joy of existence and a surplus of life. The 
contradiction in the lives of the accidiosi was emblematically found in the 
gurgling hymns of the monks submerged in the slime of Dante’s river Styx 
in the fifth circle of hell, who died as they had existed: embodying in death 
the terrifying darkness which they had harboured in life in the light and 
warmth of the world above, these poor souls were the victims of a love de-
fective. The contradiction they embodied was the dejection in the exercise 
of the virtue, the darkness within the light, the sorrow over God. 
This existential contradiction was reflected in the pathological problem 
of acedia. Describing a BINARY ANTINOMY in contrast to the circular alterna-
tion of melancholy and mania, the pathological problem described in the 
sections above was only representable in negative terms. Nowhere was this 
as lucidly exemplified as in the assertion of the psychosomatic pattern of 
suffering in the body of the monastic as a demonical possession. The name 
of this noon-day demon may of course be said merely to refer to the fact 
that it took control of the monk at the time of day when the sun was strong-
est and the work that he undertook hardest. But Evagrius’ description of it 
also seemed to suggest something more. Apart from being associated with 
the middle of the day because it appeared at the hours around noon, the ti-
tle which was given to the demon, in the light of the negation it represented, 
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could be said to refer more symbolically to an existential darkness. As 
Theunissen (1996) has pointed out, the model for the Kierkegaardian pseu-
donym with the same name, Johannes Climacus, saw in acedia the paradox 
of death surrounding the monastic in the middle of life. The same is sug-
gested by Dante when he finds himself, in the famous opening words of the 
Divine Comedy ‘midway upon our journey of life … within a forest dark’. 
The pathological problem associated with the noonday demon was the 
negativity of anhedonia (Willner 1993), the inability to experience pleasure 
from normally pleasurable life events, the terrible feeling of feeling nothing 
when one ought to feel only joy (Jaspers 1948). 
As especially Evagrius’ description showed, the central problem of the 
terrible paradox of a sorrow over God represented more than a private is-
sue. Or to phrase it otherwise: it constituted the complex problem of a sin of 
privation. The demonical possession itself was described as an overwhelm-
ing feeling of dislike with the whole monastic community; but while this 
feeling made of the demon in the flesh a terrible opponent, the worst was 
what came after it: the ‘ineffable joy’ of the time of relaxation after the de-
monical attack filled the monastic with the illusory feeling of a need to do 
good to save himself – that is for his own private sake. Opening his soul to 
temptations and vices of all kinds, this problem constituted the heart of the 
pathological pattern. It was this privative character of affect that led to the 
confusion, which made the monk inaccessible to both himself and the God 
who would have mercy on his soul. Emblematically illustrated in the differ-
entiation between two kinds of sorrow, one coming from God and the other 
of the world, the confusion of affect found in the case of Judas Iscariot’s 
privation of sorrow represented the problematic at the bottom of the patho-
logical problem of acedia. While Judas’ remorse itself was justified, its rea-
sons were flawed as the excess of it opened him to the influence of the 
Devil. Constituting what may be termed a negative imitatio Christi, it came 
to represent the negative experience of the reality of the world as a place of 
suffering. A terrifying vertigo of God, the demon of acedia which took hold 
of the monastic body represented a sinful and privative deepening of a 
natural and existentially given pattern of suffering, and as such the patho-
logical problem manifested itself as DESPAIR. It was this matter of a confu-
sion of affect at the heart of the sin of acedia that was carried over into the 
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Hobbesian sociocosmos and came to represent a crisis in the social body of 
the Leviathan long after the burden of God had been exchanged by the bur-
den of the social formation of the Commonwealth. The pathological projec-
tions of the desire for power represented by Hobbes as the passions of sud-
den dejection resulting in weeping or sudden glory resulting in laughter 
were examples of privative hyperboles associated with the melancholic in-
ability to regulate the self within the framework of the social formation. 
It is along the lines of this confusion at the heart of the sin of acedia that 
the delimitative problem of acedia can be found. The delimitation of indi-
vidual from collective in the chapter above was constituted primarily as a 
negative experience of the fundamental existential rules of the reality into 
which this individual was introduced. For the monk this meant the experi-
ence of God in the mode of negation. If St. Paul’s conversion in Damascus 
can be viewed as a literal dejection, as he was struck to the ground and 
blinded (Acts 9:1-30), leading into the body of Christ representing the 
Christian community (Romans 12:5, Corinthians 12:27), then the terrifying 
dejection associated with the demonical possession of acedia led out of the 
body of Christ and into the despair of exile from the community of the vir-
tuous. Hence the delimitative problem points to a complex situation of be-
ing simultaneously in the middle of a social order and yet on its OUTSIDE. In 
this sense the monastic individual as opposed to the Greek melancholic was 
found in the middle of reality, as stated above, but always falling out of it. 
As a mark of depravity, the psychosomatic pattern of suffering structured 
around the demon in the body constituted a threshold between the collec-
tive nomos and the individual physis. The problem of delimitation was the 
problem of the vertigo of a cosmological order: on the one hand as the 
eruption of the monstrous Other of the collective in the individual body 
causing despair; and on the other of a crisis in the social body where the in-
dividual regulation of affect fell out, a state of exception representable as a 
social pathology. As a brother of Agamben’s homo sacer especially the 
Hobbesian melancholic’s rejection from the Commonwealth because of his 
deficient regulation of his desire for power, illustrated the correspondence 
between the individual and the social body. Advertising the threat of disso-
lution of the social order, the melancholic represented the eruption of an 
immanent disorder that made the state body appear tamquam dissolute, as 
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if it was dissolved (Agamben 1998: 105). This was seen in Hobbes’ assertion 
of the melancholic as a lycanthrope, a wolf-man, whose excessive desire for 
power, for which the greater good of the Commonwealth had no space, had 
rendered mad. 
Essentially structured around the problem of freedom, the three prob-
lematizing dimensions explored above in this light demanded responses 
that were very different from the ones associated with the dietetics of the 
classic Greek melancholic. While self-regulation to the extraordinary was an 
important aspect contributing to his management of a natural disposition, 
in acedia and the later Hobbesian version of melancholy it was the self-
regulation itself that became pathological. The pathology associated with 
acedia consisted in doing the right thing wrong. The self-regulatory re-
sponse to the problematic dimensions fleshed out above, was thus primarily 
concerned with the VIRTUOUS LIFE within the moral framework of the cos-
mos within which the individual existed. In relation to acedia this response 
emerged on the threshold between sin and vice as a precarious attempt to 
lead the self on its intermediate position between soma and psyche. If 
acedia represented a disorientation of affect, more than a physical exhaus-
tion or a weakening of man’s will, then the demonically induced pain which 
the afflicted felt was the result of a self-inflicted carelessness with vice re-
sulting in sinful activity. This carelessness, as it was illustrated, had to be 
resolved by therapeutic measures. Closely associated with the gradual 
transformation of the meaning of manual work from representing merely a 
therapeutic tool, to constituting a virtue in itself, this self-regulatory re-
sponse constituted an important structural part in the transformation of the 
theocosmos into the sociocosmos of Hobbes’ political theories. 
Thus the self-articulatory response associated with the sinful disposi-
tion of acedia was primarily concerned with THE CONTROL OF AFFECT articu-
lated as ABSTINENT SUBLIMATION. The symbolic assertion, for example in 
Isaac of L’Étoile’s sermon, of acedia as an unbearable inner tempest result-
ing from the slackening of faith and leading to the ‘sleep’ of Christ, illus-
trated very well the importance of assuming a personal responsibility for 
rectification, which evolved with the gradual institutionalization of the 
moral scheme within the framework of capital vices and virtues. It was as a 
sin of the heart that acedia assumed the role of a threshold, which made it 
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primary to other sins. Infecting the world with a spiritual meaninglessness 
that reflected Nietzsche’s later notions of nihilism, acedia assumed a special 
role as other, minor sins followed with its implied slackening of faith. From 
concerning primarily the coenobite monk, the self-articulation associated 
with the threat of this spiritual despair gradually came to concern practi-
cally all members of the Christian community. The personal acknowledge-
ment of vices as sinful dispositions, for which one would have to seek the 
ministrations of the church in confession, evolved into a general exhorta-
tion to make oneself accessible to moral advice. Simultaneously the 
evolvement of acedia into the notion of sloth saw the problem of a demoni-
cally induced pattern of psychosomatic suffering in the individual wane as 
the problem became associated largely with notions of laziness instead. 
It was within the context of this shift in self-articulation from concerning 
the threshold between vice and sin to representing the much more general 
ability to maintain a regular and temporally bound existence that the Hob-
besian melancholic was of interest. Representing the madness of someone 
whose deficient regulation of passions resulted from the difficult task of 
managing a human existence that was always already projected into the un-
certain future of the sociocosmos, melancholy in Hobbes’ Leviathan like 
acedia was associated with the confusion of affects resulting in an inability 
to lead the self for the sake of a greater good. Culminating here, the prob-
lem of a correspondence between the pathological states in the body of the 
individual and in the body of the moral framework, underlines how the ar-
ticulation of the self was concerned with becoming accessible to manage-
ment. Yet, as an important problem which played a central role in the tran-
sition from the theocosmos where acedia was found, over the intermediate 
position of sloth, to the Hobbesian melancholy in the sociocosmos of the 
Leviathan, the problem of making oneself accessible to management also 
played a central part in the transformation of the importance of work. The 
dimension of the performative response in the sections above is repre-
sented first and foremost by the transition of the importance of manual la-
bour from a secondary position in the Christian ‘good works’, where it was 
associated with the deeds performed for others, to an absolute primary po-
sition of crucial socioeconomic importance in the idea of work as a virtue in 
itself in the sociocosmos. Acedia and the problem of becoming accessible to 
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management played an important role in the gradual transformation of this 
response as manual labour was recommended broadly as a therapeutic 
measure against the spiritual despair it implicated. The transformation of 
acedia into the much broader implications of sloth gradually saw the spiri-
tual dimension of the problem wane for the problem of idleness to which 
the implication of work as a virtue itself was a response. Whereas the prob-
lem of acedia had been concerned primarily with the demonic dejection, 
which exiled the monastic from the body of Christ, the virtue of work in the 
sociocosmos was a response rather, as it was illustrated above, to the ne-
glect of the obligations of one’s status or profession within a socioeconomic 
framework. It was within the context of this transition that work, as a per-
formative response to the correspondence between individual suffering and 
social pathology, attained the position from which it was later to emerge as 
the pivotal point of a whole culture treating it as a kind of second nature. 
This, as the following will illustrate, was the culture of nervous disorders. 
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Chapter Four 
The Neuropathic Household of Neurasthenia 
 
Prologue  
1. George M. Beard’s Philosophy of Nervousness 
2. The Culture of Sensibility and the Maladies of the Will 
3. The Human Motor: Nerves and Labour Power 
4.  The Mechanics of Melancholy: Freud and Neurasthenia 
5. The Pathologies of Performativity: Neurasthenia   
Prologue 
Despite their many differences, the two independently evolved conceptual 
formations of melancholy and acedia, the first subscribed to by the writers 
inspired by the Hippocratic-Galenic humoral theory, the latter by the eccle-
siastical writers and their lay followers, shared one fundamental issue: the 
dispositions designated by them were always ascribable to someone in par-
ticular. Whether it was the Aristotelian ēthos perriton, whose extraordinary 
disposition constituted a precarious relation between suffering and 
achievement, or the accidiosi in whom the mapping of maladies of affect 
and behaviour onto the soma was the result of a social analogy, their afflic-
tion was that which pointed them out and set them apart from the opacity 
of their collectives. Like Foucault’s “infamous men” (Foucault 2000: 157-
176) who were snatched by their momentary articulations from the dark-
ness in which they could have otherwise remained, the psychosomatic pat-
tern of suffering structured around the ‘thing’ in the bodies of the melan-
cholic geniuses or the despairing monks in these traditions apprehended 
and exposed them in a fleeting trajectory that made them stand out. Even 
the general possibility of a hyperbole of affect constituting a crisis in the so-
cial body of Hobbes’ Leviathan, which democratized the motif of a monas-
tic correspondence between an individual and a social pathology, singled 
out the melancholic on the background of the chain of collectively. It was 
not before the theories of evolution in the 19th century began to designate 
bestiality as a shared point of the origin of the species, when these theories 
placed the animal within the bodies of everyone, that this age-old designa-
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tion of the ‘thing’ in the body as the marker of a precarious individuality be-
gan to wane. With the assumption of the nerves as a ‘thing’ in the body in 
the 19th and early 20th century, the precarious character of a disposition as-
sociating the psychosomatic pattern of suffering in the individual body with 
the ability to lead and manage the self, gradually became a possibility for 
anyone. Designating the ‘thing’ in the body, the pathological character of 
neurasthenia, coined by the physician George M. Beard, came to reflect the 
gradual emergence of a democratized culture of articulation directed at the 
psychosomatic pattern of suffering in the bodies of individuals. The injunc-
tion to articulate the ‘thing’ in the body in a socially acceptable and under-
standable manner culminates in the Freudian conceptualization in the fa-
mous “Mourning and Melancholia” of melancholy as a hyperbolic emo-
tional response to the loss of an object. Associated with the inability to self-
differentiate through the overcoming of suffering, melancholy here emerges 
as a problematization of the ability to manage the self within the context of 
a meaningful and productive life. It is as a background to this that neuras-
thenia, the pathology structured around the nerves as a ‘thing’ in the body 
of the modern individual, is of great interest. 
Representable within the context of the two Brunonian categories of 
sthenia and asthenia, neurasthenia thematized both the excess of stimula-
tion of the individual who was exposed to the modern world and the result-
ing incapacity of the will to react to stimulus, because of the pathological 
depletion of the individual reserves of energy found in the central nervous 
system. As the first of the following chapters will illustrate, Beard’s designa-
tion of neurasthenia as a nervous bankruptcy implicated a kind of neuro-
pathic household associated with an individual responsibility to know and 
manage the self. 
As a pathology of sensitivity to the demands of modern society, neuras-
thenia came to represent the failure of the individual will to stand its 
ground against modernity, structured as a pattern of psychosomatic suffer-
ing around the nerves. The second section of this chapter of the thesis will 
illustrate how nervousness emerged as a pathology of everyday character, 
problematizing the prophylactic articulation of the limitations of the indi-
vidual body, which both defined the boundary beyond which social de-
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mands were deemed illegitimate and a place from where the individual 
could no longer return without the help of therapeutic medicine.  
Representing a much broader appeal than the traditions explored in the 
previous chapters, neurasthenia on this background became a disease of la-
bour; an affliction of the ambitious struggler in the burgeoning economic 
system of 19th century industrialism to whom work was a second nature. As 
the third chapter of this part will illustrate, the pathological exhaustion of 
the nerves resulting from fatigue not only focused on the impairment of en-
ergy as a productive resource, but also on this energy as the individual 
body’s unique capital, its Arbeitskraft. Designating the ‘thing’ in the body as 
the primary site of its conversion, what the historian Anson Rabinbach calls 
the transcendental materialism of the 19th century, came to predicate the 
notion of a single Kraft, a force of nature that could be transformed into 
productivity. As a problematization of the individual attempt to provide a 
goal-oriented use of the body’s most valuable asset, neurasthenia came to 
constitute a relatively simple mechanistic explanation that focused on the 
pathological deficiency of an individual will to lead the self productively be-
cause of exhaustion. By the end of the 19th century this perspective had 
transposed the problematic of the ‘thing’ in the body from one affecting 
only the extraordinary in character into the sphere of work, where it poten-
tially affected everyone, transforming idleness into the paradoxical ideal of 
the working class, rather than a mortal sin.  
 Freud’s theory of melancholy can be seen on the background of the ma-
terialistic and mechanical assumption of the nerves as a ‘thing’ in the body 
subjected to the individual will. His therapeutic method, which promised to 
help his clients by transforming their hyperbolic ‘hysterical misery’ into an 
‘everyday unhappiness’ was based on the restoration of the nervous system, 
which would enable the inhibited will of the melancholic to once again pro-
ject himself in into a meaningful and productive existence. The Freudian 
conception of melancholy designates the structural emotional hyperbole of 
a mourning lament (“Klage”) that has become an accusation (“Anklage”) in 
the melancholic who consequently has lost the ability to articulate his or her 
suffering as a pattern of self-differentiation through ‘inner travail’. The 
‘thing’ in the body of the individual becomes the target of a therapeutic ar-
ticulation, which designates the pattern of suffering as the field of a produc-
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tive transformation of the self, whose gesture is obstructed and shattered by 
the melancholic lack of meaning.  
1. George M. Beard’s Philosophy of Nervousness 
To a contemporary reader the most surprising part of the Heidelberg chem-
ist Wilhelm Weichardt’s invention in 1904 of antikenotoxin was perhaps 
not that it constituted an antibody to the poisonous substances that he 
imagined gathered like quickly approaching, dark clouds in the bodies of 
the rodents, which he exposed to strenuous physical exercise. Rather the 
fact that Weichardt believed his invention to be a vaccine to cure fatigue, 
revolutionizing mankind by abolishing weariness altogether and transform-
ing human bodies into tireless machines (Turner 2008) may seem curious. 
Yet Weichardt’s designation of a substance in the bodies of the rats from 
which he could extract the toxin that constituted an essential chemical base 
of the antibody, was part of a much broader, social pattern of interests, as-
sociating worries about changes in the processes of civilization and the 
emerging science of work, with exhaustion and mental illness. If one phe-
nomenon summarizes the conglomerate of these interests in the late 19th 
and early 20th century it is neurasthenia, the pathological state of fatigue 
structured in a pattern of psychosomatic symptoms around the central 
nervous system, first coined in 1869 by the American physician George 
Miller Beard.  
A forerunner not only of Freud in his study of neurosis but also of the 
contemporary popularity of the cognitive and behavioural sciences, Beard’s 
popularization of neurasthenia was based on work that was far from origi-
nal. As Charles Rosenberg indicates, Beard was neither a profound nor a 
critical thinker. His medical writings constitute a mosaic pattern of the 
fashionable and controlling ideas of his time, making it the familiarity, 
rather than the novelty of his theories which made them so easily and rap-
idly accepted (Rosenberg 1962: 245). Yet Beard’s conviction of an underly-
ing kinship between a range of seemingly unrelated symptoms of illness 
which were not, he believed, reducible to hysteria or hypochondria is im-
portant to recognize, especially to the present study, as his consequent at-
tempt to bring order to the chaotic field of the so-called functional nervous 
disorders provides a crucial example of the kind of introspection and rela-
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tionality implicated by the nerves as a ‘thing’ in the body. Motivated partly 
by his own experiences, Beard managed to blend scientific theories from 
physics, neurophysiology and technology about the nature of nervous im-
pulses, energy-conservation and biological evolution into a disease entity, 
which was not only plausible, but provided the lack of nervous energy as a 
medical answer applicable to a broad range of more or less obscure symp-
toms (Sicherman 1977: 39). Ever growing in number, the list of symptoms 
of neurasthenia was quickly expanded to include such variables as: 
Tenderness of the scalp (cerebral irritation, cerebrasthenia); tenderness of the 
spine (spinal irritation, myelasthenia); tenderness of the teeth and the gums; 
tenderness of the whole body (general hyperaesthesia); general and local itch-
ing; abnormalities of the secretions; vague pains and flying neuralgias; flushing 
and fidgetness; tremulous and variable pulse with palpitation; sudden giving 
way of general or special functions; special ideosyncrasies in regard to food, 
medicine, and external irritants; sensitiveness to changes in the weather; a feel-
ing of profound exhaustion unaccompanied by pain; ticklishness; desire for 
stimulants and narcotics; insomnia; nervous dyspepsia; partial failure of mem-
ory; deficient mental control; seminal emissions; spermatorrhea; partial or 
complete impotence; changes in the expression of the eyes and countenance; 
mental depression with general timidity; morbid fear of special kinds, as agora-
phobia (fear of places); astraphobia (fear of lightning); sick headache and vari-
ous forms of headache; disturbances of the nerves and organs of special sense; 
localized periphal numbness and hyperaesthesia; general and local chills and 
flashes of heat; local spasms of muscles. (Beard 1879: 246) 
When Beard in 1881 published his American Nervousness: It’s Causes and 
Consequences, he had listed more than 75 neurasthenic symptoms, indicat-
ing the broad range of phenomena believed to be attributable to a patho-
logical weakness in the nervous system. As Barbara Sicherman argues, it 
was the implied precision of this broad range of symptoms that offered 
practitioners an emphasis on what they could do for their patients, rather 
than exposing their impotence, at a time when most physicians felt only 
comfortable with clearly organic disorders (Sicherman 1977: 39). Providing 
a relatively simple, mechanistic explanation to a problem that was ham-
pered by the fact that no two individuals would experience it in a uniform 
symptomatological manner neurasthenia was a huge success. As Beard 
could only hope that it would ‘in time be substantially confirmed by micro-
scopical and chemical examinations of those patients who die in a neuras-
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thenic condition’ (Beard 1869: 217), it was justified almost entirely by scien-
tific models found elsewhere. 
Reflecting primarily the recent discovery of the first and second laws of 
thermodynamics, Beard’s definition of nervousness as ‘nervelessness – a 
lack of nerveforce’ (Beard 1881: 5) emphasized the central nervous system 
as a reservoir of energy. The German physicist and physiologist Hermann 
von Helmholtz, whose argument that the forces of nature are forms of a 
single source, was an important influence on Beard (Rosenberg 1962: 249). 
Only a few years later this assumption of a universal, natural force power-
ing both man and his machines alike was joined by Rudolf Clausius’ formu-
lation of the second law of thermodynamics, which established that any en-
ergy transfer from warmer to colder bodies in isolated systems undergoes 
entropy.  
The offset of the enormous social confidence sparked by the implications 
of the theory of thermodynamics, which was caused by the realization in the 
1850s and 1860s that a dissipation of force is inevitable, is reflected in 
Beard’s theory of neurasthenia. The notion of nervous bankruptcy applied 
by Beard to describe the differences between individual reserves of nervous 
energy is more than a metaphor. Constituting one among a few privileged 
terms that he used to illustrate the importance of nervous energy to the 
body, nervous bankruptcy, he claimed, results basically from the individ-
ual’s overdrawing of his ‘accounts’:  
In finance, a man is rich who always lives within his income. A millionaire may 
draw heavily on his funds and yet keep a large surplus; but a man with very 
small resources – a hundred dollars in the bank – can easily overdraw his ac-
count; it may be months or years before he will be able to make himself square. 
There are millionaires of nerve-force – those who never know what it is to be 
tired out … and there are those – and their numbers are increasing daily – who, 
without being absolutely sick, without being, perhaps for a lifetime, ever con-
fined to the bed a day with acute disorder, are yet poor in nerve-force; their in-
heritance is small, and they have been able to increase it but slightly, if at all; 
and if from overtoil, or sorrow, or injury, they overdraw their little surplus, they 
may find that it will require months or perhaps years to make up the deficiency, 
if, indeed, they ever accomplish the task. (Beard 1881: 9f.) 
Constituting a correspondence in the individual body to the assumption in 
the universal theories of thermodynamics of a single force of energy, 
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Beard’s use of the bank account as a metaphor reflects the individual task of 
self-regulation related to the ‘thing’ in the body. Designating the nerves as 
this ‘thing’, around which both the reserves of productive energies and the 
pattern of their pathological depletion are structured, Beard’s ‘philosophy 
of nervousness’ emphasizes an individual reserve of energy, the conserva-
tion of which can be modulated more or less successfully by the meticulous 
care of the individual and his physician.  The origin of the differences in the 
amount of nervous force in the single bodies, Beard argues, is essentially 
hereditary, something which he believed had recently been proved by ex-
periments that showed how damage to nervous tissue might be passed 
down from one generation to another (Rosenberg 1962: 251). This argu-
ment was in line with hereditary explanations of mental illness and with the 
pervasive contemporary theories about degeneration that was often used to 
argue for social difference between race, gender and class (e.g. du Coudray 
2002, Herman 1997). Neurasthenia in this sense was assumed to be the re-
sult of the depletion of a limited natural resource found within the individ-
ual on the background of the deficient management of a hereditary re-
source.  
A similar assumption is represented by another popular example in 
which Beard draws on the work of Thomas Edison, whom he worked with 
for a short period. In order to illustrate another important theme in neuras-
thenia, namely the limited amount of pressure under which the individual 
can sustain himself, Beard asserts that the research into electric light ‘is 
now sufficiently advanced in an experimental direction to give us the best 
possible illustration of the effects of modern civilization on the nervous sys-
tem.’ (Beard 1881: 99) In all calculations made to estimate the force sup-
plied by any central source of energy, Beard argues, it has been made clear 
that there is a limitation to the number of lamps which can be interposed 
on a circuit without its failing. Illustrating another correspondence between 
the individual body and a natural phenomenon, this example emphasizes 
the individual need to care about the amount of stresses to which the body 
is exposed.    
The popular analogies provided by Beard to illustrate the causes and ef-
fects of nervousness in the body work to supply the relatively simple 
mechanistic framework that came to constitute an answer to the very dif-
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fuse external pressure on the modern individual. Set apart from the An-
cients primarily by five elements – steam power, the periodical press, the 
telegraph, the sciences and the mental activity of women (Beard 1881: 96) – 
this individual was under the imminent and constant threat of succumbing 
to states of exhaustion from which it no longer could return on its own:  
The force in this nervous system can, therefore, be increased or diminished by 
good or evil influences, medical or hygienic, or by natural evolutions – growth, 
disease and decline; but none the less it is limited; and when new functions are 
interposed in the circuit, as modern civilization is constantly requiring us to do, 
there comes a period, sooner or later, varying in different individuals, and at dif-
ferent times of life, when the amount of force is insufficient to keep all the lamps 
actively burning; those that are weakest go out entirely, or, as more frequently 
happens, burn faint or feebly – they do not expire, but give an insufficient and 
unstable light – this is the philosophy of nervousness. (Beard 1881: 99) 
Suggesting a neuropathic household, which must be constantly observed by 
the individual, Beard’s philosophy of nervousness designates a ceaseless 
prophylactic activity constructed to balance the ‘thing’ in the body in order 
not to suffer under the expenditure of the energy located within it. While 
this activity, as the next section will illustrate, had for a longer period been 
the privilege of the higher classes who suffered from the fashionable effects 
of glamour resulting from affluence, neurasthenia as a pathology of every-
day life quickly democratized it. As Sichermann illustrates, a study of diag-
noses in two New England clinics shows, that by the beginning of the 20th 
century, neurasthenia had become the most frequent diagnosis among 
working-class patients (Sicherman 1977: 44). Reflecting the activity of both 
the extraordinary melancholics and the despairing monks of the early Mid-
dle Ages, the introspection of the potential neurasthenic designated a pro-
phylaxis structured around the ‘thing’ in the body; but if these early exam-
ples of subjections to a psychosomatic pattern of suffering had been re-
served for eccentrics and sinners, the definition of neurasthenia as an ex-
haustion of energy related to a general sensibility made this activity acces-
sible to anyone.  
2. The Culture of Sensibility and the Maladies of the Will  
The immense influence of George M. Beard’s work on the conceptualization 
of nervousness as a state of pathological exhaustion associated with a gen-
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eral sensibility to the challenges of modernity and civilization, is attested to 
by the fact that in Europe the affliction was often referred to merely as 
‘Beard’s Malady’. But despite the popularity of Beard’s work, the idea of the 
nervous system as an organ sensible to external influence was not some-
thing for which he can be credited. In terms of dealing with psychiatric af-
flictions, already George Cheyne’s The English Malady (1777) argued for 
disorders as a result of disturbances in the nervous system. As Roy Porter 
has pointed out in his introduction to a newer edition of Cheyne’s work 
(Cheyne 1991: vii), Cheyne believed that such sickness was growing more 
frequent, and argued that it should be viewed as a ‘disease of civilization’ 
related to the pressure on the individual by the demands of modern life. 
Cheyne viewed this malady as a phenomenon, which was first and foremost 
found in English nobility, because their luxurious lifestyle made them more 
susceptible to nervous disorders.  
The assumption of neurasthenia as an affliction found among the higher 
classes, who were engaged in the spectacular performances of fashionable 
society is reflected in one of the most prominent textbooks on neurasthenia 
of the early years of the 20th century, written by the French Dr. Achille-
Adrian Proust. Achille-Adrian Proust was father to the now more famous 
Marcel Proust, who was not only the author the immense À la recherche du 
temps perdu (“In Search of Lost Time” 1913-1927), but perhaps also the 
greatest literary neurasthenic of his age. Considered a sickly child from his 
early years, where he suffered asthmatic attacks, he spent long periods of 
his life in bed, where he is also said to have eventually written his great 
work. It may very well be Marcel Proust’s sickly condition, combined with 
the character of his literary work and his frequenting of the fashionable Pa-
risian society, which inspired his father in his description of the neuras-
thenics’ disorder. At least the older Proust, together with his co-author Gil-
bert Ballet, decidedly argued against neurasthenia as a neurosis among 
anyone else but the cultivated middle and upper classes that held intellec-
tually demanding positions of work (Rabinbach 1992: 157). These ‘society’ 
women and men would be under immense moral pressure during their fre-
quent visits to the Parisian saloons, where they would have to ‘work’ hard to 
take care of their reputations: 
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One can easily be convinced of this by picturing oneself the existence led, espe-
cially in the Parisian world, by those who are called in the current slang “soci-
ety” men and women. Those who go out much and especially women, have their 
whole day taken up by the duties that convention and vain care of their reputa-
tion impose on them: visiting dinners, balls, evening parties make their life one 
of continual constraint, and of obligations without respite (Proust 1902: 21f.). 
Like Thomas Mann’s main character Hans Castorp in The Magic Mountain 
(1924), those who became the refugees of Europe’s growing number of 
sanatoriums were bourgeois. Reflecting a spreading culture of sensibility 
with more than pathological implications, the general notion of sensibility 
that used to be the hallmark of the extraordinary in character, from the late 
18th century on had entered a process of democratization, sparked by an 
elite full of Enlightenment ideologies (e.g. Porter 1995, Barker-Benfield 
1992). As Joachim Radkau argues in his work Das Zeitalter der Nervosität 
(Radkau 1998) the ‘nervousness’ of the late 19th century not only consti-
tuted a diagnosis, but also a specific cultural aspect that both came before 
and outlived neurasthenia. 
The broad based description of the symptoms of neurasthenia as ar-
ranged around the pathological sensibility of the ‘thing’ in the body, de-
scribed by the Danish physiologist and pathologist Peter Ludvig Panum can 
be seen on this background: 
The symptoms of neurasthenia are constituted as a pathological sensibility to 
impressions that used to pass unnoticed; trivialities appear very austere, minor 
predicaments build up in the mind of the patient to become insurmountable 
impediments, portending calamity and ruin. He becomes impetuous, irascible 
and sees the world only as a vale of woe. Or he becomes fretful, arguing back 
and forth endlessly without determination, living in constant fear of calamities 
to come. Strong sense impressions have an excessive effect on him, lightning 
and thunder even inspire terror (Panum 1904: 491; my italics and my transla-
tion). 
Reflecting the gradual democratization of an extraordinary sensibility to ex-
ternal influences, Panum’s general description of neurasthenia as ‘a patho-
logical sensibility to impressions’ involving anxiety, irresoluteness and de-
jection, implicates a pathology structured around the receptivity of the 
nerves, specifying this as the cause of the nervous exhaustion. The deple-
tion of the nervous energy in the neurasthenic patient results from a vul-
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nerability to a broad and diffuse pattern of both trivialities and more seri-
ous matters impressing themselves on the individual.  
Growing out of the empiricist insistence in the works for example of Ba-
con, Locke and Hume on the receptivity of the senses as a matter of not 
only moral importance but with profound ontological implications, this as-
sumption in Panum’s work of neurasthenia as the result of a hypersensitiv-
ity, assigned to the nerves as a ‘thing’ in the body a central role as the organ 
of sensitivity. As a popular critical attack on the Kantian anthropology that 
had asserted the central role of reason, the designation of the nervous sys-
tem as the physiological source of all emotional life was fashionable among 
the medical intellectuals of the late 19th century. Another example is the 
work of Carl Lange, the Danish physician and psychologist who formed 
what became known as the James-Lange Theory of Emotions with William 
James, in his famous work The Emotions (org. 1885). Here Lange criticizes 
the Kantian anthropology for what he believes to be a psychologically unre-
alistic focus on the general role of reason (Lange & James 1922: 33). The 
James-Lange Theory of Emotions, which became an important factor in the 
development of the cognitive and behavioural sciences, instead emphasizes 
the nerves as a sense organ by viewing emotions as a result of physiological 
changes created by the autonomic nervous system in response to experi-
ences in the world (e.g. Ellsworth 1994).  
It is on this background that neurasthenia can be viewed also as a dis-
ease of the will. As a ‘thing’ in the body, the nerves represented not only the 
source of suffering, but also a source of emotionality and volition that was 
vulnerable to external influence and could inhibit the will so profoundly 
that it could no longer transform itself into volition. In The Diseases of the 
Will (1884), written by Théodule Ribot, an influential editor of the Revue 
Philosophique, neurasthenia is represented primarily as a functional pa-
thology structured around the inability to act. Transforming neurasthenia 
into a disorder which was not primarily concerned with pathological lack 
(as implied by the lack of nervous force in Beard’s understanding of neuras-
thenia), Ribot’s work focused on the disorder of a will that lacked the capac-
ity to direct and project itself in the right, goal-oriented manner. The inhibi-
tion of the will resulting from the deficient care of the nervous energies here 
is the central issue.  
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Coming from an anti-Kantian perspective like most of his materialist col-
leagues, Ribot’s understanding of the will, as he argues, is not derived from 
the ‘state of consciousness, the “I will”, which indicates a situation’ (Ribot 
1915: 2). Rather he takes his perspective from the psychophysical funda-
ment of the will in the nervous system and its immanent pathological mani-
festations, its dissolution. In Ribot’s view, the Kantian argument for a free 
will is problematized by the fact that every form of volition is the result of 
nervous activity:  
It is not the state of consciousness as such, but rather the corresponding physio-
logical state which transforms itself into an act. In short, the relation is not be-
tween a psychical event and a movement, but between two states of the same 
kind, between two physiological states, two groups of nervous elements, one 
sensory and the other motor. If one insists upon making of consciousness a 
cause, all remains obscure; but if it is considered as simply the accompaniment 
of a nervous process, which alone is the essential element, all becomes clear and 
the imaginary difficulties vanish. (Ribot 1915: 6) 
The designation of the will as a ‘physiological state which transforms itself 
into an act’ is especially interesting here, because of Ribot’s understanding 
of the pathological manifestations of this will. Maintaining a wholly physio-
logical perspective, Ribot argues that desire is constituted as an incomplete 
form, for example in the actions of small children and savages, of the fully 
developed physiological manifestation of the will that he refers to as the 
ideomotor. To the adult and civilized, the ideomotor represents a physio-
logical guarantee that affects are transformed into sensible volitions, when 
experiences have accumulated enough for the intellect to arise. When an 
individual is suffering from ‘diseases of the will’ as a result of nervous fa-
tigue the ideomotor becomes dysfunctional and the individual is subjected 
once again to the desire, which habit or reflection otherwise had come to 
modify or restrain. Pathology, Ribot argues, shows how the activity of de-
sire ‘is augmented when the will is diminished, and persists when it disap-
pears.’ (ibid.) As a curious reflection of the emotional hyperbole of the Pla-
tonic leader who becomes a tyrant because he fails to lead himself Ribot 
finds this represented also in ‘the case of despots, placed by their own opin-
ion or that of others above the law’. 
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Constituting a bulwark against the augmentation of self-destructive 
thoughts in fatigued individuals, the morally impeccable will to Ribot rep-
resented an anti-thesis to the primitive form of affective life: desire. If de-
sire represented the lack of self-control, the will, structured around the 
management of the ‘thing’ in the body, constituted a superior form of mate-
rial power counteracting its negative effects (Rabinbach 1992: 165). The 
vulnerable will in Ribot’s work, in this sense represents a ceaseless prophy-
lactic activity structured around the nerves in answer to the imminent 
threat of succumbing to the inferior form of desire. The pathology of the 
will represents the conscious ‘I will’ not transforming itself into volition in a 
goal-oriented and self-differentiating manner. Ribot provides an illustra-
tion of this by referring to one of the famous cases treated by one of the 
founding fathers of French psychology, Etienne Esquirol:   
A magistrate, very distinguished for his learning and power of language, was, as 
a result of troubles, attacked with a fit of monomania … He has recovered the 
entire use of his reason but he will not go out into the world again, although he 
recognizes he is wrong; … “It is certain,“ he said to me one day, “that I have no 
will except not to will; for I have all my reason; I know what I ought to do; but 
strength fails me when I ought to act (Ribot 1915: 29). 
Neurasthenia in the work of Ribot emerges as the malady of a will that has 
lost control over itself and has succumbed to a precarious state of not-
willing as the result of external pressure. As a part of a general democrati-
zation of a culture of sensibility, the pattern of psychosomatic symptoms 
structured around the nerves in the body of the neurasthenic focused on the 
challenges of modern life against the autonomous will of the individual, 
whose general orientation in life was in danger. As a pathology of everyday 
life, neurasthenia represented not only a clinical diagnosis, but also the 
broader implications of a diagnosis of the present, focusing on the exposure 
of individuality to for example life in the big city.  
One illustrious example of this is found in a widely read and discussed 
sociological dissertation published in 1895 by Max Nordau (Wagner 1956). 
By drawing also upon the other great explanatory figure in the latter part of 
the 19th century, that of inheritable degeneration, Nordau claims that the 
etiology of the increasingly prevalent neurasthenia was ‘the vast fatigue 
which was experienced by the generation on which the multitude of discov-
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eries and innovations burst abruptly, imposing upon its organic exigencies 
greatly suppressing its strength, which create favourable conditions under 
which these maladies could gain ground enormously, and became a danger 
to civilization’ (Nordau 1895: 3). The same attitude towards neurasthenia is 
taken by the German sociologist George Simmel his famous essay “The Me-
tropolis and Mental Life” (Simmel 1950), which was originally a result of a 
series of lectures conducted alongside the Dresden city exhibition in 1903. 
Simmel’s essay illustrates well the critical attitude that many theorists and 
practitioners of the time took towards the individual’s life in the big city. 
Based on the assumption that the will of the individual is threatened by the 
intensification of nervous stimulation, Simmel argues for a fundamental di-
chotomy between the intimate life of the individual and the social forces 
that impress themselves on him. He commences by stating that the ‘deepest 
problems of modern life derive from the claim of the individual to preserve 
the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming 
social forces’ (Simmel 1950: 409). The discrepancy between man’s histori-
cal heritage and external culture, between the calling upon man to set him-
self free in the 18th century and for example the division of labour, forces 
man to struggle against ‘being leveled down and worn out by a social-
technological mechanism’. This discrepancy, Simmel argues, is nowhere as 
profound as in the metropolis, where a type of individuality has emerged, 
whose psychological basis consists in the ‘intensification of nervous stimu-
lation which results from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and 
inner stimuli’ (Simmel 1950: 10). The contrast between the small town and 
rural life of earlier times and life in the metropolis consists in the intensi-
fied societal impression on the nerves ‘with each crossing of the street, with 
the tempo and multiplicity of economic, occupational and social life’ (ibid.). 
It is out of the individual dealing with this fundamental conflict that a pro-
phylactic activity emerges, which illustrates how the diffuse pressure of 
modernity is matched by an equally super-individual, mechanistic psycho-
logical response. As Simmel argues, the metropolitan type of man ‘exists in 
a thousand individual variants’, but these variants act in a conformal man-
ner by developing a protecting organ ‘against the threatening currents and 
discrepancies’ of the external environment. It is out of intellectual effort, 
which the creation of this organ demands of the individual that the phe-
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nomenon of the ‘blasé attitude’ emerges as a result of ‘the rapidly changing 
and closely compressed contrasting stimulations of the nerves’ (Simmel 
1950: 413). This psychological hardening of the will in the intellectual, met-
ropolitan type is a good example of the assumption of a mechanistic re-
sponse to the diffuse pressure of modernity that was widely accepted in the 
late 19th and early 20th century as a threat to the nervous energy of the indi-
vidual. 
The gradual democratization represented by the emergence of a culture 
of sensibility in the 19th century, as this chapter has shown, made neuras-
thenia a pathology of everyday life to which virtually everyone was suscep-
tible. In contrast to the traditions explored in the previous chapters, the 
nerves as a ‘thing’ in the body, constituted a democratic phenomenon, 
around which the concerns about the relation between society and the indi-
vidual was structured. Oriented towards a neuropathic household, the pro-
phylactic activity of the individual will had to balance the ‘thing’ in the body 
in response to both the inner individual and the outer social stimuli that 
threatened it with overstimulation. While this oikos was by no means re-
ducible to the sphere of work, as the next section will illustrate, it here 
gained a generality that underlined its socioeconomic importance. As a re-
serve of energy, the nervous force also became representable in the analogy 
of labour power, as a resource to be harvested in the individual body. 
3. The Human Motor: Nerves and Labour Power 
The actual conditions of someone who experienced the ‘complete exhaus-
tion of supreme nerve centres’ is recorded in The Autobiography of a Neu-
rasthene by Dr. Margaret A. Cleaves (Cleaves 1910: 5). The work, which was 
assessed by the Boston Gossip of Latest Books to be of great value, because 
of the author’s indications to ‘her nervously afflicted sisters’ of better ways 
to live, is the biography of a physician, who knows from experience ‘the 
worst of this condition without a pathology, but which evidences a definite 
pathological physiology.’ Reflecting the household of the ‘thing’ in the body 
within the socioeconomic context of work, Cleaves’ documentation of a get-
away trip to Long Island represents very well the convergence of nervous 
energy and labour power. In the ancestral home of a patient, where she has 
settled to work, she experiences a nervous breakdown. Armed with books of 
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reference, data and papers, the intensity of her arrangement drains her of 
energy:  
Every morning we rose early and immediately upon the completion of breakfast 
– by half past seven always – I began my labours. Hour after hour I toiled inter-
ested beyond words in what I was doing and unconscious of the fact that I was 
hour by hour exhausting my nerve centres (Cleaves 1910: 5). 
Brought up with a stern sense of duty, which the narrator attributes to her 
Puritan ancestors, she will not give up work although she feels exhausted, 
until at some point she is stricken by terror at the sight of her own colour-
less and quivering hands. Only then does she realize that ‘the strange in-
comprehensible feeling of desolation and danger’ (Cleaves 1910: 60), which 
she is sensing, is a sign that she has been overwhelmed by neurasthenia. 
Wearily walking down to the boat and setting out across the sound to reach 
the main land, she reflects in a way reminding of the blasé attitude of the 
previous section: 
All was beauty about me, everything was full of the joy of life, but I could not 
feel it. I knew it was all there, that everything was just the same, but I had nei-
ther part nor parcel in it. I was glad my work was done, simply because I could 
not strive any longer (Cleaves 1910: 61). 
Back in the city and struggling with a profound sense of shame, she calls on 
one of her ‘neurological friends’, who sees her even in advance of other pa-
tients. He examines her and concludes that she has ‘sprained her brain’ and 
needs to see a different side of life (p. 63). Maintaining that she has fol-
lowed his advice and learned from the incident on Long Island, she still 
only increases the intensity of her work, but does not tell her physician 
about it. As she says: 
… I felt he would discourage me and I simply had to do it. The impelling force 
within me, which is always driving me at full speed, would not slow down. To 
me it is infinitely better to wear than to rust. Inactivity is stagnation. As I write 
these pages, I am living at top speed and white heat … Still I know perfectly well 
now how far I dare go. I did not then. Even now I would not be awakening neu-
ronic memory of pain, sleeplessness, mental anguish, impaired physical 
strength, if I had not a purpose in it … (Cleaves 1910: 67). 
Commenting that there is of course a loss in this mode of life, but that the 
‘expenditure of precious nerve energy’ (Cleaves 1910: 68) is better spent 
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achieving something useful than merely regretting that it is lost, the 
anonymous physician of The Autobiography of a Neurasthene concludes: 
‘Work was and is second nature. It meant not only the means of living, but 
life, the power to do and to be.’ 
Cleaves’ description of a nervous breakdown associated with the defi-
cient regulation of the energies in the body, along with her description of 
work as a kind of nature comparable to life itself, provides a brilliant de-
scription of how neurasthenia became a democratic phenomenon within 
the context of work. Reflecting the combustibility of the black bile as a 
‘thing’ in the body, here represented within a socioeconomic context, her 
description of a life at ‘top speed and white heat’ illustrates the precarious 
convergence of the neuropathic household of the individual and the notion 
of labour power which grew out of the transvaluation of work invigorated 
by the classical political economists and the enlightenment thinkers. Repre-
senting the universal notion of labour as a source of value to be gathered in 
the individual body, labour power became the object of widespread scien-
tific studies in the late 19th and early 20th century. With it a growing interest 
in the negative effects of pathological fatigue focused on the depletion of the 
working body as a natural resource. The division and specialization of la-
bour, which became more and more commonplace during European indus-
trialization, for example, was listed by Beard as the primary reason for 
nervous illnesses among the working classes (Beard 1881: 101). 
A pathological exhaustion specifically related to the development of the 
concept of labour as a resource to be found and yielded in the individual 
body is one of the main subjects in Anson Rabinbach’s fascinating study 
The Human Motor (1992). Like Weichardt’s announcement of a cure 
against fatigue with which this chapter began, the literature that Rabin-
bach’s study examines, is concerned not only with the human body and the 
extent to which it can be productive, but also with the conservation of the 
energy reserves found in it and the threat of their depletion. Reflecting the 
mechanical framework that was explored in the previous section on Beard’s 
concept of neurasthenia, Rabinbach examines the metaphor of the human 
motor, which came to provide a new overarching scientific and cultural 
framework to thinkers of the 19th century by conflating the human body and 
the industrial machine to one automata toiling to convert energy into me-
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chanical work. As Rabinbach argues, it was the metaphor of the motor 
which enabled society to manage the energies of the working body in the at-
tempt to harmonize them with those of the industrial machine (Rabinbach 
1992: 2).  
Whereas the sin of sloth and idleness growing out of the tradition of 
acedia, as already discussed above, constituted the earlier predominant 
moralistic mode of conceptualizing and dealing with resistance to labour, 
the industrial metaphors of the 19th century theories about work introduced 
the newer problem of mental and physical fatigue as an object of scrutiny, 
which emerged both as an obstacle to be overcome and as an omen of the 
ultimate decline and failure of civilization. Like neurasthenia (and to a large 
extent indistinguishable from it) the phenomenon of pathological fatigue, 
which came to dominate the discourses of political economy, medicine, 
physiology, psychology, and politics, also focused on the energy reserves of 
the individual body both in terms of constituting a natural threshold that 
preserved them from dissipating under the strains of modernity and in 
terms of pathological exhaustion. As Rabinbach reflects, fatigue was not 
only a negative property but could also be linked to the individual body’s 
natural ability to resist the demands of productivism. The trope of fatigue:  
… also represented the legitimate boundary of the individual’s physiological and 
psychological forces beyond which the demands of society become illegitimate 
and destructive. Fatigue thus defined both the limits of the working body and 
the point beyond which society could not transgress without jeopardizing its 
own future capacity for labour (Rabinbach 1992: 23). 
Although the tropes of neurasthenia and the tropes of pathological fatigue 
were often homonymous to the extent of inseparability, one aspect of dif-
ference is important. If the psychosomatic pattern of suffering implied in 
the conception of neurasthenia focused primarily on the overstimulation of 
the ‘thing’ in the body resulting in the pathological degeneration of the 
autonomous will, then the neuropathic household associated with the theo-
ries of pathological fatigue in the working body focused on the loss of natu-
ral resources. If neurasthenia had the impairment of the will as a key factor, 
the broader debate about pathological fatigue focused on the loss of produc-
tive abilities in a socioeconomic context.  
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Although the two tropes cannot be reduced to each other, the conver-
gence between them in the notion of labour power is interesting because it 
illustrates how by the end of the 19th century the assumption of an energy 
source associated with the individual management of a ‘thing’ in the body 
was not only generalized, but had also become unavoidable. As Rabinbach 
argues, the concept of labour power, which became popular in the 19th cen-
tury as a dominant trope of the pervasive materialistic theories of the time, 
provided the analogy of the bank account, which Beard used to illustrate the 
stock of nervous energy in the body, with a gravity that he could not have 
given it himself. Corresponding on a socioeconomic level to the assumption 
of a relation between the nerves as a ‘thing’ in the body controlling volition 
and the exhaustion of neurasthenia, the dichotomy between labour power 
and fatigue came to be an indicator of the body’s unique capital (Rabinbach 
1992: 6). As Rabinbach argues, the distinction between a creative act and 
alienated labour that had been appropriate to a preindustrial era, by the 
second half of the 19th century became superseded by the energeticist model 
of mechanical work, which made the work performed by humans, the gears 
of an engine, the motions of planets, in short society and nature virtually 
indistinguishable (Rabinbach 1992: 47). It was primarily the development 
of the notion of labour power, as the resource of the individual working 
body, which suggested an analogy between the human and the machine as 
motors converting energy into mechanical work. As what Rabinbach de-
scribes as a transcendental materialism, predicating a single power, which 
was viewed as the source of all motion and matter, labour power came to 
designate the manifest actualizations of the universal and yet invisible 
source of energy, when it was processed productively. It was under the aus-
pice of this transcendental materialism that society, in Rabinbach’s words, 
became ‘assimilated to an image of nature powered by protean energy, per-
petually renewed, indestructible, and infinitely malleable’ (Rabinbach 1992: 
46). Reflecting Ribot’s assumption of the ideomotor transforming desire 
into will, the labour force of the working body as a resource related to this 
overarching trope of energy, constituted the primary site of conversion for 
the forces of nature, when they were transformed into productivity. It was 
on this background that the 19th century notion of fatigue, reflecting the 
precarious status of neurasthenia as both a prophylaxis against the de-
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mands of society and a pathology of exhaustion, came to indicate a physical 
entropy of the individual body. Rather than constituting a sharp dichotomy 
between health and illness, fatigue came to designate the effects of a defi-
cient management and regulation of the natural power in the individual 
working body. As such it came to signify both the simple effects of consid-
erable work and the dystrophic exhaustion, which in the worst case could 
lead to mental illness. If the phenomenon of neurasthenia offered a rela-
tively simple, mechanistic explanation to a diffuse multiplicity of symptoms 
associated with modern life and structured around the sensibility of the 
‘thing’ in the body, then the potential depletion of labour power constituted 
also a potential socioeconomic crisis. As a democratized phenomenon, the 
culture of a sensibility, which had once been reserved to the extraordinary, 
emerged in terms of the moral problem of a will unable to provide a goal-
oriented use of the body’s most valuable asset, its labour power. Structured 
around the neuropathic household of the nerves, this problem came to have 
a horizon of its own. 
The universal character of the assumption of labour power as the indi-
vidual capital of the working body in the 19th century political debates can 
be illustrated by the curious example of Paul Lafargue’s scandalous pam-
phlet The Right To Be Lazy (1880). Posited by Rabinbach as the most 
poignant objection of its time to the new productivist metaphor of labour 
power (Rabinbach 1992: 34), this infamous text constitutes a brilliant ex-
ample of the elevation of the concept of energy to be the basis and source of 
all reality. It illustrates how, by the end of the 19th century in the debates 
about labour power, an outside to the assumption of the body as a reservoir 
of energy to be managed intelligently by the individual was no longer repre-
sentable. Lafargue’s assertion of the right of the proletariat to idleness, 
which used to be a sin, illustrates how the problem of the neuropathic 
household related to the ‘thing’ in the body had transcended the context of 
pathology to be subsumed under a general problematization of the right to 
labour power.  
To the embarrassment of his father-in-law, Karl Marx, Lafargue’s essay 
begins with a mockery of the famous ‘spectre’ in The Communist Manifest 
(1848): ‘A strange delusion possesses the working classes of the nations 
where capitalist civilization holds it sway.’ (Lafargue 1907: 9). This delu-
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sion, Lafargue holds, ‘is the love of work, the furious passion for work, 
pushed even to the exhaustion of the vital force of the individual and his 
progeny’ (ibid.). With this indication of a convergence of the individual’s 
life force and his labour power, Lafargue goes on to complain about ‘the sa-
cred halo’ that economists and moralists have cast over work and declares 
that ‘work is the cause of all intellectual degeneracy, of all organic deform-
ity.’ (ibid.) Even Jesus, Lafargue maintains, preached idleness and the great 
Jehovah himself is the best example of the ideal of laziness: ‘after six days 
of work, he rests for eternity.’ (ibid.)  
Sadly, even the proletariat follows the ‘disastrous dogma’ of work, 
thereby ‘betraying its instincts, despising its historic mission’. It is on this 
background that the working classes must free themselves from the yoke of 
productivism and oppose the ‘most terrible scourge that has ever struck 
humanity’ (Lafargue 1907: 29f.). By destroying the doctrine of idleness as a 
sin, it must come to recognize that its real freedom lies in preserving the 
energy of the working body, rather than taking over the means of its con-
version:  
But to arrive at the realization of its strength the proletariat must trample under 
foot the prejudices of Christian ethics, economic ethics and free-thought ethics. 
It must return to its natural instincts, it must proclaim The Rights to Laziness, a 
thousand times more noble and more sacred than the anaemic Rights of Man 
concocted by the metaphysical lawyers of the bourgeois revolution. It must ac-
custom itself to working but three hours a day, reserving the rest of the day and 
night for leisure and feasting (Lafargue 1907: 29). 
Rabinbach may be right in asserting that Lafargue’s essay is no more than a 
naïve anachronism, with its obversive idealization of the virtues of idleness 
and idyll of a working class dedicated to consumption and luxury (Rabin-
bach 1992: 35). But while the assumption of a ‘Right to Laziness’ serving the 
natural instincts of the working body may be said to be naïve, Lafargue’s 
antinomy of work and idleness also illustrates how dominating the trope of 
energy had become in the 19th century. As a part of the social conflict struc-
turing society in different classes, the infamy of Lafargue’s elevation of idle-
ness to a virtue instead of a sin shows how little room there was for an al-
ternative conception of man within the all-encompassing horizon of pro-
ductivism. Lafargue’s doctrine of laziness, exactly because of its persisting 
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infamy to work ethics, provides a very good example of how the assumption 
of a protean energy resource structured around a ‘thing’ in the body became 
a crucial piece in the understanding of society as defined by a political con-
flict between class interests. 
4. The Mechanics of Melancholy: Freud and Neurasthenia 
It may seem like an odd idea to read Sigmund Freud and especially his 
short essay “Mourning and Melancholia” from 1917, which will be the pri-
mary topic in the following, within the context of the framework that has 
been presented in the previous sections. There is no doubt that Freud’s 
work is found on the limit of the tradition of the nerves, representing a 
waning of the 19th century obsession with the protean energies of the body, 
and signalling also the dawning in the early 20th century of a tradition more 
concerned with the opaque realms of the human unconscious. Known as 
the father of psychoanalysis, Freud himself represents the inauguration of a 
whole new way to articulate and understand the inside of man. 
Yet for exactly that reason it may be interesting to look at how his work 
reflects the social, medical and epistemological norms structured around 
the nerves, which have been explored above. Like many of his contemporar-
ies, Freud cast his model of man in energeticist terms, transposing the no-
tion of protean energy to the dark realms of the human unconscious and as-
cribing pathological states to fluctuations in or diversions of the perpetuum 
mobile of the drives.  
This model is a close to perfect reflection of the conflictual relation be-
tween the individual and the social modernity explored above, but if the 
conflict of the sensitive individual with the world it inhabited was consti-
tuted as a dichotomy between an inside and an outside, the Freudian sub-
ject represents an internalization of the conflict. The Freudian subject, like 
the socius it grows out of, is structured and held together by conflict. 
Transposing the externality of diffuse pressure on the nervous system to a 
conflict between hierarchies of the psyche, Freud describes a subject in 
whom the splitting of the self constitutes the unity of the person. Like the 
theories of evolution planted the beast, which had used to represent an ab-
solute outside, within man as a source of origin, Freud integrated an ani-
malistic part – das es – into civilization - das Über-ich. The two extremes 
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were then asserted to constitute the extreme parts of the model personality 
of the individual. 
Represented as a discontent with civilization, the frustration caused by 
the experience of the conflict between the two extreme sides of the psyche, 
according to Freud, could become so strenuous that it became pathological, 
causing neurotic psychosis. It was the sense of guilt which presented itself 
to the ego, pinned down between civilization and its discontents, which ex-
hausted the individual of nervous energies. Pathology, in this Freudian 
sense, was not qualitatively different from the problems associated with an 
everyday bourgeois life, but represented instead a deepening of an existen-
tial condition that lead to nervous exhaustion. In Civilization and its Dis-
contents (1930), although the work never directly defines the nature of the 
“discontent” that it addresses, Freud speaks of the anxiety neurosis devel-
oping in those who are for some reason unable to recognize their guilt for 
what it is and deal with it (Freud 1946: 495). The anxiety neurosis results 
directly from the failure to recognize the conscience of guilt produced by the 
process of civilization, when it surfaces as a general feeling of discontent or 
diffuse discomfort, for which other causes are articulated (i.e. compulsory 
neurosis) (Freud 1946: ibid.). Presented within the context of the question 
about how civilization – on the level of the Freudian psyche represented as 
das Über-ich – renders harmless the aggression which is directed against it 
by das Es, the anxiety neurosis represents the eruption of pathology in the 
individual, when the conflict between self and self becomes so profound 
that the ‘I’ begins to come apart. Reflecting the physiological assumption 
presented above of a moral ideomotor in Ribot’s Maladies of the Will, 
which could be rendered dysfunctional by neurasthenic exhaustion, the 
constant pressure of the moral law, which separates the Freudian ‘I’ from 
the dark recesses of its unconscious animalistic drives, can become so se-
vere that it leads to nervous disorders. 
Freud’s psychoanalysis – referred to by himself as his ‘cathartic method’ 
– must be seen on this background. Its task is not to remove the conflict be-
tween the sense of morality and the drives altogether, but merely to restore 
the reflexive subject to a state in which it is able to handle the conflict on its 
own. In an essay discussing “The Psychotherapy of Hysteria” from 1912, 
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therapy is explained as a method to restore the nervous system to a less agi-
tated state, enabling the hysteric patient to help herself: 
When I promised my patients help and relief through the cathartic method, I 
was often obliged to hear the following objections: “You say, yourself, that my 
suffering has probably to do with my own relation and destinies. You cannot 
change any of that. In what manner, then, can you help me?” To this I could al-
ways answer: “I do not doubt at all that it would be easier for destiny than for 
me to remove your sufferings, but you will be convinced that much will be 
gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into everyday un-
happiness, against which you will be better able to defend yourself with a re-
stored nervous system (Freud 1912: 120). 
The primary task of the psychoanalytic method is not to heal, but to trans-
form the hyperbole of hysterical misery, found in the anxiety neurosis – 
and as we shall see in Freud’s definition of melancholia – to a level of eve-
ryday unhappiness, where the patient, with the help of a restored nervous 
system, can take care of the self by themselves. In the tradition of existen-
tial thought found in Kierkegaard and later in Heidegger, the assertion of 
anxiety as a mechanism through which selves reflexively turn back on their 
own boundaries, the Freudian assertion of the emotional hyperbole of hys-
terical misery in this sense represents a pathological inhibition of the will. 
Associating the boundaries of selfhood with both the exhausting overstimu-
lation of the nerves and with the inability of the will to react to stimuli, 
Freud’s subject represents an immanent version of the neuropathic house-
hold described above, structured around the same assumptions of a protean 
energy in the body. Pathology here emerges not as an outside, the other side 
of health, but rather as the eruption of an antinomy immanent to health, 
associated with the ability of the subject to manage the self correctly. Em-
blematic of the tradition described in the more materialistic terms associ-
ated with neurasthenia, this assertion of a pathology of everyday life cul-
minates in the Freudian assumption of the neurosis as a deepening of an 
everyday pathos, with which the subject exists as a fundamental condition. 
The pathological state, which Freud associates with the exhaustion of the 
nervous system, is not qualitatively different from what defines the subject 
as such; rather it is the deepening of the conflict, which at the same time 
structures the subject, which is pathological. 
 141 
 
Associating this pathological deepening with the conditions of a subject 
who suffers under and struggles with loss, Freud’s 1917 essay “Mourning 
and Melancholia” can be read in this light. The Freudian melancholic, in 
analogy to the neurasthenic’s exhaustion, is someone in whom overstimula-
tion has caused a pathological inhibition of the will that as such is no longer 
able to perform its duties. Characterizing someone who knows that he has 
lost, but unlike the person in mourning fails to see what he has lost there, 
the Freudian melancholic is defined in terms of his inaccessibility to him-
self and to others. As it will be illustrated, this implicates two important as-
pects to the theme explored in this thesis: first, the Freudian melancholic is 
characterized as someone in whom the internalization of the conflict ex-
plored above has lead to an inhibition of the will. Secondly, and important 
because it emblematically points away from the materialistic tradition of 
the nerves, this inhibition is associated with the inability of the self to dif-
ferentiate and reinvent itself at its own limits. While the first of the two as-
pects, as explained above, constituted a central characteristic of the prob-
lematization of the neuropathic household, the second was only tentatively 
present here. Pointing deep into the 20th century and beyond, the definition 
of the melancholic as someone dejected by the inability to differentiate the 
self through reflective activity marks a threshold between the functional pa-
thology of neurasthenia and the contemporary assumption of depression as 
a pathology problematizing the ability to be and become a self. Freud’s es-
say points towards contemporary conceptualizations of depression as a 
phenomenon concerned with a societal demand to be and become an entre-
preneurial self.  
“Mourning and Melancholia” has gone largely unchallenged in psycho-
analytic accounts of melancholy and depression (Radden 2000a: 282), de-
spite the fact that it breaks nearly completely with the historical associa-
tions of melancholy. But because of its introduction and development of 
such key psychoanalytic concepts as projective identification and introjec-
tion it is considered by many to be one of Freud’s masterpieces. The essay, 
as Radden points out (Radden 2000b: 282), is concerned with three aspects 
that it associates with melancholia in ways that distinguish it from the ear-
lier writings on the subject: the theme of loss, the strong emphasis on self-
accusation in the melancholic subjectivity and the elaborate theory of nar-
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cissism, identification and introjection that it introduces. Especially the last 
of these three aspects provides an important theme in later psychoanalytic 
theory on the nature of depression, for example in the works of Melanie 
Klein and Julia Kristeva (e.g. Kristeva 1989, Klein 1975). As the following is 
more concerned with the affinities of the Freudian theory to the traditions 
explored in this thesis, it will primarily engage with the implications of the 
first two aspects of loss and self-accusation. 
Freud commences “Mourning and Melancholia” arguing for a correlation 
between the two conditions, which he finds justified by their general pic-
ture. Comparing the emotional states associated with grief to the symptoms 
of melancholia, he maintains that melancholia consists in:  
… a profoundly painful dejection, abrogation of interest in the outside world, 
loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-
regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-
revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment (Freud 
1917: 283). 
Except for the last of the symptoms, which will be explored in more detail 
later, Freud makes no qualitative distinction between mourning and melan-
cholia; rather the central characteristic of the mourning position provides 
him with an explanatory perspective on melancholia. Mourning, Freud 
maintains, ‘is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the 
loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as father-
land, liberty, an ideal, and so on.’ (Freud 1917: 283) Although a tradition of 
amatory mania exists in the literature presented above that might reflect 
this association of the melancholic sentiment with the feeling of loss found 
in mourning, the Freudian approximation of the two conditions remains 
surprising. The dominant reaction to frustrated love in Antiquity was vio-
lence, while the romantic notion of lovesickness and its literary depictions 
during Romanticism seems to have represented a whole other phenomenon 
altogether (e.g. Toohey 2004, Mohr 1990). Yet Freud not only insists on the 
association, he also maintains that mourning and melancholia share on an 
etiological level the problem of object-loss as a defining characteristic. 
Coming to speak of this problem in the dynamic terms of the libido, which 
reflects the tropes of energy associated with the neuropathic household ex-
plored in the previous chapters, he describes the struggle with the loss of at-
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tachment and how this may result in a condition, the intensity of which may 
come to resemble psychosis: 
The testing of reality, having shown that the loved object no longer exists, re-
quires forthwith that all the libido shall be withdrawn from its attachment to 
this object. Against this demand a struggle of course arises – it may be univer-
sally observed that man never willingly abandons a libido-position, not even 
when a substitute is already beckoning to him. This struggle can be so intense 
that a turning away from reality ensues, the object being clung to through the 
medium of a hallucinatory wish-psychosis (Freud 1917: 284). 
The loss of an object of great personal importance, according to Freud, can 
be so traumatic that it leads the subject into a wish-psychosis that it takes 
time to resolve, while the beloved object is preserved in memory. The proc-
ess that accompanies the libidinal attachment of the drives to the lost object 
is painful, but as long as the ego once again ‘becomes free and uninhibited’ 
(Freud 1917: 284) through the work of mourning, it is not pathological. 
The psychical pain that accompanies melancholia, Freud maintains, is 
not qualitatively different from the one found in mourning. What sets the 
melancholic position apart from the mourning position is the symptom of 
self-loathing and the expectation of punishment mentioned above. Associ-
ated with the mourning process that consists in the painful realization of a 
loss, the melancholic patient who shares this pain, as Freud argues, may be 
aware that he has lost and even of whom he has lost. But he is tragically 
unaware of what he has lost there: 
In grief the world becomes poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself. 
The patient represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any effort and 
morally despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast 
out and chastised. He abases himself before everyone and commiserates his 
relatives for being connected with someone so unworthy. He does not realize 
that any change has taken place in him, but extends his self-criticism back over 
the past and declares that he was never any better (Freud 1917: 285). 
While the analogy between mourning and melancholia associates the pat-
tern of suffering with the loss of an object, the distinguishing feature in 
melancholia, according to Freud, is the replacement of the object with the 
ego, which the melancholic presents as hopelessly despicable and unalter-
able. The conflictuality of the pair Es/Über-Ich in melancholia represents 
the inhibition of a will which has turned on itself. The complaint (“Klage”) 
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associated with the healthy and self-differentiating process of mourning is 
transformed by an excessive emotional response into the accusation (“Ank-
lage”) of the self against the self. The melancholic suffers under the inter-
nalization of the lost object, the loss of which he substitutes for his own self. 
As a pathological process of objectification, this mechanism by Freud is as-
serted to be the problem of a conscience, which distinguishes itself from the 
rest of the ego: 
We see how in this condition one part of the ego sets itself over against the 
other, judges it critically, and, as it were, looks upon it as an object. Our suspi-
cion that the critical institution of the mind which here is split off from the ego 
might also demonstrate its independence in other circumstances will be con-
firmed by all further observations. We shall really find justification for distin-
guishing this institution from the rest of the ego. It is the mental faculty called 
conscience that we are thus recognizing (Freud 1917: 286). 
It is the assertion of melancholia primarily as a pathology of the con-
science, which is interesting here. The Freudian reflection of the exhausting 
conflict structuring the subject susceptible to neurasthenia represents an 
internalization of the neuropathic household. But the assumption of this 
inner conflict in Freud’s work has broader implications. The aggressive ex-
pectation of punishment found by Freud to be a matter associated with the 
melancholic conscience not only causes the exhaustion of the nervous ener-
gies, representing both an inability to participate in the socioeconomic de-
velopment of society and a personal bankruptcy. It also associates the 
pathological deepening of the emotional apparatus with the inability of the 
self to become a self through the self-articulation in the process of mourn-
ing. Representing the melancholic inability to self-differentiate as a pathol-
ogy of self-hood, Freud’s essay points out of the materialistic tradition of 
the nerves, towards the contemporary assumptions of depression as a func-
tional disorder associated with the exhaustion caused by the demands to be 
and articulate the self in the socioeconomic terms of new management 
technologies. 
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5. The Pathologies of Performativity: Neurasthenia   
Another return to the systematic perspective constituted by the six dimen-
sions of problem and response, within which also the problematizations of 
melancholy and acedia has been represented, will illustrate that the pathol-
ogy of neurasthenia, and the tropes associated with it, although it is clear 
from the sections above that it has a framework of its own, in some respects 
bear strong similarities to what has been explored in the previous chapters. 
Beyond the symptomatological consistencies between the three pathologies 
of performativity, this is especially true for the affinity between acedia and 
neurasthenia as phenomena associated with sociality as civilization. In 
both the case of acedia and the shift implicated by Hobbes’ notion of mel-
ancholy and in the case of neurasthenia, the idea that civilization bred self-
inflicted sickness has been illustrated to be of emphatic importance. Yet the 
designation of such an affinity covers over a much more categorical differ-
TABLE 4 
Problematical 
Formations 
MELANCHOLIA ACEDIA NEURASTHENIA 
Pathological 
Problem 
MANIC-MELANCHOLIA 
CIRCULAR ANTINOMY 
DESPAIR 
BINARY ANTINOMY 
EXHAUSTION 
ERUPTION OF IMMANENT 
ANTINOMY 
Charac-
terological 
Problem 
THE EXTRAORDINARY 
 
 
THE REJECTED THE SENSITIVE 
Delimitative 
Problem 
PERIPHERY 
 
 
OUTSIDE 
 
INSIDE 
Self-
Regulatory 
Response 
DIETETICS 
 
 
VIRTUOUS LIVING 
 
NEUROPATHIC  
HOUSEHOLD 
 
Performative  
Response 
 
ACHIEVEMENT WORK AS VIRTUE 
 
WORK AS SECOND NA-
TURE 
Self-
Articulatory 
Response 
SELF-TRANSGRESSION 
 
SUBLIMATION 
CONTROLLING AFFECT 
 
ABSTINENT SUBLIMATION 
RESOURCE ADMINI-
STRATION 
PSYCHOANALYTIC 
SELF-DIFFERENTIATION 
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ence, which is of great value to the following explication: if acedia was an 
affliction concerned with the lack of civilization, then neurasthenia rather 
represented its opposite, an illness primarily associated with too much civi-
lization. The neurasthenic, and the tropes associated with his pathographic 
profile, as the sections above have illustrated, concerned the challenges of 
modernity to the autonomy of the individual. Not rejecting, but focusing in-
stead on the need to refine the process of civilization in order to ensure that 
the individual would not succumb under its pressure, the tropes structured 
around neurasthenia were concerned with ensuring the lightness of being 
rather than the virtuous burden of existence associated with acedia. While 
this focus on the individual hints at another affinity, that between the sensi-
tive artist and the culturally formative Aristotelian melancholic, the asser-
tion of such a likeness also covers over a more important disparity: al-
though the culture of nervousness, which mapped maladies of behaviour 
and affect onto the nerves as a ‘thing’ in the body, found its sources on the 
stage of affluent and fashionable society, neurasthenia was more concerned 
with normalization than with the originalization of the exceptional. Repre-
senting the beginning democratization of the sensitivity that had used to be 
reserved to the extraordinary, the tropes of neurasthenia explored above 
concerned the laborious, rather than the culturally formative, the entrepre-
neur rather than the genius. If the paradoxical nature of the ēthos perriton 
both allowed his genius and made him susceptible to the diseases of the 
black bile, then work as second nature was both the democratic gateway to 
success for the struggler, and the threshold beyond which the depletion of 
the definite and not inexhaustible quantities of energy resources in the body 
became irredeemable. Continuing the symbolic assertion of a line of sight 
emblematic for the characters represented within the different problemati-
zations, the potential neurasthenic may be understood as a custodian. If the 
theoros of melancholy represented the emergence of the peripheral specta-
tor and the martyr the witness of personal sacrifice in the theocosmos, then 
the custodian as a guardian or keeper (from the latin custodis) who 
watched over a personal stock of resource may be the best way to represent 
the character who had to navigate between a neurological and a socioeco-
nomic reality. 
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The language that mediated between these two realities was the language of 
EXHAUSTION (see TABLE 4). Representing the primary trope of the patho-
logical problem explored in this chapter, the depletion of a personal reser-
voir of energy structured around the nervous system was constituted in a 
fashion that owed much to the Brunonian division of pathology into two 
categories: respectively the excess of stimulation and the incapacity to react 
to stimulus. The depletion of the nerve force through excessive demands, 
according to Beard’s medical model, would cause irritation and send ex-
haustion pulsing through the body, manifesting symptoms in the most 
unlikely places and fashions. This process itself caused a weakening of the 
individual will, causing disorders on another level that were reducible to the 
social imaginaries of the lower classes: degeneration, poverty and moral 
blemish being some of them. Representing a kind of physiological bank-
ruptcy, the pathological problem, rather than describing the circular antin-
omy of the manic-melancholic or the binary antinomy of the despairing ac-
cidiosi, in this sense represented an IMMANENT ANTINOMY to the will itself, 
erupting primarily as the pathological lack of Kraft, which caused a protean 
variety of other secondary symptoms stretching from anxiety over fear of 
lightning to impotence or extreme fatigue. Variations of this pathological 
problem were found in three emblematic contexts: that of the neuro-
mechanical impairment of the will associated with hypersensitivity to the 
phenomena of the modern world, that of labour power which could be ex-
hausted as a result of the excessive spending of the personal capital, and 
that of the Freudian economy of the drives, the deficient control of which 
could lead to the hysterical misery of the anxiety neurosis. 
The representation of a characterological problem of the problematiza-
tion of neurasthenia can be seen on this background. Constituting the prob-
lem of THE SENSITIVE within the modern world of impressions, the democ-
ratized sensibility to impressions of the character, which was pivotal point 
in the sections above, represented a nexus of conversion between nature’s 
raw material and the culturally refined. Both in the literal sense as a human 
motor and in the figurative sense of Ribot’s ideomotor transforming desire 
into will that influenced Freud, the characterological problem was that of 
one whose function as a perpetuum mobile installed as an intermediate link 
between nature and culture might blot out any individual characteristics 
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and threaten to erase the human. The sensitive character represented here 
in this sense also functioned as a seismograph of the social, whose individ-
ual autonomy and private existence was constantly under siege. An em-
blematic example of this was Simmel’s notion of the prophylactic blasé atti-
tude of those whose nerves were torn and tattered, because they had been 
exposed to life in the big city too long. The internalization of conflict in the 
split subject of Freud’s psychic apparatus, whose exposure to the exhausted 
nervous system resulted from the excessive strain between the natural de-
sires of the Id and the ‘civilizing’ process of the super-ego, illustrated that 
the characterological problem associated with neurasthenia was one that 
had to be managed successfully in order at all to become a ‘self’. 
The conflict associated with the difficult task of becoming and maintain-
ing a ‘self’ in the social context was also what designated the dimension of 
the delimitative problem of the problematization presented in the sections 
above. If the threshold between collective and individual in the problemati-
zation of melancholy was found at the ever-transforming peripheries of 
both, and in the problematization of acedia as the precarious eruption of 
the other of the social within it, then the delimitation of the neurasthenic 
individual erupted as a threshold on the INSIDE of the social itself, beyond 
which its demands were illegitimate and from where, in the worst case, the 
subject could not return on its own. This complicated problem of delimita-
tion may best be understood by thinking about the difference between the 
anomaly of the melancholic and the abnormality of the neurasthenic. What 
defined the first was primarily his peculiarity as an exception from the rule. 
The abnormality of the neurasthenic, on the other hand, was not primarily 
representable as strange, unique or unusual; rather it constituted a devia-
tion from the norm, which in its turn had nothing natural about it, but was 
always somehow retrospectively determined as a virtual community. As 
Sverre Raffnsøe has pointed out (2001: 132-141), the norm of the 19th cen-
tury was not representable as a fixed moral framework beyond the com-
mon, which one had to conform to. It took the form rather of an enclitic 
common goal that was only determinable through the ceaseless evaluation 
of practice. An emblematic example of this indiscernibility between the ab-
normal and the norm was found in the Freudian (in)distinction between the 
process of mourning and the condition of melancholia, from which the sub-
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ject needed help to return. As the eruption of a disorder immanent to the 
‘normal’ and healthy process of mourning, the condition of melancholia 
represented the nervous and hysterical misery, which had to be returned to 
a state of everyday unhappiness in order to be regulated properly on an in-
dividual level. As a representation of the difficulty associated with main-
taining a healthy ‘self’ capable of projecting the will within the social con-
text, the neurasthenic individual emerged as the deepening of an always al-
ready constituted conflict with the collective, an immanent pathological 
manifestation of everyday life, which was only determinable over time. 
As the first of the three dimensions of response, the self-regulatory re-
sponse represented within the context of the problematization of neuras-
thenia was constituted as the task of a NEUROPATHIC HOUSEHOLD. Reflecting 
the task of maintaining a ‘self’ on the threshold between nature and culture, 
which functioned as a nexus of conversion of a naturally given, but definite 
and exhaustible protean source of energy, the self-regulatory response rep-
resented above was explored as a prophylactic activity structured around 
the nerves as a ‘thing’ in the body in three privileged dimensions. Firstly, as 
a regulation of the moral will to civilization, which functioned as a bulwark 
against the self-destructive and confusing anti-thesis constituted by desire 
as affective life’s more primitive form. Emblematically illustrated by Ribot’s 
mechanistic assertion of the ideomotor, this dimension represented the will 
as a dynamo transforming the ‘raw material’ of affects into civilized voli-
tions being projected into a socioeconomic reality. Secondly, the regulation 
of labour power as a personal capital in the working body constituted the 
transformation of natural resources into productivity and value. Owing 
much to an analogous association of the human body with the steam engine 
and drawing on the theory of both the first and the second law of thermo-
dynamics, the regulation of labour power as a source of value to be gathered 
in the individual body was constantly hampered by the threat of fatigue, 
representing the depletion of resources which also constituted a socioeco-
nomic crisis. Thirdly, and finally, the Freudian economy of the drives repre-
sented by the internalization of a similar model in the psychic apparatus 
saw self-regulation becoming an issue of the conscience, which had to con-
trol the ceaseless strain that the ego was under in the conflict between the 
super-ego and the id. This psychodynamic regulation associated the deple-
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tion of nervous resources with the anxiety neurosis, which over time would 
make it harder and harder for the afflicted to regulate and manipulate the 
‘self’ and guarantee its projection into the public sphere. 
These three levels of regulation all reflect the self-articulatory response 
of the problematization explored above. Describable as the RESOURCE AD-
MINISTRATION of the character who had to regulate and project the different 
manifestations of a protean source of energy from a neurological and into a 
socioeconomic reality, the mode of self-articulation found here assigned to 
the individual the task of a ceaseless mediation between the unrefined and 
the refined, between nature and culture. The most emblematic illustrations 
of this neuropathic household was beyond doubt found in Beard’s likening 
of the nervous system to a bank account, with which he sought to demon-
strate how nervous energy could both be wisely invested in the future, spent 
prudently or splashed out recklessly, and in his likening of it to an electrical 
circuit that could only take so much pressure without failing. But in terms 
of the self-articulatory response these illustrations, which are concerned 
with watching over the precious nervous resources, all have to be seen in 
combination with the injunction to projection that likened man to a dy-
namo, a vehicle of ceaseless alteration of the protean energies that circu-
lated in him. The crisis of an inhibited will or of the inability to self-
differentiate, which set the Freudian melancholic apart from his peers, des-
ignated the real antinomy to the articulation of the ‘self’ as the entrepreneu-
rial locus of activity. The mode of PSYCHOANALYTIC SELF-DIFFERENTIATION 
which associated the ability to redefine, reinvent and reevaluate the past in 
terms of the future constituted an important aspect of the articulation of a 
‘self’, to which, as the anonymous physician of The Autobiography of a 
Neurasthene commented, inactivity was stagnation and to wear infinitely 
better than to rust. In this sense neurasthenia and the associated articula-
tion of an entrepreneurial ‘self’ was always closely related to the all-
encompassing assertion of labour as the democratic arena of the aspiring 
businessman. 
The democratization of the possibility for achievement asserted by this 
assumption of WORK AS A SECOND NATURE was what governed the performa-
tive response of the problematization explored above. The example of La-
fargue’s reinvention of idleness, no longer as a sin, but instead as a weapon 
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in the struggle between the classes, illustrated how by the end of the 19th 
century labour itself had attained a new and central role in a society where 
the conflict of the social constituted the unity of the community. No longer 
associated with the culturally formative achievements of the extraordinary, 
with the hardships of the ascetic, or even with the virtue of work as a goal in 
itself, performativity here had become completely subsumed under the no-
tion of labour power that no longer seemed to have an outside to it. Labour 
and the tropes of achievement associated with it became the democratic 
arena on which everyone could attain the status of an achiever and poten-
tially come to display individual independency. 
 
  
  
Chapter Five 
Conclusion: Aspects of Melancholia 
 
1. A Recapitulation of Historical Dimensions  
2. Stress and the Popularization of the Extraordinary 
3. Depression and the Articulation of the Self  
4. Depression and Subjectivity as a Resource  
 
 
As indicated in the first chapter, the primary task of this thesis was the con-
stitution of three problematic formations pertaining to the association be-
tween pathology and performativity (in the melancholia of Antiquity, in 
medieval acedia and in the neurasthenia of 19th century industrialism) with 
the intent of creating a philosophical background for the exploration of 
such an association in the present age. With the conclusion of the previous 
chapter, the bulk of this work has now been completed. As three, very di-
verse formations that represent problematizations structured around a 
‘thing’ in the body, the pathologies of performativity explored in the chap-
ters above have been shown to constitute a tradition that ties into the his-
tory of the association between the heterogeneous tropes of work, perform-
ance and pathology in Western culture. Yet, while these explorations each 
can be said to represent precarious instantiations that describe the plight of 
the individual at different times in history, the task of indicating how they 
can inform a philosophical investigation of the present remains. Reflecting 
Adorno’s formulation in Minima Moralia, such an endeavour itself can be 
described as a melancholy science, hesitant and evasive in its attempt to 
subject modern life to critical reflection without becoming enmeshed in the 
dangers of maintaining a critical perspective on society from within society. 
Coming to know the truth about life in its estranged form, as Adorno has it, 
means to investigate ‘the objective powers that determine individual exis-
tence even in its most hidden recesses’ (Adorno 2005: 15). The following re-
capitulation and indication of fields for further study may be said to reflect 
this relation between life and production referred to by Adorno, in which 
the former to a certain extent is reduced to the latter. 
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But even on this background the history of the three problematic forma-
tions explored in this thesis cannot be represented as one of decline. Not 
only the inconclusiveness of its character, but also on a more profound level 
its fundamental indication of how life has always somehow been estranged 
prevents this. An indication of how the tradition of an association between 
performance and pathology can inform the present is not gained by com-
bining the three formations and claiming that this combination constitutes 
the emergence of the contemporary society. The complex job of illustrating 
the relevance of what has been unfolded in the chapters above to an investi-
gation of the present consists not in reduction, but in the task of keeping 
the formations apart and in insisting on the enduring relevance of their pe-
culiarities and diverse character, while seeking to subtract from them 
themes of interest that can assist a critical understanding of the social to-
day. On that note, what follows in this concluding chapter is neither a com-
plete and methodical exhaustion of the themes introduced and discussed in 
the previous chapters. Nor is it reducible to a fourth formation exclusive to 
the present, which replaces and crowns the historical dimensions explored 
above. Instead of pertaining to the sublation of the past into the present 
‘age’, the critical perspective of the following will be gained by exposing the 
‘untimeliness of times in the present’ (Kristensen 2008) in a search for con-
temporary tendencies loaded with aspects of the history explored above. 
The ‘melancholy science’ of the following reflections attempts to indicate a 
level for critique of contemporary society; but it does this also by demon-
strating (in good, melancholic style) the eccentricity of the present. Pertain-
ing to an opening, rather than to closing down, the task of this informative 
level is to indicate areas for further investigation which are beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
1. A Recapitulation of the Historical Dimensions 
The explorations of the dimensions of problem and response constituted by 
the problematic formations of the melancholia of Antiquity, by medieval 
acedia and by 19th century neurasthenia may be arranged in TABLE 5, which 
constitutes an overview of the historical findings of the thesis illustrated 
within the context of the systematical framework developed in chapter one. 
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Before continuing with the broader based reflections on how these dimen-
sions may inform a philosophical inquiry into the contemporary association 
between pathology and performativity, a short recapitulation of the ‘cos-
mologies’ is in place. 
 
The DIETETICS of THE EXTRAORDINARY melancholic of Antiquity, struc-
tured around the black bile, was organized in a CIRCULAR ANTINOMY relating 
states of exaltation and states of dejection with each other. As the assump-
tion of a paradoxical nature found in the outstanding and culturally forma-
tive of character, whose disposition found them always at the PERIPHERY of 
the collective order they pertained to, the eucrasia anomalia – the well-
balanced diversity of melancholy – constituted the precarious ‘great health’ 
of SELF-TRANSGRESSION, which in time came to be the mark of genius. Mod-
elled as an aporectic and erotic figure of sublimation that designated the 
TABLE 5 
Problematical 
Formations 
MELANCHOLIA ACEDIA NEURASTHENIA 
Pathological 
Problem 
MANIC-MELANCHOLIA 
CIRCULAR ANTINOMY 
DESPAIR 
BINARY ANTINOMY 
EXHAUSTION 
ERUPTION OF IMMANENT 
ANTINOMY 
Charac-
terological 
Problem 
THE EXTRAORDINARY 
 
 
THE REJECTED THE SENSITIVE 
Delimitative 
Problem 
PERIPHERY 
 
 
OUTSIDE 
 
INSIDE 
Self-
Regulatory 
Response 
DIETETICS 
 
 
VIRTUOUS LIVING 
 
NEUROPATHIC  
HOUSEHOLD 
 
Performative  
Response 
 
ACHIEVEMENT WORK AS VIRTUE 
 
WORK AS  
SECOND NATURE 
Self-
Articulatory 
Response 
 
SELF-TRANSGRESSION 
 
SUBLIMATION 
CONTROLLING AFFECT 
 
ABSTINENT SUBLIMATION 
RESOURCE  
ADMINISTRATION 
PSYCHOANALYTIC 
SELF-DIFFERENTIATION 
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task of self-regulation between the hyperboles of affect, this paradoxical na-
ture took as its base the assumption of a negative, which could be trans-
formed into positive and creative ACHIEVEMENT. The black bile of the mel-
ancholic ēthos in this sense was attributed a fundamental, exasperated in-
clination to ēros ensuing from temperature as the mechanism that un-
hinged the moral equilibrium, to which normality was bound. As an am-
biguous object of love-hate, to which the exalted states associated with both 
madness and geniality were connected, the ‘thing’ in the body of the ex-
traordinary melancholic emerged as the nexus of dynamic self-
manipulation for those to whom the ordinary ‘middle’ of the Aristotelian 
ethics were unobtainable. The sinister consequences that this nature, con-
stituted by the aporectic conflict itself, might have for the individual, were 
redeemed only by the indissoluble promise, which the doctrine of geniality 
held for those who found it in themselves to manage and regulate their dis-
position towards an ever inaccessible telos beyond even the confines of 
ēthos, of their ‘right character’. This self-devouring pathos of melancholy, as 
the potentially pathological takes the form of the healthy, and becomes a 
paradoxical prerequisite for great achievement, contains a figure, which by 
all means, I will argue in the following, is with us today – albeit in a very 
different form. 
Although it shared with this classic notion of melancholy symptoms of 
severe depression, the DESPAIR of acedia – the name given by the church fa-
thers to affliction also known as the noon-day demon – was of a very differ-
ent character. The BINARY ANTINOMY of this pathology, structured around 
the assumption of demonical possession and associated with the death of 
the soul induced by the deficits of VIRTUOUS LIVING within the conceptual 
framework of vice and virtue in the theocosmos, designated the topology of 
THE REJECTED, whose privation of affect constituted a flight from the rich-
ness of spiritual possibilities of man placed before God. Emerging as a fall 
from the world of the living, acedia was the mortal evil of those who found 
themselves suddenly on the OUTSIDE of the social reality to which they be-
longed. The ambiguous negative value of acedia in this sense was not re-
lated to achievement in the manner found in melancholy, but took instead 
WORK AS VIRTUE as the therapeutic answer to the desperation implied by the 
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horrified flight from that which one could not evade in any way. The per-
formativity of the religious men, which evolved into a the more generalized 
struggle with sloth, took the form of CONTROLLING AFFECT, as it was sub-
jected to the context of the sociocosmos in the guise of melancholy as a so-
cial pathology. But to both acedia and the later Hobbesian melancholic, the 
monstrous eruption in the body of a ‘thing’ that threatened to spiral out of 
control because of hyperbolic affect, the withdrawal from divine destiny or 
simply from the virtue of ABSTINENT SUBLIMATION did not mean that the af-
flicted simply forgot the proper categories of a virtuous life; rather the fun-
damental indistinctness of the phenomenon was found in ambiguous rela-
tion of despair to the desire to take part itself. This ambiguity was what set 
the phenomenon apart from the laziness implied by the concept of sloth as 
the affliction of someone answering to a goal, which revealed itself only in 
the act by which it was also rendered unobtainable. The reversal of the 
process of frightful and vertiginous negation implied by acedia was not a 
matter of lack of salvation – as the opportunity for that showed itself pains-
takingly and relentlessly – but that instead of finding a way to eclipse the 
desire which knew itself to be in despair. As the ‘despair which knows itself 
to be despair, aware therefore of having an ego in which something eternal 
resides, and now despairingly wishes not to be itself, or despairingly to be 
itself’ in the words of Kierkegaard (Kierkegaard 2008: 162, my translation), 
acedia as a pathology of performativity designated the mortal malady of 
man placed always already in a social reality. 
The affliction also of the individual placed in the middle of a social real-
ity, neurasthenia like acedia was concerned with civilization and its an-
tinomies. But if acedia was the pathology of the one whose inability to regu-
late the self constituted the lack of civilization so lethally symbolized by 
monstrous eruption, then the EXHAUSTION of THE SENSITIVE, who failed to 
observe the physiological laws of his NEUROPATHIC HOUSEHOLD, resulted 
from too much civilization, from the pressure associated with the modern 
lifestyle of the ambitious businessman, whose shattered nerves affected his 
ability to transform desire into volition. In this sense the abnormality of the 
neurasthenic erupted on the INSIDE of the social as an IMMANENT ANTINOMY 
designating the failure of agency. As a ‘thing’ in the body, the nerves 
marked an indeterminate border between the pathological state of the will 
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and an agitated social body, which ceaselessly threatened to crush the indi-
vidual autonomy. Weaved into the fabric of a socioeconomic reality, the 
task of the democratic man, whose fibres were perpetually strained, was the 
RESOURCE ADMINISTRATION that worked to transform the culturally imagi-
naries of protean energies into productivity. The excessive build-up and 
discharge of energies in the body borrowed from energy physics, which was 
attributed to be the cause of a diffuse host of mental and physiological 
symptoms stretching from depression to palpitations and impotence, was 
widely represented in the tropes of investment and possible bankruptcy. 
Thus the language of the nerves was also the language of the aspiring and 
entrepreneurial businessman, designating a democratized trope of perfor-
mativity, by which potentially everyone through hard work could attain the 
affluence and glory that had used once to belong to the fashionable upper 
classes of society, and earlier yet to the geniuses, who had it in their nature 
to achieve great things. Bound indissolubly to the tropes of labour and to 
the assumption of WORK AS SECOND NATURE, the depletion of nerve force 
through excessive demands was the affliction of the burgeoning economies 
bursting with social mobility, dynamic entrepreneurs and ambitious 
achievers, who acted as an intermediate link for the protean, natural re-
source as it was turned into culture and volition in the environment of high-
tension and non-stop tempo of life that the American civilization prided it-
self of. The language of the nerves, unlike that of the black bile and that of 
the demon in the body in each their fashion, was not the language of the ex-
ceptional, but that of the general public whose aspiring hopes for a good life 
might be crushed under the weight of societal demands. 
It is these three ‘cosmologies’, structuring problematic patterns of het-
erogeneous elements in each their distinct fashion around a ‘thing’ in the 
body, which may be said to constitute a tradition of pathologies of perfor-
mativity. With this recapitulation of how they are organized in mind, the 
following sections will attempt to point out some of the privileged themes in 
the contemporary association between pathology and performativity, which 
they may be said to tie into and inform. 
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2. Stress and the Popularization of the Extraordinary 
A discussion of how the three problematic formations of classical melan-
choly, acedia and neurasthenia can open up to new modes of philosophi-
cally questioning the present may begin by assuming again a perspective on 
stress, which was used in chapter 1 as a formal indication of the kind of dis-
position that this thesis set out to explore. As the formal indication illus-
trated, like no other phenomenon today, stress and the tropes surrounding 
it assume the existence of a natural relation between pathology and perfor-
mativity to the extent that such an association has become a matter of 
course, the truism of a mode of existence that is accessible to anyone, even 
if it is different from individual to individual. Or as the author of Stress 
Management for Dummies puts it: ‘Everybody has it, and everybody talks 
about it, but no one really knows what stress is. Why? Because stress signi-
fies different things for each of us, and also really is different for each of us.’ 
(Elkin 1999: xxvi) As already indicated in chapter 1, the opacity of stress as 
a ‘thing’ in the body is assumed to be impenetrable because it – paradoxi-
cally – constitutes a collective phenomenon that differs from individual to 
individual. Yet, the historical problematizations explored in this thesis may 
be said to contribute to the opening of a field in which stress and the tropes 
surrounding it – primarily the modern-day phenomenon of depression and 
its relation to the way work is organized – may be understood in a new 
light. The following sections will be occupied with the indication of this 
field. 
First, and most fundamentally, the perspective developed in the first 
chapter of this thesis illustrated how stress as a ‘thing’ in the body today is 
much more than just the byproduct of a particular modern lifestyle. Stress 
is a mode of existence that involves and associates the whole life with – 
even subsumes it under – productivity in its assertion of an individual abil-
ity to distinguish between the pathos of over-work and the beautiful tone of 
balance, the ēthos of eustress associated with individual agency. Yet in the 
light of what this thesis has found, the assumption of a paradoxical ‘nature’ 
to which the working subject pertains and which designates the individual 
ability to identify, isolate, manipulate, mobilize and recombine stress as a 
‘thing’ in the body, constitutes a precarious generalization of the extraor-
dinary. As I have also discussed elsewhere (Johnsen 2008), in the light of 
 160 
 
classical melancholy, the assumption of stress as a natural potentiality that 
can be turned into productivity through self-management techniques car-
ries a strong affinity with the disposition of the ēthos perriton, the excep-
tional in character described by the author of Problems XXX, 1. But if the 
disposition found in the Aristotelian assumption of an eucrasia anomalia 
was reserved for outstanding and culturally formative genius, then stress 
constitutes the democratization of the extraordinary and its subjugation 
under the general tropes of labour power. The assertion of stress as a sub-
ject that takes place in the body on the background of the individual’s abil-
ity to control and regulate the hyperboles of affect associated with its patho-
logical manifestations, in the light of the conception of melancholy as a 
‘thing’ in the body, can be seen to open up for a topology differentiating be-
tween over-work and burnout in the self-managing employee of today’s 
work-place. Remembering the fundamental association of melancholy with 
ēros, such a philosophical topology of productivity may be said to under-
stand stress as an eroticism of modern-day capitalism, as it takes the rela-
tion of the individual to the ‘thing’ in the body to be a joie d’amour, an un-
stoppable and ambiguous love-hate relationship ceaselessly rearticulating 
itself as the arbiter of self-management. Like the disposition structured 
around the melaina cholé, the mode of existence associated with stress is 
mapped onto a circular antinomy between the highs and lows of the ‘corpo-
rate athletes’ who in the words of the authors of the best-selling Stress for 
Success ‘need to (1) deepen their capacity to tolerate stress of all kinds and 
(2) increase their ability to respond to stress in ways that bring full per-
formance potential within reach’ (Loehr & McCormack (1997: 5). To speak 
of the circularity in such a generalized mode of existence as the eroticism of 
modern-day capitalism is more serious than it may sound; it hints at the 
traditional association of melancholy with the obsessive and exhausting ob-
ligation to the impossible object of health, of balance and of happiness. In 
this context stress appears as the erotic process engaged in the ambivalent 
exchange with the unreality of the phantasmagoric ‘great health’ of melan-
choly, the infatuated mode of self-transformation that always gazes beyond 
itself towards the ‘next level of performance’ which is identified as the ‘next 
level of health and happiness as well’  (Loehr & McCormack (1997: 5). The 
precarious trajectory of the erotic object in the bodies that it passes through 
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in this teleology without a telos itself is the decadence identified by 
Nietzsche in Ecce Homo (1908): 
To look from the perspective of the sick towards healthier concepts and values, 
and again conversely to look down from the fullness and self-assurance of rich 
life into the secret labor of the instinct of décadence—this has been my actual 
experience, what I have practiced most, in this if in anything I am a master. 
(Nietzsche 1967: Wise 1) 
To this gaze, health and illness are not mutually exclusive terms. Rather, 
health emerges as discernible from the pattern of suffering structured 
around the ‘thing’ in the body only as a transformative and sublimating ges-
ture, what Nietzsche also refers to as ‘my will to health, to life’ (Nietzsche 
1967: Wise 2). The incessant self-transformation of the culturally formative 
in the context of stress-management becomes the exhortation to the cease-
less self-differentiation of the ‘athlete’ who not only has his gaze fixed al-
ways already on the new frontiers of productivity, health and happiness, but 
also gazes back at the ‘thing’ in the body as the dejecta, the excrement of the 
erotic process. 
The opening of such an informed philosophical perspective on the con-
temporary phenomenon of stress does not reduce it to melancholy. The 
point to make is not that we have all become melancholics. As already indi-
cated in the section about Foucault’s historical problematization analysis, 
the past field of experience that melancholy could be said to constitute does 
not repeat itself. Rather, what a philosophical topology of productivity con-
cerned with the ‘thing’ in the body can do is to open up for an inquiry in-
formed by the historical findings: what, for example, does it mean to speak 
of labour in the general terms of achievement to which the classical concept 
of melancholy pertained? What exactly is popularized in the generalization 
of the extraordinary? The individual ability to differentiate between the di-
mensions of the pathological and of the performative? Heterogenization as 
opposed to normalization as a novel mode of socialization? A virtuosity of 
existence? It is questions like these that the philosophically informed per-
spective on the contemporary pathologies of performativity will have to deal 
with. Implicating that the ‘thing’ in the body is always already a social bond, 
indicating a crisis in the assertion of the individual self within a social con-
text, the philosophical topology of the ‘thing’ in the body will have to seek 
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its answers in the exploration of the way we perceive the association be-
tween tropes of labour, pathology and performativity today in the light of 
history. 
While the following will touch on some of these questions, the answer to 
them lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, the indication made above of 
a contemporary erotic circularity of productivity points to another topic for 
further investigation, which the findings of this thesis inform. In Bipolar II 
(2006), a self-help book for patients suffering from manic depressive disor-
der by Ronald R. Fieve, a professor of clinical psychiatry from Columbia, 
the same emblematic circularity can be found. Dr. Fieve’s book promises to 
‘enhance your highs, boost your creativity, and escape the cycles of recur-
rent depression’ and to help by answering important questions like: ‘How 
do you channel hypomania’s creative fire without getting burned?’ Present-
ing medical breakthroughs that preserve a ‘hypomanic advantage’, Dr. 
Fieve offers advice that echoes the findings of this thesis: ‘Maintain a sense 
of control. This means an ability to face future situations with determina-
tion rather than helplessness’ (Fieve 2006: 248). 
Such self-help advice, which takes the ecstatis of the individual in its lit-
eral sense to mean a displacement (from gr. ek “out” + histanai “to place, 
come to stand”), with which this individual becomes a social being, relates 
depressive disorders to the tropes of productivity and stress and reflects the 
assumption that ours is the age of depression (Horowitz & Wakefield 2005, 
2007). As Emily Martin has illustrated in an interesting study of mania and 
depression in American culture, the connection between market and the 
trope of mania today is more than metaphorical. Manic depression and the 
economic order, Martin argues, today is ‘linked through structures of feel-
ing’ (Martin 2007: 249). As I will suggest in the following, this link between 
the cyclical eroticism of stress and productivity, and depression as a con-
temporary phenomenon, can be informed by what this thesis found in the 
problematic formation of acedia and illustrate how depression today can be 
viewed as a problem of self-articulation. 
3. Depression and the Articulation of the Self 
A perspective on the contemporary phenomenon of depression as a fall 
from the social in the sense found in the problematic formation of medieval 
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acedia may be found by reflecting on the status of the individual in a society 
where the ability to differentiate the self in the circular fashion articulated 
above, has attained a crucial socioeconomic status that relates the despair 
of the vertiginous to the tropes of productivity and labour. In other words, 
another aspect of what this thesis has found opens up to the discussion of 
the status of depression today, how it is related to the eroticism of the 
‘thing’ in body and to the ability to articulate the self as a self in the context 
of a socioeconomic reality.  
A point of departure for this perspective may be found in the work of 
Axel Honneth, the professor of social philosophy and leading heir to the 
critical tradition as director of the famous Institut für Sozialforschung in 
Frankfurt. Honneth programmatically understands the contemporary phe-
nomenon of depression as the manifestation of a social pathology associ-
ated with an institutionalized injunction to realize and maintain a self 
(Honneth 2005, Honneth 2004, see also: Willig & Østergaard 2005, Peter-
sen & Willig 2004). To Honneth the notion of social pathologies as ‘those 
developmental processes of society that can be conceived as processes of 
decline, distortion’ (Honneth 1996: 370) became the central matter for a di-
agnosis of the present in the 1990s (Kristensen 2008). The position he de-
fends is that the processes of individual self-realization in Western societies 
today to a large extent have become a ‘feature of the institutionalized expec-
tations inherent in social reproduction’, where they are ‘transmuted into a 
support of the system’s legitimacy’ (Honneth 2004: 467). The result of this 
reversal, Honneth claims, is ‘the emergence in individuals of a number of 
symptoms of inner emptiness, of feeling oneself to be superfluous, and of 
absence of purpose.’ Based on the work of the French sociologist Alain 
Ehrenberg in La fatigue d’être soi (“The Exhaustion of Being Oneself”, 
Ehrenberg 1999), Honneth concludes that today there ‘remains for indi-
viduals only the alternative of simulating authenticity or of fleeing into a 
full-blown depression, of staging personal originality for strategic reasons 
or of pathologically shutting down’ (Honneth 2004: 204). Resulting from 
structural transformations in the electronic media, the advertising industry 
and business enterprise, the expectations concerning the ability to become 
a ‘self’ have attained a socioeconomic importance, which heavily increases 
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the social pressure on the individual. What began as the individualism of 
self-realization: 
… has since been transmuted – having become an instrument of economic de-
velopment, spreading standardization and making lives into fiction – into an 
emotionally fossilized set of demands under whose consequences individuals 
today seem more likely to suffer than to prosper. (Honneth 2004: 474) 
Although Honneth’s precarious assumption that the depressive disorder is 
something one flees into may be more than problematic from a clinical 
standpoint, the association it makes of depression with the socioeconomic 
order, the way contemporary work is organized and the ability to be and be-
come a self can be seen as emblematic of a popular critical view on how the 
nearly epidemic spreading of depressive disorder in Western societies today 
can be explained. While a whole other story of depression can also be told, 
Honneth’s standpoint opens up to a topic where the despair associated with 
the problematic formation of acedia is very relevant. If the surge of depres-
sions today can be seen as the result of a social pathology associated with 
the ability of the individual to realize an authentic existence, then it is be-
cause it shares with medieval acedia as a ‘thing’ in the body the terrifying 
association with a despair that knows itself to be despair and suffers the 
disdain of the social order, which sees it as a vulgarity and a sin against the 
work ethics of modern day capitalism. This aspect of modern day depres-
sion, which sees in it a ‘sinful’ flight from the social exhortation to become 
and articulate the self in the erotic manner described above, may be diffi-
cult to accept in the light of the attention the phenomenon enjoys. Yet, the 
ambiguous negative value of this ‘thing’ in acedia, which described the pri-
vation of affect and the hyperboles of the despair implicated by it, may be 
said to inform an unresolved aspect of depression as it has become associ-
ated with socioeconomic tropes of value-creation. Like acedia was not op-
posed to desire and attention itself, but instead to the virtue of joy and the 
satisfaction of the spiritual good, an aspect of depression today is associated 
with the vertiginous inability to articulate the ‘thing’ in the body and make 
it accessible to management.  
How a perspective on depression can be developed that takes into ac-
count the findings of acedia, can be understood by drawing on the theory 
developed in the work Black Sun (1989) by the French psychoanalyst Julia 
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Kristeva. Kristeva’s work is interesting, because it approaches depression in 
a manner similar to the one developed in the chapters above, viewing the 
melancholic suffering as a pattern structured around a ‘Thing’. Although 
Kristeva’s inspiration for this perspective is primarily taken from Heideg-
ger’s philosophy of Das Ding (Heidegger 1970), her understanding of the 
‘Thing’ comes close to the assertion in this thesis of the ‘thing’ in the body 
as an opaque relational object, which structures the relation between indi-
vidual and collective. As Simon Critchley has pointed out, Kristeva’s ‘Thing’ 
is ‘the soleil noir, the black sun of melancholia … a light without representa-
tion, the unknown object that throws its shadow across the ego’ (Critchley 
1999: 216). Remembering how acedia asserted the ‘thing’ in the body to be 
a monstrous eruption, which the afflicted was bound to in despair as the 
pattern of suffering it implicated signified the inability to exercise the virtu-
ous, Kristeva’s assertion of a non-representable locus of suffering in the de-
pressive, a ‘black sun’ of immeasurable suffering, can be approached in 
terms of the inability it signifies in depression to articulate a self that is 
open to management within the socioeconomic reality. Depression, accord-
ing to Kristeva, signifies a fundamental lack of meaning, which even makes 
it difficult to write about: 
I am trying to address an abyss of sorrow, a noncommunicable grief that at 
times, and often on a long-term basis, lays claims upon us to the extent of hav-
ing us lose all interest in words, actions and even life itself … Within depression, 
if my existence is on the verge of collapsing, its lack of meaning is not tragic – it 
appears obvious to me, glaring and inescapable (Kristeva 1989: 3). 
To Kristeva, the depressive pattern of suffering – like the ‘thing’ found in 
acedia – is a presence, shining even with the paradoxical light of a cold sun, 
which looks like nothing else and feels like nothing else. It is an affect, 
which cannot be understood linguistically but in reality subtends the activ-
ity of language. What characterizes the depressive subject’s problem in this 
(cold) light, is the inability to speak in a meaningful way (Watkin 2003: 
86). The depressive, from Kristeva’s theoretical standpoint, suffers from a 
pathology of articulation associated with a fundamental loss of meaning. 
Melancholia, she argues, ‘is the institutional symptomatology of inhibition 
and asymbolia’ (Kristeva 1989: 9). Depressive speech is dead speech in the 
sense that it remains a-symbolic and unable to articulate the character of 
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the sadness which from the outside is representable only as ‘the most ar-
chaic expression of an unsymbolizable, unnameable narcissistic wound’ 
(Kristeva 1989: 12). This narcissism reflects the privation of affect found in 
the problematic formation of acedia. 
To Kristeva the analytic framework of psychoanalysis, understood as the 
analysis of the interaction between psyche and soma through the distribu-
tion of drive energies (Watkin 2003), holds a privileged place in the cure of 
the depressive’s linguistic disorder. Entitled “Psychoanalysis – A Counter-
depressant”, the first chapter of Black Sun revolves around the role that the 
space opened by psychoanalysis for voice and interpretation plays in getting 
the depressed to construct a text out of their dead language. As pointed out 
by William Watkin: 
Psychoanalysis’ cure for melancholia consists precisely in an act of reading the 
radical speech and expression of the depressed and converting their avant-garde 
expressive material into a more socially and culturally acceptably symbolic and 
meaningful text. It does this by allowing the depressed to discover differentia-
tion … (Watkin 2003: 92). 
Reflecting the Freudian designation of the ‘talking cure’ as a help to return 
from ‘hysterical misery’ to ‘everyday unhappiness’, Kristeva’s argument is 
that psychoanalysis provides the socially acceptable text, which again will 
make the hyperbolic language of depression accessible to modification and 
offer an alternative to the non-differential language of dead speech. From 
the point of view developed in this thesis on acedia, this aspect of modern 
day depression is comparable to the position of the monastic whose both 
literal and symbolic aphonia that was interpreted as the quenching of the 
soul’s voice made him inaccessible and his spiritual life incommunicable to 
the extent that he would have to seek the ministrations of the Church. 
Yet to liken aspects of the modern-day phenomenon of depression to the 
spiritual despair associated with acedia has profound implications. In such 
a light, the privilege held by psychoanalysis as the provider of a language in 
which the dead speech of the depressed can again become articulate and 
present the afflicted with a space for self-differentiation, is broken, and 
points to a much more fundamental shift in the socialization of the individ-
ual. If the socioeconomic value of being able to articulate a self, suggested 
for example by the managerial tropes associated with the ability to contrib-
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ute as a self at work (Costea, Crump & Amiridis 2008, Fleming & Sturdy 
2008, Fleming & Spicer 2003, Alvesson & Willmott 2002, Johnsen, Muhr & 
Pedersen 2009), in this light is taken for granted, then it opens up for a dis-
cussion of depression as a flight and diversion from the most authentic pos-
sibilities of Being, as the cathartic effect, which used to be the privilege of 
psychoanalysis has been transformed it into a social injunction. Depression, 
on such terms, signifies a fall from the social, not primarily as an effect of 
how society is organized, but as a glaring vertigo of the socioeconomic value 
of the tropes of self-realization. Associating the contemporary focus on de-
pression with acedia will mean to open for a discussion of how the patho-
logical inability to articulate the ‘thing’ in the body as a social bond – to 
‘work with oneself’ in terms of making the self accessible to management – 
represents a crisis in a society, where the ability to articulate meaning, even 
if it is associated with disorder, is primary to the pattern of suffering which 
may appear meaningless. As a fall from the erotic relation to the ‘thing’ in 
the body, which sees the hyperboles of affect as parts of a ceaseless and 
meaningful process of self-differentiation, the somnolent stupor of the de-
pressive, from the perspective of acedia, represents the vertiginous terror of 
a social bond that has become void of meaning in a society where even suf-
fering can represent a meaningful trope to those who work with themselves 
in it. The perspective developed in this thesis thus opens up for a discussion 
of depression as a fundamental crisis of self-differentiation. 
4. Depression and Subjectivity as a Resource 
In the light of the problematic formation of acedia, depression as a pathol-
ogy of self-differentiation today assumes the vertiginous position of the so-
cial formation that values the ability to articulate, mobilize, regulate, ma-
nipulate, and manage the social bond of the ‘thing’ in the body as the ecsta-
sis of a productive virtuosity. It is a fall from the social, or as Kristeva has it: 
‘a waste with which, in my sadness, I merge. It is Job’s ashpit in the Bible’ 
(Kristeva 1989: 15). Yet the sin that it constitutes is not directed against 
God; it is a violation instead of the exhortation to articulate the ‘thing’ as a 
social bond, a sin against the ‘self’ as a productive vehicle that has attained 
an important role in the contemporary socioeconomic order of society. 
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This aspect of depression as a contemporary social phenomenon opens 
up to the final subject, which I will point out as a privileged topic for further 
study on the background of the findings in this thesis. Depression, and its 
association with subjectivity as a resource today, constitutes a field of in-
terest which can be informed by the energetic tropes of the problematic 
formation of neurasthenia and its assertion of a neuropathic household, an 
individual oikos designating the ability of the subject to manage a personal 
stock of socioeconomic capital. The problematic formation structured 
around the nerves as a ‘thing’ in the body, as illustrated in chapter 4, was 
primarily concerned with the tropes of the protean resources in their 
physiological quality as neurasthenia came to signify the deficiency of self-
regulation leading to neurological bankruptcy. Transposed onto the con-
temporary tropes of depression in their association with the organization of 
labour, this figure of exhaustion precariously assumes subjectivity to be a 
limited resource, the exhaustion of which results in the collapse of the self 
as a socioeconomic resource. Such a perspective on depression can be 
found in La Fatigue d’être soi (1999), a work on contemporary depression 
as a social phenomenon that has set a standard for the sociological debate, 
inspiring the standpoint of Honneth and others (e.g. Honneth 2005, Hon-
neth 2004, Willig & Østergaard 2005, Petersen & Willig 2004, Hammer-
shøj 2008, Petersen 2007).  
Ehrenberg’s thesis is that depression today is manifested as the mental 
fatigue of a sovereign individuality. Transformed from being a disorder 
primarily concerned with sadness without cause, depression has become a 
disorder of activity for the individual, whose societal task it is to become, 
articulate and maintain a ‘self’: 
Madness is the verso of the subject of reason, the Freudian neurosis that of the 
subject of conflict, depression that of an individual that wants only to be itself 
and can never catch up with this demand as if it was chasing its own shadow, 
the shadow on which it is also dependent. Depression is the pathology of a con-
science that is only itself and is never completely filled by this identity, never is 
active enough – too wavering, too charged. (Ehrenberg 1999: 265, my transla-
tion) 
Modelled on the 19th century’s tropes of energy, Ehrenberg’s assumption of 
depression as a mental fatigue represents a shift of perspective on the na-
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ture of the personal resource. If the self-regulatory response of the potential 
neurasthenic was represented as a regulation of the forces of nature as they 
were converted in the body, then the shift from the outside to the inside of 
the individual asserted by Ehrenberg transforms the management of 
physiological resources into a management of affective resources. The con-
temporary phenomenon of depression in the light of the tropes of produc-
tivism of 19th century neurasthenia takes the form of a functional disorder 
(Petersen & Willig 2004). To the philosophical topology of productivity that 
can be developed on the background of the findings in this thesis, this natu-
rally opens up to a discussion of the quality of labour resources today. If the 
primary quality of the natural resources, modelled on the discovery of the 
first and second laws of thermodynamics, was their scarcity, then the trans-
position of this model onto subjectivity as a resource at work today repre-
sents itself a problematic anthropogeneric aspect of the managerial exhor-
tation in organizations today to employees to expand and intensify their 
contributions as selves on the workplace (Costea, Crump & Amiridis 2008, 
Fleming & Sturdy 2008, Fleming & Spicer 2003, Alvesson & Willmott 
2002, Johnsen, Muhr & Pedersen 2009). Can the assumption of nervous 
energy as a limited resource, which was defined primarily in terms of quan-
tity, be said to be the same as a psychical or affective resource, which is de-
fined instead in terms of its in principal indefinite character and its quality 
as something demanding ceaseless articulation and rearticulation? Provid-
ing a privileged place to study the association of depression as a pathology 
of performativity with the qualities of the human resource, the trope of sub-
jectivity as a resource at work, in the light of what this thesis has found, 
contributes to an investigation of the performativity of the self-managing 
employee, whose personal capital, rather than consisting in nervous energy, 
consists in affective resources, which have to be articulated and ceaselessly 
rearticulated in a language manoeuvring within the space of the  hyperboles 
of affect attributed to the circular antinomy described above. The modern 
day depression as a social phenomenon in this light is not representable as 
a part of the eroticism of stress-management, but rather as a part of a bi-
nary antinomy, a repulsive incapability to contribute in a society, where the 
hypomania of affect has become normalized as a productive resource. 
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On this background, stress as an eroticism of modern day capitalism and 
its relation to the contemporary social phenomenon of depression as the 
pathology par excellence of the self-managing employee, who must regulate 
a stock of affective resources, can be seen as a field constituting a privileged 
topos for the study of the association between pathology and performativity 
today. Providing a philosophical background on which to study this topos, 
the three problematic formations of melancholy, acedia and neurasthenia 
represent a tradition of phenomena that all tie into and inform such a 
study. Apart from constituting a privileged source of information to such a 
topology the history of the ‘thing’ in the body explored in this thesis may 
also be said to describe the history of how labour came to be associated with 
achievement, how that which used to be the privilege of the extraordinary 
in character was gradually transformed into a trope of work. It illustrates 
how the virtuosity of the genius came to be subsumed under the general no-
tion of labour power as the spectacle of self-transgression has come to rest 
with the self-managing employee as a mode of production. Representing a 
transformation of what it means to be ‘culturally formative’, the spectacle of 
the sublimating self-transgression associated with the great achievement of 
the extraordinary melancholic, in modern work-life can be represented as 
the burden of ceaseless self-differentiation of an individual, whose self-
articulation paradoxically must represent the articulation of a productive 
social bond. Depression in this light is not only the terrible and tormenting 
crisis of an individual, but also the crisis of a socioeconomic reality, which 
subsists as a social community through the ever-differentiated articulation 
of individual selves.  
The history represented in this thesis thus suggests that the virtuosity of 
achievement, which was the hallmark of the genius, today has become an 
important aspect of the way work is organized. As what Paolo Virno has 
called a ‘virtuosity in the workplace’ (Virno 2004: 61), this designation of 
the self-managing employee as a performer, who transforms affective re-
sources, like linguistic competence, knowledge and imagination into labour 
power, can be said to be emblematic to the present age. Virno thinks of this 
performativity as ‘an activity which requires the presence of others, which 
exists only in the presence of an audience’ (Virno 2004: 60) and suggests 
that this mode of production, as a model for contemporary work, has be-
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come prototypical of wage labour. While this assumption may be ques-
tioned, the findings of this thesis suggest that the activity of the working 
virtuoso as an activity that produces value without finding its own fulfil-
ment, without ever becoming fully objectified as an end product, is closely 
related to the trajectory of the ‘thing’ in the body.  If Virno is right in assum-
ing that the virtuosity of work, which can be said to absorb important fea-
tures of the historical formations described in the chapters above, involve 
‘the very anthropogenesis in the existing mode of production’ (Virno 2004: 
63), then this implies that the passions of the ‘thing’ in the body bear an 
important relevance today to the study and critique of modern day capital-
ism. Returning to the motive of Plato’s “wandering uterus”, the unruly or-
gan that traversed the bodies of childless women in the social order of An-
tiquity, we may say that the study of the trajectory of the ‘thing’ in the al-
ways already social body of the human resource may contribute to a better 
understanding of both the plight of individuality today and of its possibili-
ties for resiliency.  
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Dansk resumé 
Temaet for denne afhandling er en undersøgelse af tre historiske ’formatio-
ner’ organiseret omkring en ’ting’ i kroppen i melankoliens brede og farve-
rige historie i et forsøg på at skabe baggrund for en filosofisk undersøgelse 
af sammenhængen mellem patologi, arbejde og performativitet i samtiden. 
I denne forstand er der tale om et stykke filosofisk grundforskning, der for-
søger at etablere og åbne et felt for mødet mellem de klassiske, filosofiske 
discipliner, og temaer i organisationsteori og ledelsesfilosofi. Afhandlingen 
begynder med en formel indikation af hvorledes stress som et samtidsfæ-
nomen kan betragtes som en ’ting’ i kroppen, der hverken kan reduceres til 
ren natur eller ren kultur, men placerer sig hinsides de to som et socialt 
bånd, et refleksivt og selv-regulativt topos for en undersøgelse af hvordan 
patologi, arbejde og performativitet associeres i dag. Afhandlingen fortsæt-
ter i kapitel 1 med en nærmere metodologisk og filosofisk undersøgelse af 
begrebet om ’tingen’ i kroppen, henholdsvis i sammenhæng med den sene 
Michel Foucaults arbejde med den historiske problematiseringsanalyse og i 
sammenhæng med Michel Serres’ begreb om kvasi-objektet som et indika-
tivt mellemværende, der hverken kan reduceres til at være subjekt eller ob-
jekt. Kapitel 1 slutter med en historiografisk refleksion over den litteratur 
som afhandlingen har benyttet sig af i sin udarbejdelse af de tre historiske 
dimensioner, der skal informere samtiden, og med en indikation af hvilken 
historie i melankoliens historie afhandlingens fokus på ’tingen’ i kroppen 
benytter sig af.   
De tre følgende kapitler udgør afhandlingens hovedbidrag og består i tre 
undersøgelser af ’tingen’ i kroppen som strukturerende element for forhol-
det mellem sygdom, præstation og performativitet i henholdsvis den klassi-
ske melankoli, middelalderens acedia-forestillinger og det 19. århundredes 
opfattelse af nerverne i neurastenien. Kapitel 2 beskriver melankolien i An-
tikken og opfattelsen af den som det ekstraordinære menneskes sygdom, 
organiseret omkring den sorte galde som en ’ting’ i kroppen, der beskrev en 
særlig og prekær natur for de kulturskabende og kulturbærende genier. Det 
viser hvorledes melankolien hos disse udmærkede naturer ikke primært op-
fattedes som en patologi, men i stedet som en disposition, der kunne subli-
meres som etos, men som også, hvis den ikke blev reguleret tilstrækkeligt, 
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kunne resultere i maniske eller depressive udfald. Som en cirkulær anti-
nomi viser den klassiske melankoli sig at åbne et rum for diætetisk selv-
regulering organiseret omkring en ’ting’ i kroppen, der kan sublimeres og 
lede den rette natur mod den store, verdensomvæltende præstation. 
Kapitel 3 fortsætter de historiske undersøgelser af ’tingen’ i kroppen ved 
at henlede opmærksomheden på middelalderens acedia-forestillinger, et 
fænomen forbundet med en slags syndig skyldsfrihed eller sorgløshed, der 
også var kendt som middagsdæmonen. Først organiseret som et mønster af 
psykosomatiske lidelser omkring den dæmoniske besættelse af eneboer-
munkene i den egyptiske ørken, beskrives acedia som en emotionel hyper-
bol afstedkommet af en manglende selv-regulering, en affektiv privation 
som gør munken utilgængelig for både sin egen og omgivelsernes ledelse. 
Som en affekt-forvirring i forbindelse med udøvelse af dyden i den sociale 
realitet kan acedia ses om en monstrøs ’ting’ i kroppen, der tegner og be-
skriver den manglende evne til at lede sig selv. 
I kapitel 4 henledes opmærksomheden på neurastenien i 1900-tallet og 
opfattelsen af nerverne som en ’ting’ i kroppen, der forbandt det sensitive 
individ med sine omgivelser i forestillingen om en neuropatisk hushold-
ning, hvormed den enkelte skulle administrere sin nervekraft i krydsfeltet 
mellem modernitet, arbejdskraft og indre drifter. Som et forbindelsesled 
mellem en demokratiseret kultur og en uhæmmet natur, der skulle tæmmes 
igennem den menneskelige vilje, blev nerverne som en ’ting’ i kroppen til 
som et forbindelsesled mellem den enkeltes vilje og autonomi, samfundets 
socioøkonomiske krav og forestillingen om naturen som en kraft, der kun-
ne høstes, manipuleres og omsættes til produktivitet og kultur i individets 
krop. Neurastenien kom på denne måde til at symbolisere en ’neuropatisk 
bankerot’ for det individ som ikke formåede at foretage en klog investering 
af sin nervekraft i sig selv og ønsket om et lykkeligt liv. 
I kapitel 5, der også fungerer som afhandlingens konklusion, opsumme-
res de systematiske undersøgelser af de tre historiske formationer omkring 
’tingen’ i kroppen, ligesom det forsøgsvist indikeres hvorledes de alle tre 
kan siges at ’tale ind i’ samtidens opfattelse af en sammenhæng mellem pa-
tologi, arbejde og performativitet. Dette afsluttende kapitel fokuserer på 
den måde som de tre historiske formationer tematiserer aspekter af depres-
sion som en samtidspatologi, der forbinder performativitet med patologi og 
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arbejde. Ved at vende tilbage til stress som en formel indikation, illustrerer 
kapitlet hvorledes den cirkularitet omkring ’tingen’ i kroppen som blev be-
skrevet i forbindelse med den klassiske konception af melankoli kan siges at 
bidrage til en forståelse af stress som den moderne kapitalismes erotik. 
Herefter vises det hvorledes aspekter af middelalderens acedia-
forestillinger kan bidrage til en forståelse depression som et samtidsfæno-
men der handler om artikulationen af et ’selv’, der er tilgængeligt for både 
ledelse og selvledelse. Afslutningsvis indikeres en sammenhæng mellem 
disse opfattelser af stress og depression og den socioøkonomiske vigtighed 
som subjektiviteten som ressource har antaget i samtiden. Det er disse tre 
områder som kan udgøre baggrunden for en filosofisk topologi over pro-
duktivitet i samtiden. 
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    Endnotes 
 
                                                        
iAll translations of Plato are from (Plato 1997). References are made according to 
the Stephanus standard. 
ii All references to Problems XXX, 1 are made according to Bekker’s (1831) standard 
edition of Corpus Aristotelicum in Greek. The translations found in the text follow 
the standard English edition translated by E.S. Forster (Aristotle 1984). 
iii All references to Gilgamesh are made according to the standard of the Gardner 
translation (Gardner & Henshaw 1985). First tablet in capital roman numerals; 
then column in roman numerals; followed by verse. 
iv The references to Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey follow the number of the song (in 
Roman numerals) and the number of the verses in the song (in Arabic numerals). 
The translations are quoted from Samuel Butler (Homer 2008: 200-203) 
v All references to Apollonius’ Argonautica follow the number of the song (in Ro-
man numerals) and the number of the verses in the song (in Arabic numerals). The 
translations are quoted from (Apollonius Rhodius 1912) and are made according 
the Loeb Standard 
vi All references to Oration on the Dignity of Man from (Pico della Mirandola 
2008) are translated by Pier Cesare Bori. 
vii All references to Dante’s Divine Comedy are taken from (Dante Alighieri 1995), 
translated by Allen Mandelbaum. 
 
